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Post-harvest loss (PHL) is the waste and spoilage of food product that occurs after harvest and 
before human consumption. Food loss occurs on-farm when grain is threshed, winnowed, and 
dried, and during storage, transportation, processing, wholesale, and retail distribution. The 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals consider PHL a major contributor to food 
insecurity in developing countries, a threat to environmental sustainability, and a major current 
and future challenge. The problem is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa, because of the 
region’s high concentration of low-income developing countries. As population increases, there 
will be growing pressures on resources needed to satisfy basic human needs, particularly food, 
clothing, and shelter. To meet global food and biofuel demands by 2050, food supplies must 
increase by 60 percent. At its current production levels, Africa would be able to fulfill only about 
13 percent of its food needs by that time, a situation that would lead to great food insecurity, 
malnutrition in children, and threaten the livelihoods of about 65 percent of workers in the 
agriculture sector. The looming crisis has prompted governments and international donor 
organizations to introduce bioengineered seeds to increase food production and provide 
improved provide better storage technologies. However, merely increasing productivity and 
improving storage may not be enough to reduce loss or meet these demands. Scaling back on 
food loss is vital to ensuring food security. 
Statement of the Problem 
According to the African Postharvest Loss Information System, about eighteen percent of maize 
harvested in Ghana is lost before it is consumed. These losses are attributed to poor 




Africa’s population is projected to increase by almost twenty-two percent, reaching 2.1 billion by 
2050. The conventional wisdom in the 1970s and 1980s was that agricultural modernization, 
through technology adoption, was the solution to reducing global postharvest loss. Even today it 
is assumed that postharvest losses in cereals are higher among smallholder farmers who adopt 
traditional agricultural methods. Therefore, to reduce the losses, the prevailing assumption is that 
farmers need to adopt modern farming practices in mechanization and biotechnology. This belief 
is based on the successes recorded by the Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America. Those 
experiences suggest that global increases in food production and supply were the result of 
technology adoption and transfer. It is believed that by adopting high yield varieties (HYVs) of 
seeds, combined with fertilizers and irrigation, farmers can convert from practicing subsistence 
farming to commercial agriculture, thus leading to surplus food. 
However, when it comes to post harvest loss the success of these technology interventions is 
inconclusive. Some studies conclude that postharvest loss is reduced with technology adoption, 
while others suggest that technology adoption and transfer do not affect postharvest loss. In fact, 
they may even increase it. For example, it has been found that increases in food productivity may 
lead to market surpluses that, given the low adoption of storage technologies, may result in 
greater PHL. 
The uncertain outcomes in Africa regarding the impact of technological solutions on postharvest 
loss have prompted others to consider market-based approaches and interventions to reduce loss. 
Some market-led strategies include assuring demand from anchor buyers, purchasing from 
smallholder farmers through links created with processors and traders, reducing the distance 




production. This research examines the impact of one market-based approach, contract farming, 
on reducing postharvest loss.  
Research Questions 
The central research question in this study is the following. Do farmers in contract farming (CF) 
arrangements have lower levels of postharvest losses than do farmers who do not participate in 
contract farming? To answer this question, the research examines numerous factors that 
contribute to postharvest losses, some of which have not been considered previously. 
The research finds that the prevailing understanding of postharvest loss is limited because the 
issue has been approached at the macro-level. Yet to really understand the true drivers of 
postharvest loss one must investigate what happens at the micro-level. A micro analysis allows 
one to better understand the problems that farmers face in their day-to-day lives. By surveying           
450 farmers in two regions of Ghana, and interviewing key representatives of farming 
organizations, government agencies, and contract framing entities, the research concludes that 
farmers who participated in formal contract farming schemes experienced lower postharvest loss 
than farmers who did not. One caveat is that the research also found that farmers participating in 
informal contracting schemes experienced greater postharvest loss than did farmers in formal 
schemes or no schemes at all.  
Findings 
1. Farmers participating in CF schemes produced three times the output of maize than 
farmers who did not participate. This is because of the training and inputs (fertilizers and 
high yield variety seeds) that the farmers receive. Also, CF farmers are incentivized to 




2. The odds of PHL for a farmer that does not participate in a CF scheme increases by 55 
percent. 
3. The odds of PHL for a farmer that does not participate in a CF scheme increases by 55 
percent.  
4. The odds of PHL for a female farmer reduces by 31 percent. 
5. The odds of PHL for a farmer with a polytechnic/university education reduces by 10 
percent. 
6. For every additional person employed on the farm, the number of bags of maize lost 
increased by a factor of 1.04. 
7. Increasing food production did not predict an increase in postharvest losses. 
8. Cultural norms and practices discouraged women from holding land and making 
decisions about farm operations. 
9. Postharvest losses do not exist in isolation but are manifestations of the inefficiencies in 
infrastructure development, governance, a lack of market access, declining regional 
security, cultural norms, and traditions that promote gender inequality, and poverty. 
Policy Options 
1.    Maintain status quo 
The government and other stakeholders could do nothing about solving the problem because of 
the financial costs and the social costs of changing traditions. However, it is clear that doing 
nothing has negative consequences on the environment, reduces farmers’ incomes, and could 






2.    Encourage Contract Farming.  
Two approaches are available to encourage farmers’ participation in contract farming. Firstly, the 
government could motivate farmers to participate by offering subsidies and incentives to 
members of a contract farming scheme. For example, the government could provide insurance 
and risk advisory services to farmers who choose to participate in CF schemes. Secondly, the CF 
schemes can drive farmers’ participation through creating economic opportunity; specifically, by 
offering rewards and incentives to farmers who participate, deliver the expected volumes, and 
comply with the recommended quality standards. 
Also, as contract farming participation increases, there is a need to create or modify the existing 
bodies of law to accommodate these changes. In developing these laws, it is recommended that 
the government set up an organization that will include farmers, agents of contract farming 
schemes and tribal chiefs. This will ensure that the voices of all the stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector are considered and heard in the formulation of the laws. 
3.    Improve Educational Attainment and Access to Education 
The results suggest that farmers with higher levels of education experience fewer losses and 
produce more per acre when compared with other farmers. The government could offer 
incentives to families that enroll their school-age children and attain a minimum number of days 
of school attendance. The government should also need to provide incentives for teachers that 
decide to work in these remote farming communities. 
4.    Gender Gaps in Agriculture 
The results suggest that women make better farmers than men; women have fewer losses than 
men and produce more per acre than their male counterparts. However, the full benefit that can 




barriers that exist in the agricultural sector. One of the recommendations for closing these 
barriers is to expand the Block Farms Program (BFP) to focus on and prioritize women. In 
developing the program to prioritize women farmers, the government could bypass the cultural 
challenges of land ownership by mandating the Ministry of Agriculture (MoFA) to allocate land 
to women who choose to be a part of the program. This program would enable women to have 
access to land and capital, make the day-to-day decisions of their farm, and also guarantee a 
source of income. 
Also, to close the gender skills gap, the government should create demonstration farms that 
would serve as a venue for teaching women agricultural skills. 
5.    Improve Regional Security 
Tackling the issue of bushfires set by Fulani pastoralists would require concerted efforts of 
regional security agencies. This is because of their nomadic lifestyle. It is recommended that the 
governments in the West African sub-region set up a security initiative to track the activities and 
contain the movement of this tribe. One of the ways to do this is to create a mode of 
identification that is mandatory for all citizens and residents of the sub-region to carry. 
It is also recommended that there be enacted a Cattle Ranching Law that prescribes the 
mechanisms for breeding animals and other procedures to ensure the safety and protection of 
lives and properties and provides a dispute settlement mechanism for agro-pastoral disputes. 
6.    Adopt a Systems Approach to Framing the Postharvest Loss Problem 
Evidence from the qualitative study of postharvest loss of maize in northern Ghana suggests that 
the problem transcends the challenges of transportation infrastructure and storage. Instead, other 
factors that farmers encounter in their daily life and other social factors contribute to the problem 




proposing solutions that reduce loss, efforts must be made to consider the social and institutional 
factors that contribute to losses. 
Policy Recommendations 
Based on the policy options described in the previous sections, reducing losses should focus on 
these three priority areas. The quantitative and qualitative data suggest that these areas have the 
greatest impact on postharvest losses. These recommendations are discussed in order of priority 
that should be followed. 
The results from the quantitative study show that participating in a formal contract farming 
scheme has the most significant effect on postharvest losses. For farmers participating in a 
formal contract scheme, the odds of PHL reduces by 45 percent in comparison with a farmer that 
does not join. Therefore, it is recommended that the government prioritizes the growth of 
contract farming schemes in the country by providing a conducive environment that encourages 
contract farming to thrive. For example, in setting prices for subsidized inputs, the government 
should consult with the contract farming schemes that provide the same services. Thus, it is 
particularly crucial for contract farming that sells inputs as seen in the Heritage Seeds example, 
where the government’s subsidized prices are negatively affecting the ability of the profitability 
of the scheme.  
Next, the government should focus on increasing educational attainment. The quantitative data 
suggest that farmers with the highest educational attainment have the least losses. According to 
the key informants, these groups of highly educated farmers were more likely to adopt good 
agricultural practices to reduce losses because of their education. Closely related to this is the 
need for the government to employ more extension workers. According to the farmers in the two 




The farmers stated that only farmers participating in the formal CF schemes had access to 
extension services. According to the representatives of these schemes, the provision of the 
extension services increases the financial costs of operation. These financial costs are passed on 
to the farmers. By employing more extension workers and partnering with the contract 
organizations to provide the service, these costs will be eliminated on the part of the CF scheme 
and the farmer. 
Finally, the government should prioritize the distribution of land to women. The quantitative data 
suggest that despite that, the average farm size of a male farmer is twice the size of a female, the 
difference between the average production per acre is marginal.  The data also suggests that 
women are less likely to have losses. According to the key informants, female farmers are more 
likely to follow instructions on good agricultural production and postharvest handling. However, 
the potential gains that could be benefitted from encouraging the participation of women are not 
fully maximized because of the cultural traditions that prevent women from landholding. It is 
recommended that the government expands its block farms programs to focus on women to 
allow women to hold land by bypassing the traditional norms. Also, the government should focus 
on creating demonstration farms that focus on women to provide training for female farmers.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of the research suggest that farmers participating in contract farming 
experience fewer losses than their counterparts that do not participate — thus implying that 
contract farming as a market strategy offers an opportunity to increase food production and 
reduce postharvest losses. However, the farmers and the country are not maximizing the benefits 
that contract farming presents because of the prevailing socio-economic and cultural norms, 




also contribute to postharvest losses. Therefore, to solve the problem of postharvest loss and 
maximize the benefits of contract farming, researchers must have a clearer understanding of the 
nature of the problem. Solving the loss problem requires the implementation of a combination of 










This thesis looks at maize, a key staple in Africa, and examines the factors and drivers of the post-
harvest loss of maize, and the impact of contract farming, as a market strategy, on reducing 
postharvest loss. I hypothesize that our understanding of postharvest losses has focused on macro-
level issues and have ignored micro-level issues that farmers face in their day-to-day lives. I also 
hypothesize that by participating in market strategies such as contract farming, farmers experience 
fewer losses. 
Maize was introduced to Africa by the Portuguese around AD 1500 (Harashima, 2007). Today, it 
is the most widely grown cereal on the continent, covering nearly twenty-four percent of Africa’s 
farmed land each year (Macauley, 2015). The crop provides a source of food and livelihood for 
more than 300 million people living in Sub-Saharan Africa. It accounts for almost half of the 
calories consumed in the Eastern and Southern parts of Africa, and one fifth of the calories 
consumed in Western Africa (Rajpal et. al., 2016).  
 Statement of the Problem 
According to the African Postharvest Loss Information System (APHLIS), about eighteen percent 
of maize harvested in Ghana is lost before it is consumed (Africa Postharvest Loss Information 
System, 2017). These losses have been attributed to poor infrastructure, labor shortages, harvesting 
methods, and marketing policies (World Bank, 2011). 







Figure 1: Maize post-harvest chains of activities showing several stages at which losses of grain can 
occur by means of different causal agents (Source: Tefera, 2012) 
 
 
 Postharvest Loss of Maize in Ghana 
According to APHLIS estimates, about six percent of maize grown in Ghana is wasted at the 
harvesting and drying stages. At the harvest and drying stages, if harvesting occurs too early it will 
contribute to increased moisture content, making the commodity vulnerable to mold growth and 
invading insects. It would also increase the costs of drying (Baloch 2010).  Harvesting too late 
exposes the crop to birds and rodent attacks, and losses caused by natural disasters (Baloch 2010). 
Sun drying also exposes the commodities to pests such as birds, rodents, insects, and other 
domesticated animals. Often, when mechanical dryers are used, the grains are not dried efficiently. 




The traditional practice of harvesting crops by hand, using hand-cutting tools such as sickle, 
knife, scythe, and cutters as adopted by many smallholder farmers in Africa, has contributed to 
the loss of food crops at the harvesting stage (Kumar and Kalita, 2017). Often, the manpower 
required for manual labor is inadequate because of increasing rural-urban migration, the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and political conflicts. This has resulted in farmers delaying harvesting 
and crops being exposed to pests such as birds (Paulsen et. al., 2015). Furthermore, because of 
inadequate drying methods, most African farmers harvest their crops at physiological maturity, 
that is, when the moisture content is about 20-30 percent. The moisture content at physiological 
maturity makes the crops more vulnerable to pest attacks, mold growth, and other fungal 
contamination (Boxall, 2002). Another four percent loss occurs during the drying phase. 
Harvested crops are usually sun-dried in developing countries. Sun-drying is limiting because it 
is labor-intensive and weather-dependent. This creates the possibility of cereals being 
contaminated by stones, animal waste, insects, and dirt thereby reducing their market value. 
Three percent of the harvest is lost during transportation because of the long distances between 
rural farms and the urban markets. Very often, rural farms are located in regions that have poor 
road infrastructure and farmers do not have access to mechanical transportation. Therefore, they 
must rely on other modes of transportation such as bicycles, animal drawn carts, and trailers. 
Food crops are also lost at this stage due to heat exposure, damage from pests, and theft (Ganpat 
and Isaac, 2015). 
Inadequate storage facilities contribute to a four percent loss of maize crops in Ghana (World 
Bank, 2010). This insufficiency is a result of the lack of extension services (Abass et. al., 2014, 
prohibitive costs of acquiring modern storage technologies particularly by small holder farmers 




et. al., 2003). In West Africa, grains are stored mostly in the farmer’s home, on the field, on bare 
floors in the open, within conical structures, on raised platforms, in clay structures, in jute or 
polypropylene bags, or in baskets (Hell et al., 2000). In Eastern and Southern Africa, grains are 
stored in bags and covered with cow dung ash, in wood and wire cribs, pits, metal bins, wooden 
open-air or roofed cribs, and in raised platforms and roofed iron drums enclosed with mud 
(Wambugu et. al., 2009).  These traditional storage methods expose the crops to insects and pests 
such as maize weevils - Sitophilus zeamais Motschulsky (Coleoptera: Curculionidae), the larger 
grain borer - Prostephanus truncatus Horn (Coleoptera: Bostrichidae), angoumois grain moth - 
Sitotroga cereallela, Oliv. (Lepidoptera: Gelechiidae), and the lesser grain weevil - Sitophilus 
oryzae Linne (Coleoptera: Curculionidae (Tefera et. al, 2011). These insects can also be the result 
of holding grain in shared in communal storage systems. 
Two percent of harvested maize is lost during threshing and shelling processes. In developing 
countries, threshing is done through the traditional methods of manually trampling or beating the 
harvested crop to detach the grains from the panicles. Grain spillage, incomplete separation of the 
grain from the chaff, and grain breakage due to excessive striking are some of the major reasons 
for losses that occur during the threshing process (Kumar and Kalita, 2017). Loss could also occur 
when the grain is exposed to atmospheric and biotic factors during the process (Sawicka, 2019).  
Losses could accrue across the value chain wherever non-standard measures are used. These non-
standard measures could be bags or containers not intended for or approved for agricultural 
storage. Reporting quantity losses using these nonstandard measures affects the quality of 
quantitative postharvest loss data on postharvest loss. For example, a bag of maize is equivalent to 
40 kg, a non-standard measure would not yield the same measure. Due to the discrepancies 




Affognon et al. (2015) attribute the challenges encountered with reducing postharvest loss to the 
lack of a clear understanding of the exact quantification of losses. Also, as they are not designed 
for agricultural storage, non-standard bags could lead to loss of grain quality by permitting 
exposure to moisture, insects, and contaminants. 
Another cause of postharvest loss of grain in Africa is Mycotoxin contamination. Mycotoxins are 
“substances produced by fungi that are poisonous or ‘toxic’ to mammals” (Fletcher and Blaney, 
2016). These fungi can contaminate commodities before, during, or after harvest. Mycotoxins 
occur globally and have been recognized for centuries. According to Stein and Bulboacӑ (2017), 
there are over 500 known mycotoxins. Only a few of these are regulated or tested for routinely, 
and new ones are being discovered frequently. Plant metabolism can produce mycotoxins that may 
not be identified with known characterization methods (Anfossi et al., 2016). According to Wu et. 
al., (2014), some of the most popular mycotoxins that affect agricultural commodities include 
aflatoxins, fumonisins, trichothecenes, ochratoxins, sterigmatocystins (STCs), and zearalenones 
(ZEAs). Aflatoxin is considered the most dangerous group of mycotoxins because they increase 
the risk of liver cancer and affect the growth of young children (Kimanya et. al., 2012). 
About 25 percent of all agricultural commodities are affected by mycotoxin (Bryden, 2007). It is 
estimated that approximately 25% of world cereal production is contaminated with mycotoxins 
(Rachoń, 2016). 
Mycotoxins have serious economic effects and have adverse impacts on human and animal health 
(Haschek and Voss, 2013). Human and animal exposure to the fungi through contact, ingestion, 
or inhalation is known to cause diseases such as akakabio-byo, stachybotryotoxicosis, cancer, 
(Patterson and Lima, 2010), and sometimes death (Sawicka, 2019). The harmful effects of human 




The cumulation of the losses across the value chain has economic impacts on the farmers and their 
communities. Buyers are often unwilling to pay the full price for insect-damaged and contaminated 
grains, or grains that are affected by mycotoxins or mold. Jones et. al. (2014) find that the market 
value for insect-damaged grains varies directly with the amount of damage. This can result in 
reduced or complete loss of income for the farmers and their families.  
 Context and Justification 
The world’s population is expected to increase to 9.8 billion by 2050. Africa’s population is 
projected to increase by almost twenty-two percent or 2.1 billion during the same period 
(UNDESA, 2017). As population increases, there will be growing pressures on resources needed 
to satisfy basic human needs, particularly food, clothing, and shelter. To meet global food and 
biofuel demands by 2050, food supplies must increase by 60 percent (Alexandratos and 
Bruinsma. 2012). At its current production levels, Africa would be able to fulfill only about 
thirteen percent of its food needs by 2050, a situation that would lead to food insecurity, 
malnutrition in children, and threaten the livelihoods of about 65 percent of workers in the 
agriculture sector (Munang and Andrews, 2014).  
In comparison with the rest of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa food insecurity and 
undernourishment are the highest. Therefore, reducing food waste is of utmost importance. 
According to the FAO, Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region with the highest prevalence of 
undernourishment, with about thirty-three percent of the population undernourished (FAO, 
2015). Although there was some progress in reaching Target 1c of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), i.e., reducing by one-half the prevalence of malnourishment, this progress has 




A total of 18 of Africa’s 53 countries reached the MDG hunger target (FAO, 2015). The factors 
that hampered the other countries from reaching this target included rapid population growth, 
low productivity of agricultural resources, poor institutions, political instability, and the inability 
of farmers to cope with adverse weather conditions. As a follow up to the MDGs, the United 
Nations (UN) announced a goal of halving worldwide food waste and substantially reducing 
global food loss by 2030 as part of its Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) agenda. Heads of 
States in Africa also recognize the need to reduce postharvest losses to ensure food security. At 
the 23rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in Malabo, African leaders “resolved to halve the 
current levels of post-harvest losses by the year 2025” (African Union, 2014). 
Scaling back postharvest loss would have far-reaching implications for national and international 
food security. Finding a solution to postharvest loss and food insecurity is imperative because the 
population of the African continent is expected to account for more than half of the global 
population growth between 2015 and 2050. More than 28 of the poorest and most food insecure 
African nations are projected to double or increase their population by a multiple of five by 2100 
(UNDESA, 2011). 
 As population grows, demand for food will also grow and when this is not met, it could result in 
political instability and unrest. Johnstone and Mazo (2011) concluded that food insecurity was 
one of the factors behind the wave of political protests that swept through Northern Africa in 
2011. According to Kuhn (2012), the Arab Spring was a response to rising caloric demands, food 
prices, and the inability of the government to meet these demands. In addition to this, food 
insecurity would also increase migration, as people seek better opportunities for food. Similarly, 




organizations to “win the hearts of the people” through the provision of basic needs such as food 
and security (Mooney and Hunt, 2009). 
Furthermore, food loss has far-reaching consequences on the environment. When food is 
discarded in a landfill and decomposes anaerobically, it yields methane emissions, a gas more 
than 25 times as potent as carbon dioxide at trapping heat (FAO, 2013). The FAO ranks food 
wastage third after the United States and China in the global rankings of methane emissions.  
Postharvest food losses are a missed opportunity by the affected communities. They lose out on 
the full benefits that agricultural products can offer in the form of nutrition, health and wellbeing, 
and the use of plant products as an alternative to fossil fuels in energy generation. The use of 
“food” as biofuels continues to grow and may represent another demand factor adversely 
affected by food loss through wastage. 
In addition, reducing food waste could contribute to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The agricultural sector accounts for about 65 percent of jobs on the African continent 
(OECD/FAO, 2016). Agriculture is also a predominant sector of the economy, accounting for 25 
percent or more of gross domestic product (OECD/FAO, 2016). A reduction in postharvest loss 
increases household income and enables households to provide better education and healthcare 
for their families. 
 Research Questions. 
The central research question in this study is "do farmers in contract farming arrangements have 
less postharvest losses in comparison with farmers not participating in contract farming?" This 
study also investigates the differences among the contract farming schemes in postharvest loss 




 Location of the Study 
I conducted the study in Ghana primarily because it is one of the few African countries that has a 
government that has resolved in reducing postharvest losses. Therefore, it will be easier to 
examine and access existing government policies and programs on loss reduction. I also selected 
Ghana because of the abundance of different contract farming schemes in the country, including 
Africa’s largest contract scheme, Masara N’Arziki. Finally, Ghana was favorable because of the 
political and economic peace and stability in the country. 
 Limitations of the Study 
The timing of this study coincided with the start of the planting season in Northern Ghana. As a 
result, I could only collect the results from the preceding year’s planting season. Given that these 
data were not previously recorded by the farmers, the information I collected was based on the 
ability of the farmer to recollect all that happened in the previous year.  
 Summary and Organization of the Study 
This thesis seeks to investigate the underlying causes of postharvest losses and examine the 
impact of market-based approaches, particularly contract farming as a loss reduction strategy. 
The results of this study have the potential for influencing the development of government and 
other stakeholder policies aimed at postharvest loss reduction. 
There are five other succeeding chapters. The next chapter is a literature review of postharvest 
loss, and the policies, and strategies that have been adopted in reducing losses. This chapter also 
identifies the gap in the postharvest loss literature and how this study aims at addressing this gap. 
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology and the data collection methods. Chapter 4 




The concluding chapter proffers recommendations for reducing postharvest losses and improving 









 Global and African Food Insecurity Burden 
To meet the increasing global food demand and ensure food security, studies have suggested that 
there is a need to ‘close the yield gap’ between the increasing demand for food and the 
diminishing supply of food (Godfray et. al., 2010; Parry and Hawkesford, 2010; Pradhan et. al, 
2015). This paradigm has also influenced recent international discussions on food security. In 
2008 at the United Nations High Level Conference on World Food Security, Ban Ki Moon, then 
Secretary-General of the UN, and Jacques Diouf, Director-General of the FAO, expressed the 
need to double the current levels of agricultural productivity (FAO, 2008). 
A strategy that has been adopted in the past to ensure that global food demands are met include 
the introduction of bio-engineered seeds. In effect, in the light of shrinking availability of 
farmland in the face of competing uses of land, farmers need to increase the output from the 
same or less land (Godfray et. al., 2010). For example, the Green Revolution introduced rice, 
maize, and wheat disease-resistant and high-yield varieties, allowing farmers to “to grow much 
more per acre” (Conway, 2003). However, the adoption rates of these seeds remain low 
(Mabaya, et. al, 2015; Falck-Zepeda, et. al., 2013).  
Changes in the climate patterns may prove a challenge to Africa’s ability to increase its food 
productivity (OECD/FAO, 2016). Changes in rainfall patterns are altering the timing, 
availability, and quality of water resources (World Bank, 2010). In addition, rainfall affects the 
moisture content of maize after harvest. Many African farmers depend on the sun for drying their 
grains. Late or excessive rainfall would result in improper drying, leading to mold growth and 




CO2 emissions would lead to reduced crop yields in Africa (Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994). A 
meta-analysis of crop yields in response to climate change in the fourth assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change finds that maize yields would decline with every 
additional 2 ℃ of warming (Easterling et. al., 2007). A field study conducted by Lobell et. al 
(2011) find that maize yield decreases by one percent for every 1℃ in temperature if the plants 
are receiving enough water, and by 1.7 percent in drought conditions. It is predicted that at 
temperature increases above 3℃, maize yield in Africa would decrease by around 20 to 40 
percent (World Bank, 2008).  Coupled with climate change is the challenge of declining 
agricultural productivity caused by soil degradation (Tully et. al, 2015). According to the World 
Bank (2008), about 75 percent of African farmland is affected by soil degradation. However, 
simply increasing productivity may not be enough to meet these demands (Aulakh, and Regmi, 
2013). Scaling back on food loss is important in ensuring food security. 
 Postharvest Loss of maize in Africa 
In the 1970s and 1980s, conventional wisdom offered modernization through technology 
adoption as the solution to reduction of global postharvest loss (Lipton, 1982). It was assumed 
that postharvest losses in cereals were higher with smallholder farmers that adopted traditional 
agricultural methods, and that to reduce the losses, farmers needed to adopt modern agricultural 
practices such as mechanization and biotechnology (Lipton, 1982). This belief is based on the 
successes recorded by the Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America that suggested that global 
increases in food production and supply were the result of technology adoption and transfer 
(Evenson and Gollin, 2003). It is believed that by adopting high yield varieties (HYVs) of seeds, 




farming to commercial agriculture thus leading to surplus food production (Bazuin, Azadi and 
Witlox, 2011).  
A literature survey of academic journals on postharvest loss in Africa using the Web of Science 
journals database shows that there are 73 journal articles on the study of postharvest loss in 
Africa.  Table 6 in Annex1 provides a tabular representation of the authors of these publications, 
the years of publication, the crops in the study, and the focus of the study. Most of the studies 
focused on storage technology interventions in reducing postharvest loss.  
However, the success of these technology interventions is inconclusive. Some studies have 
concluded that postharvest loss is reduced with technology adoption. In a comparative study of 
postharvest loss of cereals in developed countries (especially the USA and the UK) and in less 
developed countries (LDCs) in sub-Saharan Africa, it was found that mechanized agriculture in 
developed countries have contributed to lower levels of postharvest loss compared with the 
losses experienced by farmers in developing countries (Hodges, R., Buzby, J., & Bennett, B. 
2010). Figure 2 shows the results of the study. The authors find that mechanized agriculture in 
developed countries has contributed to lower levels of postharvest weight loss compared with the 
losses experienced by farmers in developing countries. According to the authors, farmers that 
adopt agricultural technologies at each stage of the agricultural value chain are more likely to 
suffer lower postharvest losses. For example, during the drying stage, farmers that adopt the 
traditional sun-drying of crops have estimated losses of 3-5 percent of the crops harvested while 
those that adopt mechanized drying record between 1-2 percent losses. Also, farmers that store 
their crops in the open record between 5-10 percent losses, while farmers that adopt technologies 
like sealed storage systems record about 1-2 percent losses. In the milling process, farmers that 




percent of their crops while farmers that mill their cereals with commercial milling technology 
record about 5-30 percent loss. 
 
 




The World Food Program (2014) in a study conducted on the effectiveness of Postharvest Loss 
technology interventions by farmers in Uganda and Burkina Faso found that by adopting 
harvesting, drying, threshing and storage technologies over 90 days, farmers recorded about 1-2 
percent losses of their maize crops. In comparison, farmers that adopted the traditional storage 
methods recorded a 60 percent loss over the same period. Affognon et. al., (2015) study of 
technologies developed to reduce postharvest loss found that losses encountered during the 
storage of cereals, particularly maize, can be reduced by about 81 percent if farmers adopt 




In contrast, other studies have suggested that technology adoption and transfer does not reduce 
postharvest loss. Instead, increasing food productivity has led to a market surplus, and, given the 
low adoption of storage technologies, the surplus product resulted in increased losses (Greeley, 
1982).  
A recent study of postharvest losses of wheat, rice, pearl millet, and maize in India found that 
despite the availability of storage technologies in the country, farmers recorded enormous losses 
of crops because of unfavorable government policies that regulated food prices (Mallory and 
Baylis, 2012). Kitinoja et. al., (2011) also found that the impact of technology adoption on 
reducing postharvest loss in developing countries is inconclusive. This is because prior research 
on postharvest loss mitigating technologies have not accounted for the costs and financial 
benefits the farmers accrue from adopting these technologies. They also found that in many 
instances, the absence of local capacity or spare parts to repair these technologies when they 
break down hinders the gains that could have been derived from technology adoption. 
The World Bank (World Bank, 2011) also acknowledges that despite an increase in technology 
options for reducing postharvest losses, there have not been many success stories in Sub-Saharan 
Africa because technologies “too often proved to be financially unsustainable, ill-aligned with 
farmers’ economic incentives to store and better protect food, or too short to pay off” (Kaminski 
and Christiaensen, 2014). 
Aulakh and Regmi (2013) found that when using technologies such as mechanization and 
precision agriculture, farmers would record a reduction in the losses they experience. However, 
technology adoption, particularly mechanized harvesting and winnowing, could also contribute 
to the losses. They also identified weather conditions, particularly precipitation and the country’s 




 Making a case for Contract Farming 
Considering these uncertainties with technological solutions in Africa, market-led approaches 
and interventions to reducing postharvest loss are becoming mainstream in the postharvest loss 
literature. Some market-led strategies include assuring demand from anchor buyers, purchasing 
from smallholder farmers through links created with processors and traders, reducing the 
distance between smallholder farmers and the markets, and creating alternative markets for 
excess production (Deloitte, 2015). Contract farming is a form of the market-led approach that 
has been proposed as a potential solution for reducing postharvest loss. (Global Knowledge 
Initiative, 2014, Rockefeller Foundation, 2018; International Finance Corporation, 2017).   
2.3.1 Contract Farming 
Contract farming has a long history. Hektemoroi or "sixth partners", is a form of contract 
farming that originated in ancient Greece where tithes, rents, and debts were settled with 
specified percentages of crops (FAO, 2001). In the late nineteenth century, the Japanese colonial 
state employed contract farming in Taiwan to guarantee supplies for sugar production (Little and 
Watts 1994). Since then, contract farming practices have spread in many developed and 
developing countries. For example, in the 1930s, contract farming was introduced to Africa in 
the fruit and vegetable canning sectors (Little and Watts, 1994). During that period, contract 
farming was also introduced in the United States in the poultry industry (Gisolfi, 2006). 
Countries in Latin America promoted contract farming as a way to implement import 
substitution programs (Little and Watts, 1994). Increased global demands for fruits, nuts, and 
vegetables in the 1960s saw an increase in contract farming arrangements. During that period, 
multinationals in North America, Europe, and Australia entered into contracts with farmers in 




the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2009), as of 2009, 
“contract farming activities by TNCs (Transnational Corporations) are spread worldwide, 
covering over 110 developing and transition economies, spanning a wide range of commodities 
and, in some cases, accounting for a high share of output.” 
Contract farming is 
“contractual arrangements between farmers and other firms, either oral or written, specifying 
one or more conditions of production and/or marketing of an agricultural product” (Roy, 1963). 
The FAO defines contract farming as  
“an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the production and 
supply of agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices” 
(FAO, 2001). 
It is also defined as 
“an intermediate mode of coordination, whereby the conditions of exchange are specifically set 
among transaction partners by some form of legally enforceable, binding agreement. The 
specifications can be detailed, covering provisions regarding production technology, price 
discovery, risk-sharing and other product and transaction attributes” (Da Silva, 2005). 
Prowse (2012) defines contract farming as  
“a contractual arrangement in which a farmer and a firm make a verbal or written agreement 
before production begins for the firm to provide material or financial resources to the farmer in 
exchange for farm produce over a specified period of time.” 
These definitions provide insight into the elements of a valid agriculture contract.  First, valid 




contracts are usually written and formal agreements between the parties. While the oral 
arrangements may be informal, they could still be valid and can be legally enforceable if the 
contracts meet other requirements for a valid contract. Second, a valid contract would have a 
clear definition of the parties, the rights, and obligations of the parties. The obligation of the 
party’s clause would include the type and quality of the crop that will be delivered, the 
production and marketing practices, and the means of delivering the crops. Also, contracts will 
contain a duration clause that spells out the lifetime of the contractual arrangement. In practice, 
most agriculture contracts are valid for one year and are subject to annual renewal. Also, a 
contract would include a dispute resolution clause that prescribes the dispute resolution options 
and mechanisms that are available to the parties when the need arises. Finally, a consideration 
clause is an essential feature of an agriculture contract. The consideration clause will state the 
price of the commodity and payment that is expected during the lifetime of the contract. Payment 
could be in the form of money or something that the parties consider valuable. In agriculture 
contracts, consideration would include money or commodities. 
Figure 3 is a framework of an agriculture contract.  There are two parties to a contract, namely 
the farmers and the sponsors. The principals manage and administer the contract for the supply 
of a commodity (the project). The success of the project and production performance is 
influenced by factors such as contract monitoring, political stability, land tenure, and the 
provision of training services for the farmers. Finally, there is a continuous feedback loop 










2.3.2 Contract Farming in Ghana 
Contract farming in Africa has its roots in the policies and strategies of the colonial years. Jaffee 
(1994) traces the earliest forms of contract farming in Kenya to the period during World War II 
when the British began developing infrastructure for supplying vegetables to British troops. Over 




appropriated large expanses of land for growing export crops (Smalley, 2013; Corey, 2014). In 
Ghana, colonial governments set up plantation farms for the cultivation of cocoa, palm oil, and 
rubber. 
Following the independence of many African nations in the 1960s, there was resistance to 
plantation farming among the rural farming communities because of complaints of displacement. 
In addition to this, there was a desire to increase employment, and to modernize and mechanize 
the agricultural sector.  This led to many governments promoting nucleus estate schemes with 
smallholder farmers (Watts and Little, 1994). Kwame Nkrumah’s1 desire to create state farms 
created the organization of smallholder farmers into state-sponsored nucleus estate schemes that 
produced sugar and tobacco (Hill, 1977).  However, these state farms failed for reasons such as 
the low productivity of the staff, and “rapid and erratic increases in food prices in rural and urban 
Ghana” (Hill, 1977). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many newly independent African nations obtained loans for 
infrastructure development. The oil shocks of 1973 which led to high interest rates, recessions in 
industrial countries and weak commodity prices, made it impossible for these developing 
countries to meet their loan obligations. A decade later, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank set up macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies to help these 
countries reduce their balance of payment deficit. African governments were encouraged to 
diversify their exports and develop non-traditional exports2. Contract farming was one of the 
strategic policies for developing the non-traditional exports (Watts, 1994). 
 
1 Kwame Nkrumah was the first president of Ghana. He ruled from 1957-1966. 
2 Non‐traditional exports are defined by the Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) as all products 





Contract farming was also seen as a means of reducing the overarching role that the government 
played in providing inputs, technical services, and commodity marketing. The government 
interventions did not produce the expected results due to unstable macroeconomic environments, 
weak legislative frameworks, inadequate political commitments and institutional capacity, and 
public policies that did not favor agriculture and rural development (Kidane et. al, 2006). 
Contract farming was a way to encourage the private sector to reduce the inefficiencies in the 
agricultural sector.  
The government of Ghana has promoted contract farming as an agricultural policy to improve 
the income of peasant farmers, grant smallholder farmers access to international markets, and to 
increase the production of export commodities (Daddieh, 1994). Evidence of this is seen in the 
Rubber Outgrowers’ Plantation Project (ROPP), a multipartite contract scheme supported by the 
Government of Ghana, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), Agricultural Development 
Bank of Ghana (ADB) the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Germany’s 
Reconstruction Credit Institute (KfW) and the World Bank.  
 Theoretical Framework 
The research employed the new institutional economic theory to organize the understanding of 
contract farming and postharvest loss. This framework is described below. 
2.4.1 New Institutional Economics Theory 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory offers a wealth of knowledge in understanding and 
describing the factors, values, and conflicts that influence contract farming and postharvest loss. 
 






NIE operates within the framework of classical economics but introduces institutions and 
transaction costs as an additional layer of constraints of a market. Classical economics assumes 
that in a perfect market, firms are rational and have a goal of maximizing profit. On the other 
hand, the NIE theory assumes that property rights are not always clearly defined, and 
information asymmetries lead to bounded rationality and increased transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1979). Transaction costs are the costs associated with organizing human 
interactions and carrying out exchange. These costs can be ex-ante, for example the costs 
associated with negotiating contracts the cost of information search, bargaining, and decision 
costs, and costs of negotiating. Costs could also be post-ante, for example the costs associated 
with monitoring, and enforcing contracts (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985; Ormann and King, 
2007).  According to Sykuta and Chaddad (1999), all human interactions involve some 
transaction costs that are influenced by social, legal, political or economic institutions. To reduce 
these transaction costs, NIE theorists argue that there is a need for institutions that constrain 
human interactions. North (1991) defines institutions as humanly devised constraints that 
regulate human interactions. In other words, institutions are rules, both written and unwritten, 
that reduce uncertainties in human interaction (Ménard and Shirley, 2005) and provide a 
stabilizing factor for societies. According to NIE theorists, institutions are important in 
determining economic performance, efficiency, economic growth and development of every 
society (Williamson, 1975; Stiglitz, 1985; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2002).  
Institutions can be formal or informal (North, 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). Formal 
institutions are “… are openly codified, in the sense that they are established and communicated 
through channels that are widely accepted as official … informal institutions are socially-shared 




sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Examples of formal institutions include 
legislative norms. Informal institutions would include institutions such as customary norms 
passed through oral traditions, patterns of clientelism, corruption, and patrimonialism. 
Agricultural practices in many parts of Africa, and particularly in Ghana, can be explained 
through the institutional theory lens. The uncertainties associated with agriculture production 
may increase the transaction costs and encourage farmers to adopt opportunistic behaviors. 
Transaction costs in Africa arise from information asymmetry for several reasons including (a) 
not all the participants in the markets have full access to production information; (b) costs and 
returns of participating in the transaction; (c) market failures in the provision of inputs and 
services for farmers in rural areas; and incomplete and imperfect credit, insurance, labor and land 
markets (Delgado, 1999). For example, farmers often lack access to information about the cost of 
inputs, whom to sell, and the price to sell. Information asymmetry also occurs in contract 
farming where contract agents lack the full information about the assets, liability and credit 
worthiness of a farmer, and where the farmers have inadequate information about the purchase 
price of their harvested products. There are also bargaining costs when the principal must 
bargain with many agents.  
The NIE theory also provides insights into the making, monitoring, and enforcement of farming 
contracts that eventually determine the economic path of a society of farmers. The ease of 
making contracts and the types of contracts would depend on several factors including the level 
of the transaction costs involved, the societal norms and customs, and the social capital expended 
(Hubbard, 1997). These factors would either increase the transaction costs, making it difficult for 
contract making, monitoring, and enforcement, or they could also reduce transaction costs, 




formal contracts would be more reluctant to engage farmers in a society with higher costs of 
contract enforcement, thereby resulting in the proliferation of informal contracts. According to 
North (1990), the inability of states to develop effective, low cost means of enforcing contracts is 
one of the factors of underdevelopment. Williamson’s (1993) contribution to the theory on the 
concepts of bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior would also explain the experiences of 
the contract agents with regards to farmer behaviors such as adverse selection, moral hazard, 
cheating, shirking, and other forms of strategic behavior. In some instances, contracts may be 
self-enforcing, at other times, third parties are needed to enforce the contracts. Third party 
enforcement involves the use of a state apparatus in the settlement and enforcement of contracts. 
The absence or weakness of a government entity further promotes opportunistic behavior on the 
part of either party to the contract.  
African agriculture is often characterized by the low rates of adoption of Green Revolution 
technologies such as high yielding crop-varieties, irrigation, and micronutrient fertilizers 
(Spencer, 1996; Feder and Savastano, 2017). Institutional theory could offer some perspectives 
on this phenomenon. Inappropriate land tenure, patriarchal land inheritance systems, and 
ineffective government regulation of land use have been attributed as the cause of small land 
ownership in the continent (Kasirye et. al, 2013). Small land ownership is broadly described as 
farmers on less than ten hectares of farmland (Samberg et. al., 2016). Smallholder farmers are 
often described by their resources, e.g. ‘small-scale’, ‘resource poor’ and sometimes ‘peasant 
farmers’ (Gininda, Antwi, and Oladele, 2014). In effect, because of resource constraints, 
smallholder farming discourages investment in expensive technologies because the farms are not 




shown that non-mechanization of farm operations leads to higher postharvest loss (Hodges et. al., 
2010).  
The state of agricultural practices in Africa could also be interpreted through the political 
dimension of the New Institutional Economic theory.  In many African countries, government 
interventions occur frequently in the agricultural sector. For example, it is commonplace for 
governments to provide subsidized loans and inputs to farmers. However, some of these 
interventions are allocated based on familial, ethnic, and or political affiliation. Bates (1989) 
argues that “lying behind the economic theory of institutions…is a political story . . .while many 
kinds of institutions may provide enhanced efficiency in markets . . . those will be created that 
favor ‘special interest’.” In effect, these political practices promote rent seeking behavior among 
rural farmers on the one hand and government officials on the other. 
Agency theory is concerned with the relationship between the parties to the contract and aims 
determining the most efficient form of contract, given the information asymmetry and the 
transaction costs. The theory recommends two best possible contract outcomes; behavioral based 
and outcome based. In behavioral-based contracts, the principal rewards the agent for good 
behavior, while with the outcome-based contract, the agent is rewarded based on the intended 
outcome of the agreement. To determine the optimal reward structure, the principal must weigh 
the cost of measuring the agent’s behavior against the cost of measuring the contract outcome 
(Rehber, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1985). 
 Types of Contract Farming 
There are two types of farming contracts namely marketing and production contracts. With 




are three common forms of pricing arrangements in marketing contracts (Hall and Langemeier, 
1999). These include the following: 
a. Forward sales contracts where the principal guarantees to buy a commodity at a set price 
and a later time. 
b. Price setting after delivery where the price that would be paid will be determined by the 
grade and quantity of the commodity. 
c. Pre-harvest pooling arrangements. In this arrangement, the harvested crops of many 
growers are collected together. The payment due to each producer is the average price of 
the total price of the commodity that is sold.  
In production contracts, the contract specifies the quantity and quality of inputs that the principal 
will provide to the agent, the quality and quantity of the commodity that will be produced, and 
the compensation that the agent will receive for his services. In deciding the model of contract 
farming that would be adopted, the principal must define the managerial responsibilities, the 
pricing structures and the set of technical specifications that directly regulate production are 
important decisions that go into the drafting of an agriculture contract. Three options are 
available to the principal in making this decision (Kohls and Uhl, 2002). These include the 
following: 
a. Market specification  
Market specification contracts are pre-production agreements that set out the quality standards 
that are to be adhered to and the rules for marketing the commodity. In this type of contract, the 
principal provides minimal inputs to the farmers. This type of arrangement is commonly seen in 




b. Resource providing  
In this type of contract, the principal provides the agent with inputs such as seeds and fertilizers 
and provides financial resources. This type of contract is used when there is a strict requirement 
to produce the commodity that will be delivered. 
c. Production management  
Farmers in production management contracts agree to adhere to specific and strict production 
standards.  
 Business Models of Contract Farming 
There are five broad types of contract models. The contract farming model to be adopted 
depends on the crop, the objectives and resources of the sponsor, and the experience of the 
farmers (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Models are usually differentiated based on the intensity of 
vertical coordination, the type of product, and the number of key actors involved. These schemes 
are discussed next.  
a. The centralized model. 
In this contract farming business model, the principal agrees to purchase predetermined 
quantities of a commodity from the agent, which are usually local smallholder farmers. The 
delivery date for the commodity is also predetermined. To ensure that the commodity meets the 
expected quality standards, the principal would offer inputs, services, and technologies at 
different stages of the production process. Figure 4 is a pictorial representation of the centralized 
model. The farmers retain ownership of their land while the principal (sponsor) offers 
management and administration of the farm operations, land preparation, inputs (such as seeds 




with the expectation that the farmer’s commodities meet strict quality standards. The success of 
the project is dependent on factors such as climate, the quality of management provided, the 
quality of technologies adopted, the financial incentives offered, and government support.  
This business model is commonly used in tobacco, cotton, sugar cane, coffee, and cocoa 
contracts (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Outgrower schemes, popular in Africa, are a form of the 
centralized model. The outgrower scheme operated by the Ghana Rubber Estates Limited 
(GREL) was considered the most preferable model for cultivating rubber because of the social 
benefits that the farming communities received from the company, and because the company 
contributed “virtually no investment costs required to ensure and maintain the volume and 












b. The nucleus estate model. 
In this model, the sponsor provides the inputs and technologies that are needed for cultivating the 
commodity. The sponsor also owns and manages an estate plantation that is usually attached to a 
processing plant. The commodities produced on the plantation guarantees an all year supply of 





c. The multipartite model. 
The multipartite model is a joint-venture agreement among several parties. This model is 
typically among government agencies, statutory bodies, and private companies jointly 
participating with farmers. In some instances, this model could also involve separate 
organizations that provide credit facilities, technical support, input, management services, 
processing, and marketing. In some instances, a national development bank is a party to the 
contract and provides growers with credit facilities for purchasing inputs (Glover and Kusterer, 
1990). According to Little and Watts (1994), there has been an increase in the number of 
multipartite schemes since the 1980s, a period associated with the implementation of market 
liberalization policies in many developing countries (Cotula et al., 2008). This growth was also 
driven by support from international donor and aid agencies (Oya, 2011). The multipartite 
scheme is common in cultivating rubber and oil palm in West Africa.  
Figure 5 is an example of the Guinness Sorghum Project in Ghana that is set up following the 
multipartite model. In this arrangement, TechnoServe (TNS), a non-profit business organization 
initiated the project and selected the value chain and nucleus farmers in the arrangement. Ghana 
Guinness Breweries Limited (GGBL), as the final buyer, provides the market for harvested 
sorghum that meets quality specifications. Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI), a 
Ghanaian government agency, provides agronomical support, input, credit facility, warehouse 









d. The informal model. 
The parties in the informal model are individual entrepreneurs or small companies and farmers. 
There are two distinguishing features of this model. First, the contracts are informal (very often 
oral agreements) and second, the contracts are made on a seasonal basis. The principal in this 
model primarily provides inputs in the form of seeds and basic fertilizer although in some 
instances, limited technical advice on grading and quality is offered. Financial investment by the 
principal is usually minimal. The informal model is commonly adopted for crops such as fruits 
and fresh vegetables (FAO, 2001). The breakdown of input supply arrangements in Africa has 
encouraged the proliferation of the informal business model. 
e. The intermediary model. 
In the intermediary model, there is an intermediary or middleman that serves as a linkage 
between the farmers and the company (Anh et. al, 2019). The company maintains a formal 




arrangement with the farmers. It is commonly used in Southeast Asia in the production of staple 
foods such as rice. Throughout Southeast Asia, the formal subcontracting of crops to 
intermediaries is a common practice. In Thailand, for example, large food processing companies 
and fresh vegetable entrepreneurs purchase crops from individual "collectors" or from farmer 
committees, who have their informal arrangements with farmers. This model has formal 
subcontracting by companies to intermediaries (collectors, farmer groups, NGOs) and the 
intermediaries have their own (informal) arrangements with farmers.  
 Advantages of contract farming 
Arguments in support of contract farming suggest that there are mutual benefits for all the parties 
in a contract farming arrangement. One argument in support of contract farming is that the 
principal is assured of a supply of the commodities under contract. On the other hand, the agent 
is assured of inputs needed for production, a market for their commodities, technical knowledge, 
and a steady income (Boadu, 2016). Also, the increase in global demand for agricultural 
commodities has corresponded with increases in private international standards for regulating the 
quality of commodities (Kleemann, 2016). Contract farming allows the principal the opportunity 
to control the production process to ensure that the commodity meets international quality 
standards. Obtaining a certification that the commodities adhere to international standards is 
expensive for smallholder farmers. However, farmers in contract farming arrangements have 
these costs covered by the principal (Kleemann, 2016). The assurance of the production and 
supply of commodities that adhere to quality standards also has an impact on the agro-processing 
and manufacturing sector of the local economy.  
Contract farming offers the opportunity to close the information asymmetry gap by sharing 




“in the absence of pricing information and standard quality assessment tools, smallholder 
farmers often accept lower prices because they do not know whether they deserve better.” Also, 
many contract farming arrangements offer an opportunity for the principal to share technical and 
business skills with the agent (Delgado, 1999).  
In addition, contract farming affords smallholder farmers the opportunity to access services such 
as extension, credit, cleaning and storage facilities through contract farming. Contractual 
agreements usually have clauses for the supply of production inputs and or the provision of 
services (such as land preparation, extension, credit, insurance, and processing). In many parts of 
Africa, access to these services are beyond the reach of farmers because of the upfront costs to 
the farmers and other institutional inefficiencies. These services provided through contract 
farming enable the farmers to increase their production and adopt mechanization (Rehber, 1999; 
FAO, 2013) and also reduce production costs (Watts, 1994).  
Furthermore, for multinational corporations (MNCs), contract farming can serve as a tool for 
public relations and political drivers. According to Oya (2011), by integrating smallholder 
farmers into global value chains through contract farming, MNCs are able to convince 
consumers that smallholder farmers were treated fairly in sourcing the raw materials that were 
used in formulating the final product. Creating a good public image becomes important in the 
face of criticisms that MNCs face about ethical trading. In the late 1960s, following the 
independence of many African countries, African governments resorted to contract farming to 
quell resistance to the plantation system and foreign multinationals faced the risk of 
expropriation. Contract farming became the platform to promote private sector investments 
(Cowen, 1981). In some other instances, contract farming serves as a political tool for 




In light of the failure of government interventions in improving the livelihoods of farmers in 
rural Africa, contract farming has been suggested as an alternative for increasing farmers’ 
income and other positive multiplier effects for impoverished rural economies. It is expected that 
with a ready market for their commodities, farmers would increase their production, and this 
would lead to increased employment and income (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). 
 Disadvantages of contract farming 
Contract farming has been criticized as a production system. For example, farmers in contract 
farming arrangements very often lose total control of the decision-making process that is part of 
their agricultural production (Rehber, 1999). This results in the disruption of traditional 
structures and support systems (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002), and increased levels of family 
conflict (Watts, 1994). Also, the supply of the required quantity and quality is dependent on good 
managerial practices, all coming at a cost to the principal (Rehnber, 1999).  
In addition, the expectation that the farmer must meet with a supply quota encourages the 
farmers to increase their investment in expensive production assets, default on repayments, input 
diversion, and they may also engage in dubious activities (Royer, 1995). As a result, the sponsor 
must make investments in monitoring the farmers. In developing countries, the main 
disadvantage associated with contract farming is the high transaction costs. Very often, the costs 
are driven by the challenges with monitoring many smallholder farmers that are dispersed in 
remote locations, and the costs of enforcing the contracts in the event of default (Barry et. al., 
1992). 
[question: is there any economic inequality or exploitation by virtue of the unequal information, 




 Literature Gaps 
The literature on contract farming as a tool for development is situated within the agronomy, 
economics, and development disciplines (Baumann, 2000). The agronomy commodity-based 
literature focuses on the efficiencies of smallholder farmers in producing export commodities 
under contract farming arrangements (Netting, 1993, Beets, 1990 and Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, 1986). This literature argues that selecting the ‘classical’ export crop is dependent 
on the production conditions and labor regimes. The development literature focuses on contract 
farming as a model for modernization and development through trade liberalization, and skills 
and technology transfer (Baumann, 2000).  
Another focus of the development literature is the study of the welfare of farmers under contract 
farming arrangements. These studies focus on conducting evaluations of donor spending in 
agribusiness. The results of the impact of contract farming on farmer welfare is mixed. The Food 
First school of thought led by Lappe and Collins (1977) criticizes contract farming for its 
exploitative nature (Glover and Kusterer, 1990). Watts (1990) also concludes that contract 
farming is a “system for self-exploitation of family labor replete with company manipulation and 
abrogation of contracts.” In a comparative study of farmers’ experiences of contract farming in 
Nigeria and South Africa, Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) also find that contract farming 
poses problems for many farmers in rural communities because it reduced farmers without land 
to laborer status. Glover (1984) argues that while contract farming arrangements are often 
exploitative, there is a significant increase in living standards among farmers participating in 
outgrower schemes. Bellemare (2018) finds that participating in contract farming deprives 




On the other hand, there are also studies that suggest that contract farming has positive effects on 
farmers. Awotide et al. (2015) find that farmers in contract farming had increased output, and per 
capita income than farmers that did not participate. Mabe et. al. (2019) also concludes that 
farmers’ participation in contract farming correlated with increased output, fertilizer usage, and 
they had greater access to extension services. According to Barrett et. al. (2012), by participating 
in contract farming, famers are able to take advantage of demands from “better off or more 
distant markets. 
Similarly, the development literature, the economic literature has studied contract farming 
through the methodological individualism and political economy frameworks (Oya, 2011). These 
studies examine contract farming from a historical and power relations perspective. Agency 
theory and transaction costs are two concepts used in analyzing contract farming (Grosh, 1994; 
Kherallah and Kirsten, 2010).  
A review of the literature on postharvest loss and reduction approaches identified the 
introduction of economic or market-based approaches in reducing postharvest loss. While there 
is an abundance of literature on postharvest loss, there are no studies that have investigated 
contract farming as a policy for postharvest loss reduction.  
Research and interventions focused on reducing postharvest loss have primarily examined the 
macro level and made certain global assumptions that neglect to consider the real-life 
experiences of small-holder farmers. For example, researchers assume that postharvest loss will 
be reduced significantly by simply introducing better farming technology, warehousing, 
transportation, and distribution networks. In reality, it may be that none of those factors, alone or 









3.1  Research Overview 
Increasing food productivity has been a major focus of agriculture policy because it would 
increase food supply and ensure self-sufficiency in Africa (Sumberg, 2012; Snyder et al., 2016). 
Some of the policy recommendations that have been adopted to close the supply gap in food 
production in Africa have focused on increasing production (FAO, 2009; Van Ittersum, 2016). 
Historically, increasing food production in northern Ghana has been accomplished through the 
use of fertilizers, hybrid seeds, and irrigation (Al-Hassan and Poulton, 2009). Since the 2000s, 
the focus has shifted to assisting farmers in accessing global markets (Mangnus and van Westen, 
2018). It is expected that this will result in the provision of extension services, improvement in 
quality control and standards, and better agri-business organization (Mangnus and van Westen, 
2018). 
However, increasing productivity has not translated to increased supply to meet the growing food 
demands in Ghana.  To make up for the supply gap, Ghana has turned to maize imports from 
Argentina and South Africa (USDA, 2018). Table 1 shows Ghana’s maize imports over four 
years starting in 2014. While maize production increased during this period, it can be seen that 
















Food importation has financial implications for the country. In 2018, Ghana’s Minister of 
Finance, Mr. Ken Ofori-Atta, reported that food imports cost the government an annual bill of 
US$2.4 billion (Adombila, 2018). This bill was about four percent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). This drain on the national foreign currency reserves displaces funding 
for critical investments in infrastructure or other macroeconomic inputs necessary for 
development and long-term economic growth. 
3.2  Hypotheses 
Increasing food productivity in Africa has not been positively correlated with reductions in food 
imports. Further, postharvest loss estimates suggest that a significant percentage of food 
produced is eventually unavailable for consumption. As such this research hypothesizes that 
reductions in postharvest loss will contribute to increases in food supply.  Furthermore, 
technological solutions have been inconclusive in reducing loss. Therefore, contract farming is 




contract farming arrangements as the basis of analysis because studies have suggested that such 
arrangements may be effective at reducing market inefficiencies which contribute to postharvest 
losses (Rockefeller Foundation, 2018; International Finance Corporation, 2017).  
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Farmers participating in contract farming experience lower postharvest loss 
rates than do farmers who do not participate in contract farming. 
The literature on postharvest loss suggests that contract farming is beneficial to farmers because 
it offers them access to inputs, technologies, services (such as extension and insurance services), 
and a ready market (demand) for their harvest (Bellemare and Lim, 2018; Anh et al., 2019). A 
corollary to the hypothesis is that access to inputs, technologies, and services, increases 
production, while access to the market for the commodities reduces waste. 
I developed a conceptual framework to test the hypothesis. The framework is outlined in the 
figure 6. To solve the problem of postharvest loss and food insecurity in Ghana, resources would 
be invested. These resources include financial, organizational, human, and community resources. 
The outputs are the activities or interventions that are needed to solve the problem, while the 
outcomes are the expected results. I investigate whether the interventions provided through 













3.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Research and interventions for reducing postharvest loss have primarily 
focused at the macro level and made certain assumptions that neglect the real-life 
experiences of small-holder farmers.  
As stated in the previous chapter, efforts aimed at reducing food insecurity in Africa have 
focused on increasing food production and the provision of storage technologies.  However, the 
effectiveness of these interventions has been inconclusive in Africa because of low technology 
adoption rates, and mixed results on the impact of these technologies on food production and loss 
reduction. I hypothesize that other socio-economic, political, and institutional factors contribute 
to postharvest losses. As such, to improve our understanding and governance of PHL, 
researchers must move from the macro-theoretical level to also consider the micro-practical level 
and examine other unanswered, ignored, and unaccounted-for social and policy issues that drive 
postharvest loss. 
I test this hypothesis by adapting the food systems map developed by Nourish Life (2014). 
Berkes et al. (2003) describe the food system as a complex interaction of the biophysical and 
social factors linked through feedback mechanisms. It is also the “social, economic, and political 
environments that determine how food system activities are performed (food system drivers). 
These activities lead to some social and environmental outcomes, as well as a certain level of 
food security” (Tendall et al., 2015). In Figure 7, I hypothesize that the interaction between the 
social, institutional, economic, and technology systems could lead to unintended consequences, 
including postharvest loss. The inductive logic is the basis of this hypothesis. Following the 
focus group sessions and key informant interviews, I identify the factors described in figure 7 as 

















3.3  Research Methods 
The inductive and deductive reasoning approaches were used in forming the research design. 
These methodological approach and hypotheses are suitable for explaining the variations in 
outcomes among farmers participating in contract farming arrangements. I adopt the mixed 
methods methodology approach for data analysis. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2007) define this 
method as the use of qualitative and quantitative data to gain a broad understanding and depth of 
the studied phenomenon. Akimowicz et al., (2018) find that while the mixed methods approach 
is not commonly used in agriculture research, the approach helps overcome the weaknesses of 
one method with the strengths of others. In particular, they find that the detailed information 
provided by their qualitative data offers better explanations for the causal relationships observed 
in their quantitative analysis. 
The second hypothesis follows the inductive logic. Following the focus group interviews and key 
informant interviews, I code the identified causes of postharvest losses and identify the most 
occurring identified causes. The causes are described in figure 7 and discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
3.4  Case and Site Selection 
Maize was selected for research because it is an important food crop in Africa. It accounts for 
almost half the calories consumed in the Eastern and Southern parts of Africa, and one-fifth of 
the calories consumed in Western Africa (Kornher, 2018). According to Macauley (2015), “the 
central role of maize as a staple food in SSA is comparable to that of rice or wheat in Asia.” 
To understand the correlation between participation in contract farming arrangements and 




Country criteria such as the existence of contract farming arrangements, institutional capacity, 
infrastructure, and political stability were employed to identify the country that would be used to 
conduct the case study.  
Initially, South Africa was selected because of the availability of government-generated data on 
postharvest loss, and because South Africa experiences the highest postharvest losses of maize. 
Also, the country has a well-developed statistical office and an abundance of open-source 
government data. To improve the robustness of the findings, I also selected Ghana for its wide 
range of public and private contract farming arrangements. In the last decade, Ghana has gained 
a reputation for its political stability, good governance, and institutions (Hague at. al., 2015).  
Ghana and South Africa are similar in that the United Nations places both countries in the 
medium rank of the human development index (HDI), and maize is a staple food crop in both 
countries. However, South Africa was ultimately dropped because of the challenges encountered 
in conducting on-site research. 
In May 2019, general elections were held in South Africa. The Economic Freedom Fighters 
(EFF), a major political party, campaigned on the promise to expropriate farmland from the 
white farmers without compensation and redistribute it to the black farmers (BBC, 2019). While 
consulting with South Africans living in Atlanta and an agricultural equipment manufacturing 
company that has its African headquarters in South Africa, it was advised that visiting the 
country and speaking to farmers just before the elections could be a safety hazard. This left 
Ghana as the sole option for the case study. Also, Ghana had fewer entry restrictions and less of 
a language barrier, because English is the national language. 
In Ghana, the Upper West and Northern regions were selected because of their reputations as the 




contract farming. The two regions share similar climate patterns, maize production, education 
attainment, and poverty rates. However, according to government sources, the “Northern Region 
is the largest contributor (of postharvest loss) with 20,411 tonnes… the Upper West Region is 
one of the least contributors with 778 tonnes” (Myjoyonline, 2017).  Also, the regions were 
selected because of the relative ease of logistics. The localhost in Ghana has an existing 
relationship with the farmers in the Tolon district of Northern region, Daffiama Bussie Issa 
district, Wa East, and Wa West districts of the Upper West region. Additional information on the 
description of the regions and farming villages is provided in Annex 2. 
Villages in the Upper West region were selected primarily because of the established presence of 
Masara N’arziki farmers association- the largest contract farming company in West Africa. The 
Northern region village of Tiboggo was selected because of the presence of Heritage Seeds 
Company’s formal contract scheme. To get the perspective of farmers who previously 
participated in contract farming, Kpachiyilli. Dundo, Nyankpala, Tali, Kpalisogu, and Komoayili 
were selected for their informal contract models. 
3.5  Population size and case selection 
This research used a quasi-experimental design wherein farmers with contract farming 
arrangements were placed in the treatment group and the farmers without contract farming 
arrangements in the control group. The total population size of the study was 467. Table 2 shows 








Table 2: Breakdown of population in the study 
Participants Number in study 
Farmers 450 
Representatives of contract farming 
organization 
3 
Academic community 3 
Government officials 4 
Officials of international agriculture 
organization 
4 






The farmers in the treatment group were randomly selected from a list of farmers provided by the 
different contract agents. The farmers in the control group were selected randomly from a list of 
farmers provided by the local farmer cooperative groups. 
I use the sampling model to test for external validity. Cochran (1963) recommends that in 








should be used where no is the sample size, Z2 is the confidence level (95%), e is the sampling 
error, p is the estimated proportion of an attribute that is present in the population and q is 1-p 
(Glenn, 1992) 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (2019), there are 1 million farmers in 
Ghana. Using this formula and establishing a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error, the 





resulting in a sample size of 385. However, to account for missing data, I interviewed 450 
farmers. 
3.6  Data collection methods 
I collected primary data through personal interviews and questionnaires administered from April 
until June 2019. The questionnaire contained structured and unstructured questions. This allowed 
farmers the freedom to express themselves and give additional information which might be 
relevant to the study. The information collected included postharvest handling practices, 
technology adoption, and experiences with contract farming schemes. The questionnaire also 
allowed the farmers to self-report general socio-economic information on farm households, 
postharvest activities, and other geographical related information. A well-established 
standardized guide was used to structure questions. This was the Living Standards Measurement 
Study - Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). It is a survey instrument developed by 
the World Bank to collect agriculture data in “regions [that] suffer from inconsistent investment, 




The collection of self-reported postharvest loss data has been done in previous studies (Kikulwe 
et al., 2018; Hengsdijk and de Boer, 2017; Kaminski and Christiaensen, 2014). One of the 
drawbacks of self-reported estimates is that it often under-reports the real amount of food loss or 
waste (FAO, 2019; Delgado, 2019) because the farmers would only report losses that are 
considered most important (Kaminski and Christiaensen, 2014). However, self-reporting is a 
desirable means of estimating postharvest loss given that the bulk of losses in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are concentrated on the farm (Kaminski and Christiaensen, 2014; Parfitt, et. al., 2010). 
Also, collecting loss data from the farmers is relatively easier than tracing the complex value 













Conduct of the Field Work 
The fieldwork began with a pilot study that was conducted in April. It included 40 farmers 
located in the Tolon District of the Northern region. These participants in the pilot study were 
spread between farmers in different contract farming schemes and farmers that did not 
participate in contract farming. The responses from the farmers that participated in the pilot data 
collection phase helped in reframing and reshaping the final questionnaire that was administered 
in June. For example, one of the changes made following the pilot study was to eliminate 
questions about losses during harvest and transportation. The farmers interviewed during the 
pilot reported that because of the difficulty in estimating and collecting data at these stages, it is 
not normal practice for farmers to collect these data.  The final data collection took place in June. 
This coincided with the planting season in both regions. 
To gain a better understanding of the farmers’ views, experiences, and attitudes I conducted six 
focus group sessions with farmers spread between the treatment and control groups. A group of 
farmers in the control group participated in a contract farming scheme in the 2017 planting 
season. The objective was to have six farmers in each of the focus group sessions based on the 
recommended size of focus group sessions (Johnson & Christensen, 2016; Langford et al., 2002; 
Krueger and Casey, 2009). However, about ten farmers showed for each of the sessions. It was 
observed that each session appointed a member of the group to speak on their behalf. This 
spokesperson was, in one instance, the oldest member of the group, and in another instance, the 
head of the community’s farming group. Although speakers within each group presented 




of the cultural norms in the communities that encourage gender separations, no group had a mix 
of male and female participants, and so the focus group in Dundo had only female participants. 
Finally, face-to-face key informant interviews were conducted with representatives of the 
contracting companies, members of the academic community, civil society groups, and 
international development organizations. The purpose of these interviews was to obtain insights 
(that the questionnaire might not have covered) from experts who have firsthand knowledge 
about the community, the nature of the postharvest loss problem, and its relationship to contract 
farming. Also, these interviews were necessary to compare the responses of the farmers with the 
perspectives of the different stakeholders. 
3.7  Study Locations 
Ghana operates a decentralized government with power devolved from the central government to 
the regions. Power is further devolved from the regional government to the metropolitan, 
municipal, and district assemblies (MMDAs). Before the implementation of the Local 
Government (Departments of District Assemblies) (Commencement Instrument, L.I. 1961) in 
2012, budgetary planning and allocation of funds received by the Regional Agricultural 
Development Units (RADU) and the MMDAs, and District Agricultural Development Units 
(DADU) were centrally controlled from Accra by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) 
(Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 2014). One of the features of the Law was the devolution of powers 
from the central government to the districts, particularly in the agricultural sector. Since 2012, 
the districts were to play more significant roles in agricultural development. For example, a new 
budgeting system that integrates the budgets of all of the departments in the MMDAs into the 
overall budget for the RADU was introduced (Resnick, 2018). Another change was that the 




Law also provides the districts with services such as extension, rural infrastructural, and small-
scale irrigation. Also, the districts are now in charge of conducting research, formulating, and 
implementing district agricultural policies. 
Surveys were administered to farmers and principals of contracts in the Northern and Upper 
West regions of Ghana, as shown in figure 9. In-depth interviews were conducted with farmers 
in both regions, and other agents who worked on the postharvest loss problem, including 
international organizations, civil society groups, the private and public sectors, and the academic 
community in the two regions and Accra, the country’s capital.  
This section gives a detailed description of the regions and the contract farming groups that 
















3.7.1 Upper West Region 
The Upper West Region is located in the north-western part of Ghana. It covers a geographical 
area of 18,478 square kilometers, about 12.7 per cent of the total land area of Ghana. It is 
bordered on the North and West by the Republic of Burkina Faso, on the South by the Savannah 
Region, and on the east by the Upper East and North-East Regions. The Region is divided into 
11 autonomous administrative districts. The highlighted districts in Figure 10 shows the districts 
















The region is located in the Guinea Savannah agro-ecological zone characterized by light 
undergrowth and scattered drought-resistant trees such as the baobab, shea, and neem. The 
region has a tropical climate with an average temperature of 73oF and maximum of 104oF.  There 
are two seasons, dry and wet. The wet season, sometimes called the rainy season, starts in early 
May and ends in September. The average annual rainfall in the region is 800–1,200 mm/annum 
(Choudhary et. al, 2015). The dry season or the harmattan season starts in November and ends in 
March.  
Agriculture is the main economic activity of the region. 72.2 percent of the economically active 
group are engaged in agriculture or related activities (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013).  Food 




beans. Cotton and shea nuts are the two main cash crops. Many households in the district raise 
livestock such as cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and poultry. The region has a unimodal rainfall 
distribution that determines farming decisions and practices. The Upper West Region is the sixth 
largest maize producing region of the country (Angelucci, 2012). Sowing season in the Upper 
West region typically starts in June, when the rains have been established, through August. 
However, climate change increased weather variability, and low climate adaptation capacity is a 
threat to food production in the region (Lawson et. al, 2019, UNDP, 2015). Harvesting 
commences in October and continues until the end of November. Humidity is higher during the 
wet season, with levels ranging from 70 to 90% and dropping to 20% during the dry season 
(Ghana Health Service, 2017). 
According to the Ghana Health Service (2017), the region has the smallest number of kilometers 
of tarred [paved] roads. “Only two of the district capitals are linked to each other and the 
regional capitals by tarred road. The roads linking the region to other regions are untarred, and 
during the rainy season traveling out of the region by road sometimes becomes a nightmarish 
experience.”  
3.7.2 Northern Region 
The Northern region is located in the north-eastern part of Ghana. Until 2018, the region was the 
largest in the country in terms of landmass. In December 2018, the Northeast and Savannah 
regions were carved out of the Northern region. It previously covered a geographical area of 
70,384 square kilometers, about 31 percent of the total land area of Ghana. It is bordered to the 
north by the North-East region, to the South by Oti region, Togo to the east, and to the west by 
the Savannah region. The region is divided into 16 autonomous districts that are shown in Figure 




fieldwork in the villages of Kpachiyilli, Tiboggo, Dundo, Nyankpala, Tali, Kpalisogu, and 
Komoayili shown in Figure 13. 
The Northern region lies within the Guinea savannah agro-ecological zone with a typical 
formation of shrub-grassland vegetation. It has a tropical climate with an average temperature of 
72.68 oF during the wet season and a maximum of 96 oF during the dry season. The rainfall 
pattern is unimodal, with an annual average of 900–1100 mm, with the rains starting in May and 
ending in November. Farming is the predominant occupation in the region, with about 75 percent 
of the population participating in the agricultural sector (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). 
Livestock, such as cattle, goats, and chickens, are predominantly kept by the farmers. Food crops 
predominantly cultivated include maize, yam, guinea corn, millet, rice, groundnuts and beans. 
The region ranks as the fifth-highest maize producer in the country (MoFA, 2017). Farmers in 
the Northern Region rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture (Abdoulaye et al., 2017). Rising 
temperatures, reducing, and erratic rainfall patterns pose a threat to food production in the region 
















3.8  Description of the contract schemes 
This section gives a detailed description of the contract schemes the farmers belonged to. These 
contract schemes include three forms of informal contracts, and three formal contract schemes, 
including Masara N’Arziki Farmers Association, the Millennium Development Authority 
(MiDA), and Heritage seeds. These formal schemes follow the centralized business model. 
3.8.1 Masara N'Arziki Farmers Association 
In 2010, Yara Ghana, a fertilizer company of Norwegian origin, and Wienco Ghana, a local 
agricultural commodity trading company set up a partnership to help small and medium-scale 




adoption of technology (Wienco, 2010). The partnership, named Masara N’Arziki (meaning 
“Maize for Prosperity” in the local Hausa language) Farmers Association, has a goal of 
promoting maize growing as a source of prosperity in the impoverished Northern region (Guyver 
and MacCarthy, 2011). The company has its headquarters in Tamale, the capital of the Northern 
Region, and has a membership of about 10,000 maize farmers in the Brong Ahafo, Northern, 
Upper East, and Upper West Regions. According to Ragasa et. al. (2018), while Masara is 
financially self-sustaining and is currently registered as a non-profit organization, the company is 
considering converting into a for-profit status. 
Masara N’Arziki provides lines of credit in the form of imported hybrid maize seed varieties that 
are estimated to produce yields up to 15 to 60 percent higher than the local hybrid variety (Fosu 
et. al, 2018). The company also provides fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, spraying equipment, 
crop protection, and innovative farm implements to the farmers before the planting season. To 
qualify for the credit line, the farmer would need to be a member of a group of between eight to 
ten farmers and agree to repay all that is borrowed (Alidu et. al., 2016). Before 2015, all the 
members of a given group were jointly liable for the default. However, this rule was changed to 
reduce attrition rates (Ragasa, 2018). 
3.8.2 Heritage Seeds Company 
Heritage Seeds Company was established in 2010 by a retired high school teacher as an out-
grower scheme. It was established to encourage local production of hybrid seeds and to increase 
access to these seeds by local farmers. The company started with 35 farmers at inception and has 
grown to 1700 farmers in 2019.  It specializes in the marketing, sales, and production of certified 




Northern region to produce three drought-tolerant maize seed varieties. The farmers are selected 
from a pool of farmers who can meet strict requirements for planting hybrid seeds. 
The company offers loans to farmers in the form of foundation seeds and fertilizers. Crop 
insurance is provided to the farmers through a local agricultural insurance company. Threshing 
and storage services are also provided to ensure the purity of maize seeds. According to the key 
informant at the company,  
“weed control and plowing are provided by the farmer because we always want the farmer to 
feel like it is a joint enterprise.” (Key informant, Heritage Seeds Company) 
Repayment of the loan is in kind, using their maize produce. The company offers to purchase all 
that is left after the loan repayment, usually at double the market price. According to the key 
informant, the farmers prefer to sell to the company because of the price incentive the company 
offers to the farmers. Also, government regulations preclude unlicensed seed agents from seed 
trade; as a result, many farmers cannot participate in the seed trade business.  
Funding for farmers’ training is provided through collaboration with international organizations 
such as Care International, Action Aid, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 
and the DFID Market Development Programme for Northern Ghana (MADE). Most of the seeds 
produced by the company is sold to the government. 
3.8.3 MiDA 
Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) was created in 2006 to administer the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA), a fund set up by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and 
the Government of Ghana.  MiDA’s goal is to reduce poverty in the country by focusing on 




In the agricultural sector the goal is “to increase the production and productivity of high-value 
cash and food staple crops in the Intervention Zones and, second, to enhance the competitiveness 
of Ghana’s high-value cash and food crops in both local and international markets” (IMPAQ 
International, 2011). 
Farmers participating in the MiDA contract in this study received loans in the form of input and 
tractor services from MiDA in exchange for repayment after harvest with their produce. 
3.8.4 Informal Contracts 
Informal contracts between farmers on the one hand, and buyers or input dealers on the other, are 
common in the Ghanaian agricultural sector (Interis et. al., 2016). The principal could be an 
input dealer, an affluent member of the community, traders, or members of a farmer’s family. 
The principal provides loans to the farmers in the production process with the expectation that 
the farmer repays with his produce. Examples of loans provided include land ploughing, seeds, 
fertilizers, and agrochemicals. The principal sells the collected produce in the open market and to 
food processors (Azumah et. al., 2016) to recoup his costs and get returns on the initial 
investment. 
It is crucial to state that the farmers participating in the informal contract schemes had 
participated in the formal schemes in previous years. However, the formal schemes abandoned 
the farming community due to low productivity and high default rates.  
 Conclusion 
In conclusion, government policies and private sector investment in agriculture drive contract 
farming in Ghana. Growing demands for high-quality grains by multinational companies 




contract farming. Contract farming is attractive in the study locations to both the farmers and the 
principals of the CF schemes. It is appealing to the farmers because of the guarantee of 
participating in the farming season, given the inputs they receive. Also, farmers participating in 
CF have the assurance of a market for their produce. For the principals of the CF schemes, 
contract farming is attractive because of the guarantee of supply of high-quality grains.  
To guarantee a supply of high-quality seeds, CF schemes invest in training farmers on the best 
agricultural practices. I hypothesize that these investments result in loss reduction among 
participating farmers.  
Furthermore, while inadequate storage and transportation infrastructure may contribute to 
postharvest losses, the socio-economic features of the farming communities suggest that there 









Over the course of the fieldwork in the Northern and Upper West regions of Ghana, I conducted 
interviews with 13 key informants and collected quantitative and qualitative data of the 2018 
farming season from 450 farmers. The summary of the observations is presented in Table 2. 66 
percent of the farmers in the population were surveyed in the Northern Region, and 34 percent 
were surveyed in the Upper West Region. 54 percent of the farmers participate in a CF scheme, 
and 46 percent do not participate in a CF scheme. In the survey, three farmers reported that 
farming decisions were jointly with their wives. I recoded these farms as owned by men because 













Table 3: Summary of observations 
Average Production per acre 11 bags (84kg bags) 
Average number of employees 10     
  CF 
Non-
CF 
Total Number of farmers surveyed 450 247 203 
Regional breakdown of respondents 






Northern 299 66% 116 183 
Upper West 151 34% 131 20 
Educational Status 
No Formal Education 312 69% 176 136 
Primary School Education 34 8% 22 12 
Post-Primary School Education 83 18% 42 41 
Polytechnic/University Education 20 4% 9 11 
Gender 
Male 355 89% 208 147 





4.1 Contract Farming and Production 
Previous studies, as discussed in the literature review, suggested that increasing production 
increases postharvest loss but reduces food insecurity. Hence, greater postharvest loss is the 
tradeoff for reducing food insecurity. This section discusses the results of contract farming 
participation among the farmers in the study population. 
The study results found that production increased with increasing farm size, and that farmers 
who participated in contract farming consistently produced more than those who did not 
participate in contract farming. This difference held steady independent of farm size as depicted 
in figure 14. This section will further explore factors that may contribute to this observed 















Figure 15 shows that male farm owners are more likely to participate in CF schemes. This is to 
be expected given that the male farmers own more land and make the decisions about the 
administration of the farms including those owned by women. However, according to a CF 
scheme operator, women were better participants than men because they are more invested in 









Figure 16 shows that farmers in contract farming schemes on average produce three times the 




CF schemes, the CF schemes provide the farmers with hybrid seeds that are expected to produce 

















Figure 17 shows that in comparison with farmers in informal CF schemes, farmers in formal CF 
schemes produce on average double the total production per acre. This could be as a result of the 
type of seeds (hybrid) planted by the farmers in contract farming and the training received by the 











Figure 18 shows that farmers in CF schemes produce more per acre than non-CF farmers across 
all levels of education. The bar-chart also shows that the majority of the farmers in the 




education. On average, the farmers with polytechnic or college level education produced less per 
acre than the other farmers. Also, this graph shows that farmers no formal education that 
participated in formal contract schemes produced more than their colleagues that did not 





Figure 18: Average total production per acre for each contract farming participation broken down by education attainment. 







Figure 19 shows the details for each farmer’s total production and self-reported losses. The 
trendline suggests that postharvest loss increases with increased production. It can be seen that 
many of the farmers reported zero losses given that self-reported losses are under-estimated, and 










4.2 Hypothesis 1: CF farmers lose less than non-CF farmers. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, postharvest loss could also be qualitative in nature, in other 
words, loss could manifest as a change in the physical appearance of the commodity. In the case 
of maize, loss of quality will include unfavorable change in the physical appearance of maize 
grains as a result of mycotoxin, mold, loss in nutritional value of maize, and presence of animal 
waste. For the dependent variable, I consider both the quantity and quality of maize by collecting 
loss data starting from harvest until storage. I aggregate the total losses from mold, animals, at 
the shelling, storage, and drying stages respectively. 
Next, I predict the quantity of postharvest loss of maize that a farmer experience. The dependent 
variable is a count variable- the count of the postharvest loss of maize in bags. I consider a 
generalized linear model (GLM) and use the negative binomial model for the analysis given that 
the data has an inflated variance (Kremelberg, 2014).  
Table 3 presents the results of the negative binomial model. The explanatory variables include  
a) Gender of the farmer. The farmers can either be male or female  
b) Years of ownership. This is the total number of years a farmer has owned the land. This 
variable is a proxy for the farmer’s farming experience,  
c) Total harvest. This is the total maize quantity of maize (in kg) a farmer harvested in the 
2018 planting season. 
d) Education. This variable is the education level a farmer has completed. A farmer with no 
formal education is one that has not attended any formal educational institution. A farmer 
with primary school education has completed six years of formal elementary education. 




education.  A farmer with a polytechnic/university education has completed at least two 
years of post-secondary education.   
e) Number of employees on the farm. This variable is the number of people employed to 
work on the farm full time.  
f) Participation in contract farming. This variable depicts a farmer’s participation in a CF 
scheme. A farmer could participate in an informal scheme, a formal scheme, or not 
participate in any scheme. A farmer can only be in one of the three categories.  
Holding all other variables constant, a female farmer is predicted to decrease the log of the 
expected loss by 1.18 in comparison to the male farmer. In other words, in comparison with a 
male farmer, the odds of PHL for a female farmer reduces by 31 percent. 
In comparison to a non-CF farmer, a CF farmer in a formal CF scheme is predicted to decrease 
the log of the expected loss by 0.60 holding all other variables constant. In other words, in 
comparison with a farmer participating in a CF scheme, the odds of PHL for a farmer that does 
not participate in a CF scheme increases by 55 percent. 
 In comparison to a non-CF farmer, a farmer in an informal contract scheme is expected to 
increase the log of expected loss by 0.53 holding all other variables constant. Said differently, 
inn comparison with a farmer participating in an informal CF scheme, the odds of PHL for a 
farmer not participating in a CF scheme reduces by 30 percent. 
Holding all other variables constant, a farmer with a polytechnic/university education is expected 
to decrease the log of expected loss by 2.26 in comparison to a farmer with a primary school 
education. In other words, in comparison with a farmer with a farmer with a secondary school 





For every additional person employed on the farm, the log of expected loss increases by 0.41 
holding all other variables constant. In other words, holding all other variables constant, for 
every additional person employed on the farm, the number of bags of maize lost is expected to 
increase by a factor of 1.04. This result is contradictory to the existing literature on postharvest 








Table 4: Binomial regression predicting count of bags of maize that is lost postharvest 









Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 3.90 49.23 0.27 3.37 4.42 213.07 1 p < .001  
Number employed 0.04 1.04 0.01 0.02 0.06 21.42 1 p < .001 
Years ownership -0.004 1.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.25 1 0.62 
Total harvest -0.01   0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.33 1 0.57 
GENDER 
[Gender=Female] -1.18 0.31 0.17 -1.51 -0.85 49.25 1 p < .001  
Male: Reference Category 0a               
EDUCATION 
No formal education -0.07 0.93 0.23 -0.53 0.38 0.10 1 0.76 
Polytechnic/University -2.26 0.10 0.36 -2.96 -1.56 39.85 1 p < .001  
Post-Primary 0.28 1.32 0.26 -0.23 0.79 1.14 1 0.29 
Primary School: Reference 
Category 
0a               
NATURE OF CF PARTICIPARTIPATION 
Formal CF -0.60 0.55 0.13 -0.87 -0.34 20.16 1 p < .001  
Informal CF 0.53 1.70 0.24 0.05 1.01 4.76 1 0.03 
No CF: Reference Category 0a               
(Scale) 1b               
(Negative binomial) 1b               
Dependent Variable: Total loss 
Model: (Intercept), Gender, Education, Nature of contract, Number employed, Years ownership, Total harvest 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 





4.3 Hypothesis 2: Assessment of PHL Drivers 
Hypothesis: Research and interventions focused at reducing postharvest loss have primarily 
focused on the macro level and made certain global assumptions that neglect to consider the real-
life experiences of small-holder farmers. 
To test this hypothesis and obtain an understanding of the experiences of the farmers with 
regards to postharvest loss, I transcribed and analyzed the qualitative data collected during the 
focus group sessions and the key informant interviews using a thematic analysis. Braun and 
Clarke (2006) recommend this analytical method because of its flexibility in identifying, 
analyzing, organizing, describing, and reporting themes found within a data set (Nowell et al., 
2017). The six-step strategy for analyzing qualitative data recommended by Braun and Clarke 
(2006) was followed to identify the common themes on the farmer’s experiences of postharvest 







4.3.1 Institutional factors 
 




Figure 20 shows the details of the institutional factors that contribute to postharvest losses. One 
of the institutional factors contributing to postharvest loss is the poor and inadequate transport 
infrastructure. According to the farmers in the Northern region, many farmers farm across 
riverbeds because of the opportunities the rivers provide during the long dry spells the region 
experiences.  Bridges and roads are often washed away following the rains making travel to the 
farms difficult. As such, the farmers claimed that they wait until the waters recede and the roads 
are safe before they can harvest their produce. During this waiting period, they claimed that 
insects and rodents attack the maize crops. Also, during this period, the farm path is overgrown 
with weeds, creating a safe breeding space for dangerous reptiles that prevent farmers from 
accessing their farms during harvesting. Bad road conditions were another cause of loss cited by 
the farmers. According to them, if harvest coincides with the rains, the tractors or tricycles get 
stuck in the mud, such that by the time they are able to get alternative modes of transportation, 








Furthermore, the farmers revealed that they encountered losses because they lacked access to 
information and training on the type of seeds to plant and the right time to harvest their crops. 
According to one of the farmers,  
“Last season, I lost all of my maize farm. Before the planting season, I bought a maize variety 
that I did not know was the early maturing variety. The harvest of this variety coincided with the 
raining season. I could not get to my farm because the bridge was flooded. When the water 
receded, all my maize was moldy.” (Spokesman for the focus group, Kpachiyili) 
According to the farmers, these losses would have been prevented if they had access to extension 
services. Extension services are primarily provided by the government in Ghana. A report on 
national farmer-extension ratio shows that the national average is 1 Agricultural Extension Agent 
(AEA) to 1500 farmers (FAO and ECOWAS, 2018). However, in some parts of the Northern 
region, the ratio is estimated at 1 Agricultural Extension Agent (AEA) to 5000 farmers (Peasant 
Farmers Association of Ghana, 2014). The report also added that extension workers are faced 
with many challenges that prevent them from carrying out their duties effectively because of 





4.3.2 Socio-Cultural factors  
 




Cultural factors that contribute to postharvest losses in the harvesting, drying, and storage stages 
are shown in Figure 21. The key informant interviews revealed that farmers follow a cultural 
practice of intentionally leaving some of their maize in the field unharvested. The farmers cite 
the biblical story of Boaz and Ruth3 and the biblical injunctions that instruct farmers to leave 
some of their food produce in the fields for the poor, widows, and fatherless. The portion is left 
unharvested, and although the practice is not culturally prescribed, it is left to be determined by 
the farmer.  
Maize harvest coincides with the start of the dry season in Northern parts of Ghana. Farmers in 
the north sometimes leave their maize in the field for about two months to reduce the moisture 
content in the maize. However, this practice predisposes their crops to insect, bird, and rodent 
infestation. Bush fires also contribute to post-harvest loss during the harvesting stage. These 
 




• Cultural norms on farming practices 
• Bush fires 
• Perception of loss 
• Perception on livestock farming 




bush fires are often caused by pastoralists, hunters, or by ‘jealous farmers’ in the community.  In 
one of the focus group sessions, a CF farmer reported that  
“Last season, I lost all my farm to a bush-fire. I do not know who started the fire. My debt to the 
CF scheme has been rescheduled for this year’s planting season” (Spokesman, focus group, 
Kojokperi). 
Another commonly used method of drying maize in northern Ghana is on-ground drying. With 
this method, maize is spread out in the open for sun-drying. The qualitative interviews with the 
farmers show that while some of the farmers spread the maize on tarpaulin, the majority of the 
farmers spread their maize on concrete structures because they could not afford to buy tarpaulins. 
Culturally, livestock farmers in Northern Ghana do not perceive livestock farming to be an 
integral part of their agricultural activities. As such, their livestock is left to gather food by 
themselves, which usually ends up being the grains left out in the open to dry. These drying 
practices exposes the maize to dirt and animal droppings. According to one of the key 
informants, commodity traders typically avoid conducting business with farming communities 
that are known for having dirt and animal droppings in their maize, thus resulting in postharvest 
loss.  
To solve this problem, the government provides solar and mechanical dryers at a discounted 
price, but the adoption rates remain low. Some of the reasons that could be attributed to this are 
the bureaucratic hurdles to purchase the products. It was observed that to purchase these driers 
from the government, a farmer has to go through their farmer cooperative, the district and state 
agricultural departments, and the central agricultural department. Also, the relatively high 
purchase costs for smallholder farmers in contrast to the cost of the free traditional methods 




All of the farmers that were surveyed stored their grains in a sack that is kept at home. A local 
plant and chemicals are introduced in the bag to prevent insect infestation. According to key 
informants, sometimes farmers misuse the pesticides, making their grains unmarketable. A major 
challenge for reducing postharvest loss at the storage level is the farmers’ reluctance to store 
their grains in public storage warehouse systems. These warehouses often provide training and 
moisture monitoring services to the farmers. Culturally, a farmer's wealth is perceived by their 
harvest. In other words, the larger the harvest, the wealthier the farmer is. Farmers typically want 
to protect themselves from ‘jealous neighbors’ by underestimating their harvest. Opit et.al. 
(2014) find that the practice of storing grains at home is influenced by the farmers’ lack of trust 
in a public warehouse system where it is believed their grains will be stolen or mishandled. In the 
absence of alternatives to the public storage systems, farmers resort to storing their grains in their 
homes where the grains are susceptible to exposure, to moisture, mold, rodent, and insect 
infestation.  
In 2017, the government launched the ‘one district, one warehouse’ project that focuses on 
reducing post-harvest losses among smallholder farmers. The project is expected to see the 
construction of 216 warehouses across the country. However, the farmers complained that 
accessing the warehouse in their district was difficult because of the long distance to the 
designated district warehouse.   
Some farmers are engaged in programs that educate them on the use and uptake of improved 
seeds and implementing processes for maintaining high quality standards for their produce, with 
an associated significant increase in the rewards. It was observed that these farmers recorded 




practices and adopting improved practices was driven by a desire for profit and meeting the 
requirements for continued participation in the out-grower scheme. 
Cultural practices determine means of farmland acquisition, and these practices have resultant 
effects on food production and postharvest loss. Table 5 shows the distribution of farm 
acquisition and the average years of farm ownership. Farmland is predominantly acquired 
through inheritance. These inherited lands are held for an average of ten years. Four farmers, that 
are staff of a school, planted on school land. According to the farmers, they did not rent these 
lands, but have an informal agreement with the school to plant on the school land for the duration 









Table 6 shows that the primary means through which men acquire land in both regions is through 
inheritance. However, women mostly acquire land as gifts in both regions. In the Upper West 
region, land was not acquired through purchase or communal ownership.  







Figure 22 shows the average farm size by the gender distribution. Farms owned by men are more 












Figure 23 shows the average production per acre of farmland in kg. The men produce more on 
average per acre, this could be attributed to the fact that male-owned farms have more workers 
than the female-owned farms. However, the difference between the male and female production 















Tribal chiefs hold the land in trust for the people in the Northern and Upper-West regions. The 
chiefs allocate land to men as they please, but cultural traditions prohibit the chief from 
allocating land to women. Women may receive land as gifts from their husband. However, 
according to a key-informant, women were less likely to experience losses due to their extensive 




4.3.3 Micro-level issues 
 




The interviews with the farmers and the key informants revealed that the farmers do not perceive 
post-harvest loss solely in economic terms. Figure 24 shows in details the micro-level factors 
that contribute to postharvest losses. According to the farmers, grains are not entirely lost 
because grains that cannot be sold due to their physical appearance are consumed by the family 
or left as animal feed thereby exposing them and their animals to health risks. For the farmers, 
increasing their farm yield was more of a concern to them than loss. This information was also 
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intentionally leave maize that had fallen off trucks because they do not consider the fallen maize 
as income lost.  
Low levels of education attainment were also cited as a cause of postharvest loss. According to a 
key informant, the farmers with formal education were more likely to comprehend and adhere to 
good agricultural practices that reduce loss. For example, they were more likely to harvest at the 
right time and apply the recommended amount of agro-chemicals during storage. These group of 
farmers are also more likely to have access to hermetic storage bags. Figure 25 shows the results 
of reported postharvest loss by the farmer’s level of education attainment. It is seen that on 
average, farmers with no formal education lose more than all the other farmers, while farmers 









4.3.4 Technology factors 
 




The full details of the technology factors that contribute to losses in Ghana are shown in figure 
26. These technology factors include the limited supply of farm machinery and inappropriate use 
of shelling technologies. Figure 27 shows the distribution of agricultural technologies used by 
the farmers. All of the farmers that use sprayers own the knapsack sprayers. 90 percent of the 
farmers rent tractors, ploughs, planters, harvesters, and threshers from ‘tractor contractors’ in the 
community. Tractor contracts are typically community members that own tractors that rent out to 
farmers. They could also be tractor sellers that also provide tractor rental services. Prices for 
tractor services are fixed by the contractors at the start of the season. However, there is a short 
supply of these services. As a result, the farmers experience delays particularly in the land 
preparation season. 91 percent of the farmers store their grains in old cocoa sacks in their homes, 
two percent store in baskets, less than 1 percent store in hermetic storage sacks. Less than one 
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While the adoption of tractors and ploughs has been on the increase since the early 2000s 




drying, and shelling. Figure 28 suggests the major causes of losses are shelling and pests. It 









Figure 29 shows that the majority of the CF farmers lose the most during shelling while the non-
CF farmers lose the most to rodents and other pests during storage. It is important to note that CF 



















While the adoption of tractors in plowing has been on the increase since the early 2000s (Cossar 
and Gollin, 2018), farmers still rely on manual labor for other activities such as harvesting, 
drying, and shelling. As a result of the labor shortages and the non-existence of alternative 
mechanical options, loss occurs during harvesting and shelling when the laborers rush through 
the process. While mechanical shellers are available in some farming communities, these shellers 
are shared among many farmers resulting in poor service delivery. According to a key-informant,  
“mechanical shellers are available in some farming communities, but sometimes the [shelling] 
contractors use defective shellers and rush through the process and end up spilling a lot of the 
grains. We have trained the contractors to collect the spilled grains with a tarpaulin, but they 
would not listen… sometimes, the contractors providing drying services want to move on to the 
next farm, so they increase the temperature of the dryer and damage the grains” (Key informant 
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Also, inappropriate use of agro-chemicals is a contributing factor to PHL. According to a key 
informant, 
“many of the farmers apply herbicides on the field and pesticides to the maize during storage, 
but in quantities that are above the recommended limits for human consumption. When that 
happens, the farmers find it difficult to sell or consume the maize, so they have to throw 
everything away” (Key  informant in the NGO sector). 
Also, the majority of farmers reported that they rely on tricycles and tractors to transport their 
produce from the farms to their homes for storage. These tricycles and tractors are in short 
supply in many of the farming communities. To cope with this challenge, the farmers overload 
the tricycles and tractors to maximize the number of trips they would make. Overloading leads to 
the maize cobs falling off during the transportation process. At other times, the available tractors 
have holes that allow the maize to fall off during transportation. 
 
 
4.3.5 Environmental factors 
 











Figure 30 shows that unpredictable weather patterns are the primary environmental factor that 
contributes to postharvest losses. About 20 percent of the responses in the questionnaire cited 
unpredictable weather patterns as one of the causes of postharvest loss. During a focus group 
session, a farmer reported that in the past, they could predict the timing of the rains based on 
their experiences. This allowed them to prepare and plan to harvest in the driest period of the 
month of November. However, in recent times, the rains have been unpredictable with rains 





4.3.6 Economic factors 
 




Figure 31 shows the economic factors that contribute to postharvest losses. Farmers also 
attributed postharvest loss to a lack of market access. According to the farmers in the Upper-East 
region, the lack of market access is a result of the absence of a major commercial center close to 
the farming community. This problem is compounded by the remote location of their farming 
community and the challenges arising from road transportation. According to the CF farmers in 
the Upper East region, the closest market to the farming community is located about 34 miles 
away in Wa. Many of the farmers cannot afford to transport their produce to Wa and rely on the 
market women coming to their community. The market women on their part offer to purchase 
the produce at a price lower than the production or market price because haggling is a cultural 
expectation. In the absence of good storage options, some of the farmers that decide to store their 
grains in anticipation for selling at a higher price lose their grains to insect infestation or mold 
growth. This puts farmers in a difficult situation where they have to choose between selling for a 
lower price and PHL.  
Non-CF farmers also face challenges with market access. According to these farmers, inadequate 
knowledge of the market price of their grains and the delay in payment by the market “queens” 
encouraged them to store their produce until they were sure they could get a higher price for the 
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maize. The average time they have for storage was about five months. The farmers reported that 
the inability to market their grains after five months was higher because of over application of 
pesticides meant to prevent insect growth in stored grain, and unavoidable insect infestation. 
Another challenge that was discussed was the effect of a decline in the percentage of people 
employed in the agricultural sector. An aging farmer population, rapid urbanization, and rural-
urban migration were contributing factors to this decline and hence to postharvest loss in 
Northern Ghana. According to the Ghana government, the average age of the farming population 
in Ghana is 55 years (MoFA, 2011).  Employment in the agriculture sector can alleviate youth 
unemployment problems in the country. However, youth participation in the sector is hindered 
by the youth perception of agriculture as jobs for the “uneducated, unskilled, and with low 
economic returns (MoFA, 2011).” As such, the youth population in the rural areas migrate to 
urban areas in search of other means of livelihood.  
The farmers reported that the labor shortage was a challenge for them during harvesting and 
drying. According to them, sometimes, they left their crops unharvested because they could not 
get anyone to do the manual harvesting. At the drying stage, losses occur as a result of declining 
agricultural labor, gathering the grains in time before unexpected rainfall is a challenge for 
farmers when they dry their grains in open spaces. A farmer also reported that he lost his produce 
because he could not get anyone willing to be hired to gather his grains during a rainfall.  
Labor shortage is further compounded by the impact of climate on the agricultural sector. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, agriculture in Ghana is dependent on rain. Compared to the 
rest of the country, the northern parts of Ghana have a shorter wet season and a shorter time for 






In conclusion, the results suggest that while contract farming is an effective market-based 
approach in increasing food production and reducing losses, the often-overlooked micro-level 
factors can hinder the communities from maximizing the potential benefits of contract farming. 
For example, often overlooked factors such as lower educational attainment levels, poverty, and 
inequality are factors that contribute to losses. The results also suggest that the nature of contract 









This thesis set out to investigate the unanswered, ignored, and unaccounted-for social and policy 
issues that drive postharvest loss from the perspective of farmers’ practical day-to-day 
experiences. Given the limited success evidence of technological solutions as a postharvest loss 
reduction strategy in Africa, the research also investigated the feasibility of market-based 
approaches, such as contract farming (CF), as an intervention strategy for reducing postharvest 
losses. This section discusses the results of the investigation. 
 Contract farming as a loss-reduction strategy. 
The results suggest that contract farming as a market-based approach increases food 
productivity. This is because farmers participating in contract farming schemes were likely to 
adopt farm inputs known to increase production. Farm inputs include hybrid maize and other 
inputs, such as fertilizers.  
5.1.1 Contract Farming, Hybrid Maize and Production 
Hybrid maize seeds are produced through a process of cross-pollination between two or more 
inbred lines. By itself, one of the inbred lines is low-yielding, but when cross-pollinated with 
another inbred line, it produces hybrid seeds that will result in uniform plants of high yield 
(Tripp and Ragasa, 2015). It is important to note that seeds produced from hybrid varieties 
cannot be saved and planted at the next planting season. Replanted seeds known as second-
generation seeds, will provide a much lower yield or produce maize seeds that are different from 




In consequence, farmers who cultivate hybrid seeds need to buy new seeds every planting 
season. These seeds usually cost three times the other varieties because of the high production 
costs (Tripp and Ragasa, 2015). The high poverty rates among farmers in Ghana causes low 
adoption of hybrid seeds (Ragasa et. al., 2013). Contract farming provides opportunities for 
farmers to obtain these seeds as lines of credit.  
5.1.2 Contract Farming, Agrochemicals, and Production 
One of the significant challenges of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa is soil nutrient depletion 
due to the adoption of unsustainable agricultural practices such as overgrazing and excessively 
mechanized agriculture (Tully et. al., 2015). Changes in climate conditions, for example, 
drought, floods, and, in some instances, diminishing rainfall are also contributing factors to land 
degradation (Doso, 2014). Ghana has one of the highest rates of soil nutrient depletion among 
sub-Saharan African countries, with annual projected losses of 35 kg nitrogen, 4 kg phosphorous, 
and 20 kg of potassium per hectare (Jayne et. al, 2015). Land degradation and nutrient loss are 
exacerbated by human activities such as gold mining, prolonged years of intensive farming on 
the same piece of land, indiscriminate felling of trees for fuel, wood and charcoal production, 
bush burning, overgrazing, and small-scale mining (Ashaley, 2013). Soil degradation has been 
associated with low food production in Africa (Scherr, 1999).  
Since the 1980s, development practitioners and many African governments have focused on 
promoting fertilizer adoption by implementing fertilizer subsidies and other targeted credit 
programs as a means of replenishing soil nutrition and increasing food production. (Jayne et. al, 
2015; Sachs, 2008). In 2006, African leaders adopted the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for the 




8.0 kilograms to 50.0 kilograms of nutrients per hectare by 2015. The declaration encourages 
African States  to “target subsidies in favour of the fertilizer sector” (African Union, 2006).  
However, compared to the rest of the world, the adoption rates for fertilizers have remained low 
in Africa (Sheahan and Barrett, 2014). Some of the reasons for this include the following: weak 
fertilizer distribution networks (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012); relatively high costs of 
fertilizers resulting from tariffs; high import costs;  and inefficiencies at the ports (Benin et. al., 
2011; Croppenstedt et al., 2003); the lack of evidence of the impact of fertilizer use on farmland 
(Marenya and Barrett, 2009); and inadequate training in the appropriate utilization of fertilizers 
(Emmanuel et. al., 2016).  
In 2008, the Ghanaian government introduced the fertilizer subsidy program that focused on 
increasing fertilizer usage by smallholder farmers. Before then, the fertilizer usage rate in Ghana 
was about 8 kg per ha, down from 21.9 kg per ha in 1978 (Oxford Business Group, 2020). The 
program was mainly applied to the cultivation of cash crops. The policy increased the usage rate 
to the 1978 level (Jayne et. al, 2015). To ensure that fertilizers are distributed efficiently, the 
government partners with local companies to sell fertilizers to smallholder farmers at a price 
lower than the market price. Women are given priority in the distribution process (MoFA, 2017). 
In 2013, the policy was changed. The change limited fertilizer distribution to only  2 hectares for 
staple-producing smallholder farmers. While the policy in credited with a usage rate that is 6 to 
10 times higher in comparison with the early 2000s, (Jayne et. al, 2015), fertilizer usage remains 
low.  
This is because many smallholder farmers still cannot afford the cost of chemical fertilizers in 
right quantities and qualities, regardless of the considerably lower price.: could not (Allotey et. 




infrastructure to ensure fertilizer delivery (Fuentes et. al., 2011), and bureaucratic bottlenecks in 
accessing the fertilizers (World Bank, 2017) According to the key informant, the quality of the 
fertilizers was not the problem, but rather that farmers misused the available fertilizers by 
spreading the allotted quantity over a larger farm area than prescribed, resulting in sub-optimal 
yield. This contributed to the perception of the products ineffectiveness and it increased distrust. 
Also, high incidents of fraud have hindered the success of the fertilizer subsidy program. In 
2018, non-governmental organizations indicated a highly sophisticated criminal syndicate 
existed that re-bagged the government-subsidized fertilizers and smuggled it to neighboring 
Burkina Faso or Togo for sale in the black market (Ajetunmobi, 2018). According to the 
Minister of Agriculture, this criminal activity costs the government $12 million in annual losses 
(GhanaWeb, 2019). 
The Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) program is another program established by the government 
of Ghana in 2017 to promote growth in food production and create jobs across the country. 
During the first year of its implementation, farmers received subsidized seeds and fertilizers. The 
payment for the seed and fertilizes was expected at the end of the farming season in the form of 
bags of harvested produce. In the opinion of one key informant, who worked with the program in 
2017, fertilizer distribution was made to farmers that were loyal to the ruling party. According to 
the informant, this emboldened the farmers to default on the loan repayment. Farmers threatened 
government officials deployed to recover the debt with arrests and job losses because of their 
relationship to the ruling political party. Debt recovery was also difficult because some of the 
farmers registered with fictitious names and addresses.  
Farmers participating in CF schemes have considerably more access to fertilizers than do those 




upfront in cash but can receive the inputs as lines of credit. They can thereby channel the funds 
toward other personal financial responsibilities. According to the farmers, this serves as a 
positive incentive to use fertilizers and increase production yield. 
5.1.3 Contract Farming, Farm Mechanization, and Production 
There was no observed difference in mechanization between farmers participating in CF schemes 
and farmers that do not. All of the farmers used tractors and plows for land preparation. 99% of 
the farmers hired tractor services provided by tractor operators, while one percent owned 
tractors. The tractor operators worked with booking agents in the communities that aggregated 
the demand. However, the farmers reported that the tractor operators favored the more affluent 
farmers and those with larger farm over farmers with smaller farms. This was also found by 
Mangnus and Van Westen (2008) and Diao et. al, (2014). According to a tractor operator, the 
decision to provide tractor and plowing services is not based on the farmer’s financial 
endowment but on the aggregate demand that is available in surrounding areas. For example, the 
contractor would accept the request for 2 acres of farmland where he can provide service for 50 
other farmers with the same farms nearby, as opposed to accepting the demand for a single 20-
acre farm with no orders along the way.  
The tractor operator also reported that because the demand for tractor services far outweighed 
supply, it created delays during the land preparation stages. According to the World Bank 
(2019), there are about five tractors per 100 sq. Km of arable land in Ghana, about 39 times less 
than the world average. To increase mechanization, the federal government provides subsidized 
tractors for sale to the farmers. According to a key informant, to access these tractors, the farmer 
would apply through their farmer cooperative, the District Department of Agriculture, the 




explained that these levels of approval were instituted to prevent traders from purchasing the 
tractors at a discount and selling across the border. However, according to the farmers, the 
government-subsidized tractors were not durable enough to work on the topography of Northern 
Ghana, and they would prefer to have a tractor brand produced in Europe. As such, many of 
them who obtained the tractors could not afford to keep up with the payments - given that they 
spend so much on maintenance. According to a key informant in the government, the 
government had limited options with the tractors they supplied because they were obtained as a 
part of “loan and foreign aid” requirements between Ghana’s central government and the origin 
countries of the tractors.  
According to the formal contract scheme principals, providing land preparation services would 
drive up the costs of production and could deter the farmers from participating in the schemes. 
However according to the farmers, the primary reason for participating in informal contracts, 
was to get access to tractor. The nature of the informal contract is such that farmers contract with 
a tractor operator, a wealthy member of the community, or a farmer that owns a tractor to plow 
their land in exchange for bags of maize after harvest time. The refund is determined by the size 
of the land that is plowed through the informal contract. 
5.1.4 Contract Farming, Grain Storage and Postharvest loss 
Farmers in CF schemes were more likely to experience lower levels of postharvest loss of maize. 
According to the principals of the formal contract schemes, participating farmers had an 
incentive to reduce losses because of the expected obligation of repaying the loan. The terms of 
the contract of the formal schemes specified that the farmers repay in the form of their produce. 
The payment structure was determined in advance and is based on the services and inputs that 




participating in subsequent seasons. However, if the default was due to force majeure, for 
example, if fire, pests, or flooding destroyed the farm, the loan is deferred until the subsequent 
planting season. For this reason, farmers make the best efforts to reduce losses. 
However, the need to repay makes farmers susceptible to adopting opportunistic behaviors such 
as diluting the quality of produce by introducing foreign material such as dirt, to meet the 
required payment. Other opportunistic practices include substandard drying and shelling 
processes. This may cause moisture retention and aflatoxin growth, causing the grains to be 
rejected at the point of quality control. Some seed growers also mix other grains with seeds, 
which also causes rejection and loss. Before 2015, the Masara scheme navigated through this 
challenge by introducing a joint liability clause in the contract. This meant that if it was 
discovered that one farmer of the farmer cooperative was adopting opportunistic behaviors or 
defaulted in the loan, the scheme would reject all the grains produced by the group and eliminate 
every farmer in the group (Ragassa et. al., 2017). This policy was changed because it encouraged 
high attrition rates (Ragassa et. al., 2017). 
5.1.5 Contract Farming, Loan Repayment, and Postharvest loss 
Farmers in CF schemes were more likely to experience lower levels of postharvest loss of maize. 
According to the principals of the formal contract schemes, participating farmers had an 
incentive to reduce losses because of the expected obligation of repaying the loan. The terms of 
the contract of the formal schemes specified that the farmers repaid in the form of their produce. 
The payment structure was determined in advance and is based on the services and inputs that 
the contract scheme provided. Farmers that intentionally default on payment are excluded from 




example, if fire, pests infestation, or flooding destroyed the farm, the loan is deferred until the 
subsequent planting season. For this reason, farmers make their best efforts to reduce losses. 
However, the need to repay makes farmers susceptible to opportunistic behaviors, such as 
adulterating the quality of produce by introducing foreign material such as dirt, to meet the 
required payment. Other opportunistic practices include substandard drying and shelling 
processes, which may lead to retained moisture and aflatoxin growth, causing the grains to be 
rejected at the point of quality control. Some seed growers also mix other grains with seeds 
leading to similar rejection and loss. Before 2015, the Masara scheme navigated through this 
challenge by introducing a joint liability clause in the contract. This meant that if it was 
discovered that one farmer of the farmer cooperative was adopting opportunistic behaviors or 
defaulted in the loan, the scheme would reject all the grains produced by the group and the 
elimination of every farmer in the group (Ragassa et. al., 2017). This policy was changed 
because it encouraged high attrition rates (Ragassa et. al., 2017). 
5.1.6 Contract Farming, Postharvest Loss and Economic Perception of Loss 
The interviews with the farmers and the key informants revealed that the farmers do not perceive 
post-harvest loss solely in economic terms. According to the farmers, grains are not entirely loss 
since grains that cannot be sold due to their physical appearance are consumed by the family or 
left as animal feed. This exposes individuals and their animals to health risks. For the farmers, 
increasing their farm yield was more of a concern than loss. The key informants alluded that the 
farmers would intentionally leave maize that had fallen off trucks because they do not consider 
the fallen maize as an income loss. According to a key informant for Heritage Seeds, farmers 
were motivated to reduce losses when they increased their production because they could see the 




incentive for the farmers to reduce postharvest losses, Heritage Seeds offers to purchase maize 
that is left over after repaying the loan at a cost double the market price. 
 
5.1.7 Contract Farming, Farmer Knowledge and Skill, and Postharvest Loss  
Also, the extension services offered to the farmers by the formal contract schemes could be 
attributed to postharvest loss reduction. Farmers in the Heritage Seeds and Masara schemes are 
given information on the best practices to adopt to increase yields, such as the right use of 
fertilizers, weed and pest control, and postharvest handling practices that reduce loss. According 
to the key informants in the formal contract schemes, the farmers receive at least six face-to-face 
training services between planting and harvesting. For example, farmers in these schemes are 
trained on loss reduction strategies in the storage, drying, and the shelling stages. However, it is 
interesting to observe that farmers participating in contract schemes reported more losses in the 
shelling stage. However, in comparison with farmers that do not participate in CF schemes, 
farmers participating reported fewer losses to mold, rodents, and during the drying stages. This 
could be attributed to the fact that the losses to mold and rodents occur in storage, and farmers in 
CF schemes do not have to store the grains because the possession of the grains is transferred 
before storage. The reason that CF farmers lose less at the drying stage is not clear, especially 
given the lack of variation in the drying methods adopted by CF and non-CF-farmers. 
 Motivations for participating in CF schemes. 
If contract farming offers all of the opportunities for accessing inputs, increasing yield, accessing 
storage, and extension services, it begs the question of why some farmers do not participate in 




farming opportunities in their communities. In some farming communities in the Northern 
Region, the farmers reported that they participated in a formal contract scheme during the 2016 
planting season, but the contract scheme had not returned since then. This cessation was 
discussed with a key informant with Masara, who clarified that the contract scheme left the 
Region and moved to the Upper East Region because the default and exit rates in the Northern 
Region were higher than those of the Upper East.  
The informant could not explain the rationale for the disparity in the default rates. However, 
Ragasa et. al., (2018) argue that “the increased presence of development projects distributing free 
inputs or cheap credit has contributed to lower entry and higher exit from the scheme.” 
Formal contract schemes have devised some strategies to reduce default incidents. For example, 
the schemes conduct regular visits to the farms to do yield estimates during the planting season. 
One is conducted at registration, another at the mid-season, and finally at harvest. According to 
the key informants, having the yield estimate helps the schemes to determine how much input 
would be offered to the farmers before the planting season. Also, the visit conducted in the 
middle of the planting season provides training to the farmers and also determines which farmers 
might have problems with repayment because of a predicted poor harvest. The key informants in 
the formal contract schemes reported that the estimates also help them if a farmer inflates their 
production numbers. According to them, 
“if a farm was estimated to produce two 84kg bags of maize and the farmer returns at the end of 
the planting season with three 84kg bags, we know that the farmer either got the extra bag from 
somewhere else or has mixed the grains with foreign materials.”( interview with key informant, 




This is important for the Heritage Seeds company that produces certified hybrid seeds. 
Specifically, diluting the quality of the farm produce creates a negative impression of the 
company, so these validation and quality assurance measures are necessary to prevent lapses. 
Another strategy that the schemes adopt is to contract with farmer groups as opposed to 
individual farmers. According to the key informants at the schemes, organizing farmers into 
groups promotes accountability among the farmers. Farmers who intentionally default lose their 
social capital within their cooperative group and are not permitted to participate in the scheme 
during the subsequent planting season. The drawback of this is that the contract negotiations are 
conducted between the representatives of the contract schemes and the leaders of farmer 
cooperatives. During one of the focus group sessions in the Upper East Region, one of the 
farmers participating in the Masara contract scheme expressed his displeasure with the price 
negotiation process because he did not perceive that the cooperative group leaders negotiated a 
fair price since all the farmers in the group did not participate in the process. According to this 
farmer, the contract scheme announced the purchase price before the harvest season and gave 
their principals little room for negotiations if the market price were to increase after the harvest 
season. Since the farmers do not have access to other markets in the Region, they have to sell at a 
lower price to the contract scheme. This observation was also made by Gage et. al. (2012). 
However, while they do not negotiate with all the farmers, because of the logistics challenges 
involved,, they encourage the leaders of the groups to carry all the farmers along in the 
negotiation process. The scheme also stated that they negotiate with the representatives of the 
farming group on three occasions - once before planting, once after planting, and finally after 
harvest before the price is determined. That way, the amount they offer is comparable to the 




It is essential to mention that while the formal contracts are made with groups of farmers as 
opposed to individuals, the common law doctrine of privity of contract applies. In other words, 
any party to the contract can enforce their rights, claim damages, and take benefits from the 
contract. However, the farmers reported that instituting legal action against the contract scheme 
is impossible because farmers do not have the financial capacity and education to institute legal 
action. 
Risk aversion was another reason that farmers would not participate in contract farming schemes. 
According to these farmers, because agriculture in their Region is dependent on and vulnerable 
to the forces of nature, borrowing against a projected harvest would be a considerable risk. They 
feared that if there were a drought or a flood during the planting season, a crop failure would be 
guaranteed and that would result in their defaulting on the loan. They added that since these 
loans would be deferred until the next planting season, contract farming could keep a farmer in a 
perpetual cycle of debt. According to the key informants in the formal contract schemes, the 
schemes offer agriculture insurance to protect the farmers from the risk of crop failures resulting 
from droughts or floods. However, it is not clear how much the farmers know about the 
insurance program.  Despite some of them reporting total farm losses, no farmer participating in 
the schemes was the beneficiary of the insurance program. 
Furthermore, farmers cited the ruthless nature of the contract schemes as a reason for non-
participation. According to these farmers, after harvest, you are expected to fulfill your loan 
obligations and sell all that is left over to the contract scheme. According to these farmers, 
sometimes they had nothing left to eat or sell after repaying the loan. For the farmers, this 
suggested that the contract schemes were not concerned about their welfare but about the maize 




formal contract schemes. The key informant of the Heritage Seeds company stated that the 
farmers are at liberty to consume or sell any of their maize that is left over. However, the farmers 
prefer to sell to the scheme because the scheme purchases at a price double that of the market 
price, and also because the government only permits the sale of hybrid seeds by approved seed 
sellers. In principle, farmers participating in the Masara scheme are required to sell their excess 
produce to the scheme. However, this is rarely done and is not strictly enforced (Ragasa et. al., 
2018). 
In the survey, some farmers would not participate in CF schemes because they “wanted to be 
their own boss and would not want to lose their autonomy.” These groups of farmers maintain 
that by receiving inputs and services from the contract schemes, they inadvertently transfer the 
ownership and control of their farms to the schemes. According to one of the farmers, he would 
not join a contract scheme because he was not interested in planting hybrid seeds provided by the 
scheme. The farmers also stated that they were financially capable of cultivating their farms and 
conducting their business without support. The literature on farmers’ perception concludes that 
farmers value their independence and autonomy (Ba, 2019; Dessein and Nevens, 2007) because 
it creates a sense of masculinity and security (Stock and Forney, 2014). It also gives them a 
feeling of  self-achievement and power (van Gelderen and Jansen, 2006). 
Finally, some farmers reported they would not participate in CF schemes because of the delays in 
receiving payments for purchased produce. The farmers stated that sometimes, the contract 
schemes delayed payment by at least one year, thereby preventing them from fulfilling personal 
financial obligations and from preparing for the next planting season. To reduce the effect of the 
delayed payments, farmers developed a strategy of partitioning their farmland such that only a 




According to the key informants in the contract schemes, the delays are not intentional but occur 
as a result of the delays in payment from their customers. For example, the Heritage Seeds 
company reported that the government delayed the payments for seeds the company provided in 
the 2017 planting season. As a result, the company also delayed payments to the farmers. 
According to the key informant, in the past, the contract scheme obtained bank loans to pay the 
farmers, but with the commercial banks’ interest rate at 18 percent, and sometimes up to 30 
percent, this became prohibitive. 
Financing remains a critical challenge to Ghana’s agricultural industry. According to the 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2018), commercial banks in the country have been reluctant to 
grant loans for several reasons including the following: high-risk perception of the industry and 
inadequate risk management options, sparse bank penetration particularly in the rural areas, and 
high loan default rates complicated by limited documentation of the farmers. In addition, farmers 
have higher illiteracy levels and commercial banks have used inappropriate financing models 
because of their poor understanding of agribusiness. Finally, commercial banks do not 
necessarily regard the agricultural sector as relevant to their activities, considering that Ghana’s 
agriculture still has low-profit potential.  
Farmers have other alternatives for obtaining financial loans. For example, the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1965 as “a specialized bank for the provision and 
administration of credit and other banking facilities in the agricultural sector” (Agriculture 
Development Bank, 2020). However, farmers often have challenges accessing loans from the 
ADB because of high-interest rates (Shafiwu et. al., 2013). Also, with the bank having 78 
(Agriculture Development Bank, 2020) branches, it is not clear if the bank has enough capacity 




Rural and Community Banks (RCBs) are also alternatives for obtaining agricultural loans. They 
were established by the Government of Ghana in the late 1970s to provide banking and credit 
services to rural farming communities. These banks are the largest providers of formal financial 
services in rural areas and represent about half of the total banking outlets in Ghana (Mensah and 
Nurah, 2012). However, the relatively higher ratio of non-performing loans poses a threat to the 
financial future of the bank. A study found that “the proportion of the loan portfolio that was in 
default for more than 30 days was 16 percent, compared with 3 percent for banks in their global 
peer group” (Kloeppinger-Todd and Sharma, 2010). 
The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 2007 (Reuers, 2019), has been correlated with 
declines in financing for agriculture and the number of people employed in the agricultural sector 
(Ackah, 2016). Limited access to funding has ripple effects on the adoption of mechanization by 
farmers and food production capacity in Africa ( Daum and Birner, 2019). Experiences from 
many countries, including from neighboring Nigeria, suggest that the combination of the 
discovery of natural resources and limited agricultural financing results in poor economic 
performance in the long term (Sala-i-Martin et. al., 2012; Ackah, 2016).  
 Challenges of formal CF schemes in Ghana. 
Besides the financial challenges, high transaction costs are the other challenge that CF schemes 
in Ghana face. Opportunistic behaviors exhibited by farmers introduce transaction costs such as 
contract management, managing and monitoring the farmers, and other personnel of the contract 
scheme. As discussed earlier, some of the opportunistic behaviors that farmers in CF schemes 
exhibit include side-selling, falsifying the harvest numbers, introducing dirt and other foreign 
materials into the maize bags to make up for the required payment, breach of contract agreement 




inputs provided by the CF scheme, and intentionally refusing to repay the loans. The frequent 
farm visits by the formal CF schemes to monitor farmers increase the transaction costs. 
Contract enforcement and dispute resolution in CF also increases transaction costs. While CF 
contracts include dispute resolution clauses, in practice, contract enforcement and dispute 
resolution remain a challenge because of costs and time considerations (Rodríguez, 2015). The 
key informant at Masara stated that enforcing contracts through the formal legal system presents 
peculiar difficulties. According to the informant,  
“we cannot institute legal actions against defaulting farmers because we will never get anyone 
to register with our scheme in the next planting season. Word will go around that we [Masara] 
are troublesome people” (Key  informant, Masara) 
In African communities where social capital is essential (Arhinful, 2003), the contract schemes 
would instead protect the relationship with the farmers. As a result, the farmers do not have any 
incentive to abide by the contract terms knowing full well that no legal actions will be taken 
against them. Also, instituting legal measures against a farmer may not be worth it in the long 
run, given the time, financial, and human resources investment. Considering that most farmers 
are poor, even if a judgment is given in favor of the scheme, executing the legal decision might 
be difficult, if not impossible. The contract schemes would abandon communities with high 
default rates, as seen in the Masara example. This creates a challenge for farmers that depend on 
the inputs provided by the formal schemes. According to some of the farmers in the formal 
contract schemes, the only means of cultivating their land and receiving training services is by 
participating in the contract schemes. While it is possible to receive inputs through informal 
contract schemes, the results suggest that farmers have increased production and reduced losses 




In the opinion of a key informant in the community, the informal schemes are better at enforcing 
contracts because they employ religion, usually African traditional religion, and dispense local 
justice to defaulting farmers. The parties to the contract swear an oath to be bound by the terms 
of the contract and the grave consequences for non-compliance. According to this key informant, 
the farmers are more intimidated by these consequences than they are of those from the formal 
legal system, and so have a greater incentive to abide by the contract terms. The farmers in the 
informal contracts also added that they would not default because of the excellent reputation and 
social capital that they have in their communities.  
Also, the government policies on providing subsidized inputs, particularly seeds and poverty 
alleviation interventions from development agencies, could have adverse impacts on the formal 
contract business models. As explained earlier, the government subsidizes the price of imported 
hybrid seeds as a means of increasing food production. However, this has the potential of stifling 
the market for local hybrid varieties. According to the key informant at Heritage Seeds 
Company,  
“last planting season, we had challenges with sales. The government sold seeds to the farmers at 
a price lower than the prevailing market price, and it was difficult for us to match the 
government prices if we wanted to make a profit and pay our farmers” (Key informant, Heritage 
Seeds Company). 
Also, increased attrition rates in formal schemes have been attributed to the interventions of 
foreign aid agencies, with farmers preferring to obtain free inputs from the agencies instead of 




 Government Strategies for Reducing Postharvest Losses 
In 2009, the Ghanaian government implemented the agricultural output price stabilization policy. 
It established the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO), an agency set up to protect 
smallholder farmers from financial losses by sustaining a minimum market price. It also reduced 
postharvest losses by purchasing excess rice, maize, soya beans, millet, cowpea, and peanuts 
from the farmers (Armah et. al., 2019). The company is charged with guaranteeing an assured 
income to farmers by providing a minimum guaranteed price and ready market, reducing 
postharvest losses and protecting farmers’ income by mopping up, expanding the demand for 
locally produced food, and managing the government’s emergency food security (MoFA, 2019). 
There are 73 Licensed Buying Agents (LBCs), appointed by the company, travel around farming 
communities to purchase the grains at a fixed price, determined by representatives of the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, representatives of farmer associations, and NAFCO. The 
collected grains are stored in a NAFCO storage facility and are intended to be sold to state 
institutions such as schools, prisons, hospitals, and the military. As of October 2019, NAFCO 
had collected 52,000 metric tons of rice, millet, groundnut, and cowpea for the free senior high 
school program (Abdul-Karim, 2019). The officials of the company at the Northern Region 
office informed the author that they did not have any data on the maize they had collected since 
the inception of the program. Also, the farmers reported that they had never seen any 
representative of the LBCs in their communities, a sentiment also expressed by farmers in the 
Eastern Region (GhanaWeb, 2019). This could be due to the adverse road conditions that make 
some of the farming communities inaccessible.  
One of the successes claimed by the program is the construction of forty 100,000 metric tonnes 




initiative, established in 2017, focuses on reducing post-harvest losses among smallholder 
farmers during storage by constructing 216 warehouses across the country. However, the farmers 
complained that accessing the warehouse in their district was difficult because of the long-
distance, and sometimes because of the adverse road conditions to the designated district 
warehouse. In the opinion of these farmers, the policy would be more effective if the warehouses 
were constructed in each farming community and if they were consulted in the decision-making 
process. According to a key informant, politicians use the agriculture sector as a political and 
campaign tool to endear the citizens. According to this informant, the construction of the 
warehouses is  
“proof to the farmers that the government cares about them and investment for securing votes 
from their constituents” (Key informant, member of the academic community). 
 Implications for Governance, Policy and Future Research 
The conclusions of this study have multiple implications for governance, policy-making, and 
future research. The existence of various criteria responsible for the success of farming requires a 
coordination point to harmonize efforts and sustain the implementation of measures aimed at 
resolving the challenges posed by these factors. Specific factors such as harvesting, drying, 
shelling, transport, and storage were identified in this study as being primarily responsible for 
losses. These issues require harmonizing technology and market approaches to solve the 
problem. A governance structure tasked with coordinating both sides of the solution would 
ensure that maximum benefit is derived cost-effectively. Although, NAFCO contracts with 
Licensed Buying Agents to mop up excess produce from farmers, this is not implemented widely 
enough to be deemed successful. Factors that would enhance post-harvest loss prevention 




storage. This should be supported by extension workers educating farmers on the appropriate use 
of these technologies, and providing information in the postharvest context to best engage 
farmers.. It is important to note that the absence of a coordination agency will lead to a fractured 
system where related postharvest loss control efforts are spread across different arms of 
government. 
This agency would be tasked with reviewing, evaluating, and updating existing policies such as 
predatory contracts and lending in agriculture. Predatory practices that drive farmers to incur 
losses are not uncommon, particularly regarding contracts where a provider of goods or services 
defers payment, in the form of farm produce, until after harvest. In many cases, the value of 
produce demanded is in multiples of actual services received. These arrangements also create 
financial pressure on the farmers and limit their abilities to utilize appropriate means in carrying 
out postharvest processes, which leads to the abandonment of the grains and quantitative losses. 
This financial pressure also makes farmers susceptible to opportunistic behaviors such as 
degrading the quality of produce by introducing foreign material such as dirt, to meet the 
required payment. 
Also, there is a need to prioritize the training of extension workers not only on the deployment of 
existing technologies but also on the need to be responsive to the cultural barriers that contribute 
to postharvest losses. Closely related to this is the need to include the technical educational 
institutions in the manufacturing of cheap and locally available materials and machines, 
including more effective drying technologies that are affordable for the farmers.  
 Implications for Programmatic Interventions 
The high default rates in the first year of the Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) program points to 




development programs, particularly those aimed at addressing post-harvest loss. For example, 
the perception of loss seemed to vary among different farmer groups. Some consider postharvest 
loss and its impact as a production issue; specifically, the solution lies in increasing the volume 
of production. Another group of farmers perceives loss as an inevitable part of the farming 
process. Practices such as gleaning, abandoning, and delaying harvesting till very late in the 
season with its accompanying losses are viewed as normal for cultural and practical reasons, and 
these losses are not considered problematic but rather are seen as inevitable. Therefore, no effort 
is made to curtail them. Another group of farmers, particularly those whose produce is subject to 
strict quality control standards, incur losses further downstream at the point of quality control. 
According to a key informant in the community, grains are rejected by food processors for poor 
quality such as high moisture content, and by consumers when insects damage the grains. These 
tend to view losses as driven by whatever factors lead to degradation in quality, be it retained 
moisture, growth of aflatoxins, or impurity of seeds (for those in seed cultivation programs). 
Efforts to reduce loss by this group are centered around maintaining the quality of their produce. 
These groups of farmers, though different in their perceptions of loss, share a standard view- that 
is loss is anything that has a financial impact.  
Another social conversation that is important to have about addressing the post-harvest loss 
problem is the perception that development aid or assistance is free of charge and without 
obligation. This perception stands in contrast to government aid programs that expect recipients 
to either reciprocate, meet specific quality standards, or fulfill certain obligations as part of the 
program. The risk, as was seen in the PFJ program, is the tendency for recipients to object to 
these requirements by either defaulting, compromising on quality, or seeking other ways to 




perception wherein the donor that provides inputs and resources expects the recipients to view 
their programs as cooperative ventures with an anticipated return on investments and benefits 
accruing to both sides, while the other views these programs as acts of kindness. This difference 
in perception must be factored into the conceptualization, development, and implementation of 
interventions aimed at addressing post-harvest loss. 
After the first year of the PFJ, there was a restructuring of the program to accommodate for 
default. Payment for the subsidized input was made upon receipt of the input as opposed to at the 
end of the harvest season. Issues such as this must be taken into consideration in policy 
development. 
 Gender, Cultural Practices, and Postharvest Loss 
Gender disparities in land ownership need to be considered in framing policies that have the 
potential to reduce post-harvest loss. While women supply 80 % of the labor in agriculture, it is 
estimated that only about 10% of women in the country are farm owners (SEND Foundation of 
West Africa, 2019). There are three types of land ownership in Ghana. First, there is public land 
that is acquired by the State for its administrative and development functions and is held in trust 
by the president on behalf of the citizens. Also, vested land that the government takes over and 
administers on behalf of indigenous communities. Finally, tribal lands that belong to families, 
clans, ethnic, or tribal groups. As such, 18% of land in the country is public land, 80% of 
Ghana’s land is held under cultural ownership, and 2% is vested land (Higgins, and Fenrich, 
2011). The native laws and norms govern rules around individual land acquisition under tribal 
ownership. Some of these native norms limit women’s ability to acquire land through 
inheritance. For example, patrilineal succession, as is the norm among some tribes in the 




the chiefs from allocating land to women. In instances that allow land allocation to women, they 
may be given marginal land or over-cultivated land because of the perception that women cannot 
prepare and till the land (Higgins, and Fenrich, 2011). Often, women can acquire land through 
marriage. Women are gifted land by their husbands after marriage. However, the woman is only 
able to own the land as long as she remains married to her husband. In communities with high 
rates of polygamy, it is common practice for the husband to redistribute the land each time a new 
wife is joining the family. In addition to working on their farms, women also carry the obligation 
of working on their husbands’ farms (Higgins and Fenrich, 2011). Although women can acquire 
land through purchase, low-income levels, and inadequate access to credit facilities prevent them 
from purchasing (Aban et. al., 2016). As such, the decision on agricultural activities is left to the 
male members of the household or community. They may not necessarily be more experienced, 
given that they spend less time on the farms. 
Also, there are disparities between male and female access to extension services due to gender 
imbalance in the population of agricultural extension agents (AEA). One factor responsible for 
this is the low enrollment rates of females in agricultural colleges despite a government policy 
allocating a 30% quota for women (Adjei, 2019). This makes it challenging to employ females 
with training in agriculture and extension. For example, it is reported that no female students 
graduated from agricultural programs at the University of Cape Coast in 2018 (Adjei, 2019). 
Also, retention rates remain low for female extension workers due to challenges with the 
transport infrastructure that could pose a risk to females traveling to remote areas. 
Furthermore, some cultural factors could limit women’s participation in the agricultural 
workforce as extension workers. Moore et. al., (2015) indicate that in some communities, women 




family. Reports suggest that women farmers in rural communities are often bypassed by male 
extension workers (Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana, 2014). This challenge is further 
compounded by the dual roles that women play as farmers, traders, and primary caregivers for 
their families. Working to satisfy the competing demands of these roles makes them unavailable 
to contribute to conversations on farming practices. 
It is crucial to address the gender dimension in the creation of interventions on post-harvest loss 
for farming communities. There is a need to address challenges that make it unattractive for 
females to serve as extension workers. For example, wage incentives could be offered to women 
to work with female farmers in rural areas. Attention should be paid to the location and timing of 
assessments, training, and resource distribution components of implemented programs to ensure 
that they reach women farmers who comprise the central part of farming labor, especially in 
specific communities. 
These gender disparities in land allocation create an unjust  system of wage distribution when 
farmers participate in contract farming. As discussed earlier, while men own the land and make 
the day-to day-farm decisions such as participating in contract farming, labor for activities such 
as weeding, harvesting, and post-harvest work in grain processing is mostly supplied by women 
and children (Raynolds, 2002; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2015; Komatsu, 2018). 
However, because they are not parties to the contract, women do not receive compensation for 
their labor. In addition to providing agricultural work on personal farms and those of their 
husbands, women and girls are also burdened with performing other domestic tasks. According 
to the FAO, in addition to providing agricultural labor, on average, “65 percent of men spend 
from 0 to 10 hours per week on domestic activities, 89 percent of women spend 10 hours per 




severe in rural Ghana where “63 percent of young rural males spend between 0 and 10 weekly 
hours on domestic work, whereas 88 percent of young rural females spend 10 hours per week or 
more on domestic work” (FAO, 2012). In consequence, females are not able to take full 
advantage of participating in other income-generating activities or in programs to develop their 
capabilities, such as skills development program, and in many instances, girls are unable to get 
an education. This results in a gender gap in educational attainment. According to the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2020), 60 percent of 
women 15 years and older are illiterate, thereby creating a 20 percent gap in the literacy 
disadvantage experienced by women in Ghana. None of the female farmers in the study 
population had formal education. The FAO (2012) further described the disparity between the 
rural and urban parts of Ghana. In the rural areas, 71 percent of the women are illiterates, and 3 
percent of women have access to secondary school education, contributing to a significant 
gender gap in literacy, which further worsens the social and economic challenges women face.  
It is illegal in Ghana to withhold salaries because of the worker’s gender, as provided by Part IX 
of the national Labour Act (2003). Sections 67 and 68 of the Act provides that: 
“Subject to this Part, every contract of employment shall stipulate that the whole of the salary, 
wages, and allowances of the worker shall be made payable in [a] legal tender in addition to any 
non-cash remuneration and accordingly, a contract of employment that contains provisions to 
the contrary is void. Every worker shall receive equal pay for equal work without distinction of 
any kind.” 
However, this may not hold in practice. The women interviewed in Dundo indicated that they 
would like to make decisions and money on their own terms. However, establishing that there is 




sector where employment contracts do not exist, and participation is driven by familial ties. In 
consequence, protecting women under this law may be impossible. 
To improve the role of women in agriculture in Ghana, it is worthwhile to consider interventions 
to increase their interest in participating in agriculture, improve their ability to take initiative 
within their own agricultural practice, and adjust the incentive structures that rewards them for 
their participation and decision making on the farms.  In one of the formal contract schemes 
Heritage Seeds company committed to training women and empowering them to take the 
initiative on their farms. By working with their farmers’ group and rewarding participation 
through a strong incentive structure, Heritage recorded better performance and productivity from 
the women farmers. Increasing the economic impact of agriculture is dependent on growing the 
workers’ base. To do this one must create an environment for more women to enter into 
agriculture and reap benefits comparable to other industries where women are able to enter, get 
the support they need to get established, participate on their own terms, and have full access to 
the rewards and benefits that accrue from their participation. In Ghana, the services sector, which 
makes up about half of Ghana's GDP, is primarily driven by women (O’Neil, 2016). These are 
mostly through businesses in the informal sector trading in the markets. The potential for 
growing the GDP in an agriculture-based economy is thus dependent on addressing this gender 
gap in Agriculture. Estimates suggest that this improvement “could raise crop production by up 
to 19 percent, boost agricultural and overall GDP, and lift hundreds of thousands of people out of 
poverty” (Rodgers and Akram-Lodhi, 2019), and lift up to 150 million people out of hunger 
(FAO, 2011). Therefore, it makes sound economic sense, and it is a good economic policy to 




 The implication for the legal system 
The weakness of a formal legal system to protect the parties to the contract and to adjudicate 
contractual challenges limits the opportunities for investment in contract farming schemes. It is 
crucial to develop a body of laws and policies that is most adaptable for Ghanaian society. To 
achieve this, input needs to be obtained from farmers, local chiefs, principals of the contract 
schemes, and members of the Ghanaian bench and bar. The efficacy of these laws would be 
proven by training law enforcement officers in administering justice particularly in cases where 
the farmer is considered vulnerable (for example, the elderly and the  extremely poor), and where 
the farmer is loyal to the political structure.  
Also, the contract schemes would need to develop a system where farmers can deposit a 
collateral before obtaining a loan. As of today, all CFs count on is the belief in the existence of a 
social capital that the farmer considers valuable. This has not always proven to be the case.  
 The Implication for future research 
Future research on post-harvest loss must consider the social factors influencing loss. This would 
help guide the recommendations. It would also shape the scope of a comprehensive definition of 
post-harvest loss, which adequately incorporates the farmer’s perspective. 
There is a need to develop a quantification of social issues for modeling effective policies. It is 
essential to create empirical standards for integrating social factors and drivers, agents, and 
leverage points when designing a strategy and assessing its social effects.  
Given the opportunities that contact farming presents to increase production, reduce loss, and 
increase farmers’ household income, there is room to improve on the challenges facing farmers 




  Food security, Human security, and Regional Security 
As discussed earlier, one of the major causes of postharvest losses is bush fires. Setting bush 
fires is deeply rooted in the cultural values and the traditional farming systems of Ghana (Yahaya 
and Amoah, 2013). It is common practice for farmers to set their farmland on fire for bush 
clearing, for honey extraction, and to make charcoal for cooking. As discussed earlier, bush fires 
are also caused by hunters to drive out game. In the dry season, this indiscriminate fire spreads 
faster because of the abundance of the foliage, including standing grain, high wind speed, low 
humidity, and low rainfall, thereby posing the risk of catastrophic loss of total crop.  
Another cause of bushfires is the activities of Fulani (Fulbe) pastoralists. The Fulani people are a 
nomadic tribe that are spread across Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Togo, the 
Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and in the Eastern parts of Sudan (Bukari and 
Schareika, 2015). 
According to Tonah (2006), Fulani herders began moving into northern Ghana at the beginning 
of the twentieth century from neighboring Burkina Faso. Over time, they migrated from the other 
countries listed above. Initially, these migration patterns happened in the dry season during the 
post-harvest period to feed on crop residues and fertilize the land. In recent times, changes in 
climate patterns, desertification, droughts, and conflicts are driving herders and their cattle into 
agricultural areas year-round (McGregor, 2017; Yembilah and Grant, 2014). They have been 
blamed for totally destroying farmland and all the crops on it by setting fires to clear the land to 
allow for fresh grass growth for cattle grazing (Kusimi and Appati, 2012), The herdsmen set 
these fires to protect their cattle from pests and insects such as ticks and tsetse flies and because 




1996). These destructions have been a cause of conflict between the herders and across the West 
African subregion (Bukari et. al., 2018; Moritz, 2010).  
Crop damage increases farmers' vulnerability to postharvest and economic losses and could have 
an overall impact on human security in the sub-region. It is often reported that these herders, 
armed with guns, machetes, and clubs, utilize them not only to protect their cattle but also as a 
tool for pushing back demands of farmers (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). A local news agency 
reports that between October 2017 and December 2019, there were 173 verified records of 
Fulani herdsmen destroying farms in Ghana (GhanaWeb, 2020). It is essential to mention that 
these destructions are not limited to Ghana, but similar attacks have been reported in Nigeria, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (AFP, 2019). Terrorist groups operating in the region such as the 
Macina Liberation Front (Front de Libération du Macina, FLM), the Alliance nationale pour la 
sauvegarde de l’identité peule et la restauration de la justice (ANSIPRJ), and the Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) have also been accused of recruiting and arming 
Fulani herdsmen to mobilize support for their terrorist agenda (Fulton and Nickels, 2017; 
McGregor, 2017).  
The Ghana government has attempted to solve the bush-fires problem through the Control and 
Prevention of Bushfires Act (P.N.D.C.L. 229). The law prohibits the “uncontrolled burning of a 
farm, forest or grassland” (Control and Prevention of Bushfires Act, 1990). Section 11 of the Act 
provides the penalty for contravening the law. It states that  
“A person who contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of this Act commits an offence 
and is liable on conviction to a fine of not less than two hundred and fifty penalty units and not 




exceeding twelve months or to both the fine and the imprisonment or community labour and for a 
subsequent offence to a term of imprisonment or community labour not exceeding two years.  
(2) Where a person is convicted of an offence under subsection (1) the Court may in addition to 
the penalty that it may impose, order the offender to make good the value of the property 
including the crops or trees damaged or destroyed by the fire caused by that person.” 
However, the Law has been described as being inadequate to deter perpetrators. According to an 
official of the Ghana National Fire Service, the Courts have typically awarded a fine of 
GHC10.00 (about 1.75 USD) (Frimpong, 2015). Further complicating the problem is the 
nomadic nature of the herdsman that makes it difficult to apprehend the offenders. Government, 
however, has a role to play in addressing the causes of this situation and implementing policies 
and laws geared towards solving the problem of bushfires and the risk it can pose for food 






In conclusion, the results of the research suggest that farmers participating in contract farming 
experience fewer losses than their counterparts that do not participate — thus implying that 
contract farming as a market strategy offers an opportunity to increasing food production and 
reducing postharvest losses. However, the farmers and the country are not maximizing the 
benefits that contract farming presents because of the prevailing socio-economic, regional 
security, and institutional factors in the farming communities. These factors also contribute to 
postharvest losses. Therefore, to solve the problem of postharvest losses and maximize the 
benefits from contract farming, there is a need to gain a clear understanding of the problem based 
on these factors. Also, solving the problem would require the implementation of a combination 









A definition for the problem of postharvest loss was given at the outset of this study. It was 
observed in the literature review that attempts aimed at increasing food security have simply 
adopted a siloed approach of focusing on one aspect of the problem and have merely treated the 
symptoms or created another set of challenges. For example, attempts at increasing food security 
have focused on increasing fertilizer adoption and increasing access to improved seed varieties to 
increase food output. The deficiencies in this approach were worsened by the lack of sufficient 
regulatory oversight and coordination between the different actors, at the appropriate levels of 
government. Although the issue of postharvest loss has not been neglected, the problem persists 
partly because it has not been given sufficient attention. This is particularly so at the local levels 
of governance because of the limited resources. 
 The institutional theory provides a framework for conceptualizing and explaining contract 
farming and postharvest losses of maize in Ghana. The institutional theory argues that 
institutions, including government policies, legal, economic, and political institutions, determine 
economic performance and are essential for economic growth, (Acemoglu et al. 2002), and 
inefficient institutions limit economic growth. Inefficient institutions could provide some 
explanation for the prevailing poverty in Northern Ghana. For instance, in Ghana, cultural norms 
that prevent women from owning land could limit the successes of interventions aimed at 
postharvest loss reduction. Information asymmetry between the farmers, the market women, and 
contract operators contribute to losses. Also, the constraints encountered by the formal contract 
farming schemes in instituting legal actions against defaulting farmers result in the exit of these 




show that farmers that participate in these informal schemes produce less and lose more than 
other farmers, suggesting that these schemes might not be beneficial for the farmers or their 
communities.  
After collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data, it is clear from the results 
that postharvest loss is a symptom, and loss reduction strategies should treat the problem as such. 
In other words, postharvest losses do not exist in isolation but are a manifestation of the 
inefficiencies in infrastructure development, governance, lack of market access, cultural norms 
and traditions, and poverty. These inefficiencies also create interdependencies wherein 
inefficiencies result in postharvest loss, and postharvest loss results in additional complications. 
For example, when grains are rejected because of the high moisture or aflatoxin content, farmers 
still find a way to get the grains into the open market. This causes harm to consumers, which 
adds a degree of complexity to the issue.  
The research has also determined that a perception gap exists between the different stakeholders 
about the problem of postharvest losses. For example, the conversations and other interactions 
with the farmers indicated they had a different understanding and perception of postharvest 
losses than the principals of the contract farming schemes, and a different perspective than those 
of the government officials. For the farmers, postharvest losses are only perceived in economic 
terms. In other words, the farmers would only care about postharvest losses when they could 
attach a monetary value to the grains. In the same vein, as long as the contract farming principals 
were duly supplied with the needed amounts of grain, losses incurred by the farmers on the field 
during processing or transportation, were irrelevant to them.  
Although this study focused on losses as primarily reported by the farmers, information from the 




limits farmers’ ability to deliver expected grain quotas to them. The contracting schemes’ denial 
that postharvest losses are a problem (even within their own sections of the value chain), further 
reinforces the notion that postharvest loss is primarily viewed through an economic lens. 
Specifically, losses are only considered important when they impact economic value or profit. 
This is the case in spite of the missed opportunities to harness the value of the lost grain and the 
potential harmful effects of food loss on human health and the environment.  
6.1.1 Contract farming and Postharvest Losses 
The results from this thesis suggest that when farmers participate in contract farming schemes, 
they are more likely to use fertilizers and plant high yield and drought resistance seeds because 
they have easier access to these inputs. Also, farmers in contract farming schemes are more 
likely to receive extension services related to the best agricultural practices, which ensures 
maximum production and minimal losses. For example, farmers participating in contract farming 
schemes are more likely to store their grains in designated warehouses using hermetic storage 
bags. However, all these benefits are dependent on the nature of the contract scheme in which a 
farmer participates. Farmers in informal contract schemes have the lowest productive output 
among the groups of farmers investigated.  
The major research question is as follows. Do farmers who participate in contract farming 
experience less postharvest losses than do farmers who do not participate? The findings of this 
research suggest that the number of maize bags attributable to postharvest losses is smaller for a 
farmer in a formal CF scheme in comparison to a farmer in a non-CF scheme. However, the 
magnitude of loss differs depending on the nature of the contract scheme in which a farmer 




that do not participate in CF schemes, but farmers in informal schemes have more losses than 
those that do not participate in CF schemes.  
Does our current understanding of the postharvest loss limit our ability to solve the postharvest 
loss problem? The results also suggest that the issue of postharvest loss significantly transcends 
the challenges of poor transportation infrastructure and storage. Instead, it also includes other 
factors that farmers encounter in their daily lives. These other factors must be considered when 
addressing the definition, perception, and resolution of loss. 
6.1. Policy Options 
There are many policy options and strategies that could be adopted to reduce postharvest losses. 
These strategies, their merits, and demerits are discussed in this section. 
6.1.2 Option 1: Maintain status quo 
This is the do- nothing option. Postharvest loss reduction strategies have huge financial 
implications such as the costs of training farmers, the costs of constructing infrastructure, and the 
costs of enforcing contracts. According to the key informants in Heritage Seeds (a formal 
contracting scheme studied), without the financial support from international aid agencies, the 
scheme would not be able to provide extension services to their farmers. One option available is 
to pass the cost to the farmers, who have the option of passing the costs to the consumers, 
resulting in higher food prices. Or, farmers could absorb the costs, which would result in lower 
profit margins. Postharvest loss reduction strategies could also include encouraging farmers to 
abandon cultural norms and traditions that have been practiced over many centuries.  
However, it is clear that doing nothing has negative consequences on the environment, it reduces 






6.1.3 Option 2: Encourage Contract Farming 
Given the many benefits contract farming offers by way of increasing food production and 
reducing postharvest losses, a recommended policy option is to encourage farmers to participate 
in contract farming schemes. There are two approaches that can be taken to encourage farmers’ 
participation in contract farming.  
Firstly, the government could motivate farmers to participate by offering subsidies and 
incentives to farmers who are members of a contract farming scheme. For example, the 
government could provide insurance and risk advisory services to farmers that choose to 
participate in CF schemes. However, the research found that government interventions in 
agriculture in the country has been accompanied by a process whereby farmers are rewarded for 
their loyalty to politicians and political parties. Thus, interventions could promote nepotism and 
ethnic bias while encouraging inefficiencies in the system.  
To deal with these problems, it is recommended that the government establish an independent 
body that is charged with providing incentives for farmers who participate in CF schemes. It is 
recommended that the staff working in these bodies are rotated after an election to reduce 
clientelism. 
Secondly, the CF schemes can induce farmers’ participation by creating economic incentives, 
e.g. offering rewards to farmers that participate, deliver expected volumes, and comply with the 
recommended quality standards. An example is the Heritage Seeds company scheme that offers a 




premium price is an incentive for the farmers to produce seeds that comply with the scheme’s 
quality standards. It also encourages the farmers to minimize their losses because the more the 
farmers offer for sale, the more money they make. A challenge with allowing the CF schemes 
drive participation are cultural practices. These practices preclude women from owning land 
would prevent women from participating. Also, participation is not guaranteed since people 
could drop out for reasons such as lack of financial capability, lack of knowledge and skills, 
cultural practices (e.g., land use, agric taboos) and constraints (e.g., gender roles and disparities 
in land ownership), and lack of interest (e.g., fear of losing autonomy). 
Greater participation and fairer representativeness by cooperative bodies representing the farmers 
is recommended as an intervention for resolving issues relating to power asymmetries between 
the parties in CF schemes. It is clear from the results that in the informal contract schemes, the 
principals had better bargaining power over the farmers. In the Masara scheme, some farmers 
reported “they did not feel their voices were heard in the contract negotiation process.” In 
contrast, every farmer in the Heritage Seeds scheme reported that they felt they had equal 
bargaining powers in the contract. Similarly, in comparison with the other schemes, it appears 
that the Heritage Seeds company has a vested interest in ensuring the success of the scheme in 
the community.  
Also, as societies develop and there is an increase in contract farming participation, there is a 
need to expand the existing body of laws to accommodate these changes. In developing these 
laws, it is recommended that the government set up an organization consisting of farmers, 
contract farming schemes, and tribal chiefs. This will ensure that the voices of all the 




Today, litigation is the only remedy available for aggrieved parties of a CF scheme. Litigation 
can be adversarial by nature, where parties are pitted against each other and have a goal of 
‘winning an argument.’ However, it is clear from the conversations with the principals of the CF 
schemes that litigation negatively impacts their ability to attract farmers afterward... It is 
recommended that other alternative forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation, arbitration, 
and reconciliation, are considered. The advantage of these dispute resolution methods is that, in 
comparison to litigation, decisions can be reached faster. Also, these alternative dispute 
resolution methods do not tend to create a win/lose outcome but seek a win/win outcome.  
6.1.4 Option 3: Improve Education Attainment and Access to Education  
The results suggest that farmers with higher levels of education experience fewer losses when 
compared with other farmers. One of the challenges of education in Northern Ghana is the high 
attrition rates during the farming season. Key informants reported that many families depend on 
their children as sources of labor. In consequence, many children drop out of school during the 
farming season. One recommendation for addressing this challenge is to offer incentives to 
families that enroll their school-age children and attain a minimum school attendance threshold. 
An example of a successful education incentive program is the Oportunidades program in 
Mexico, where the government provides financial incentives to families who enroll their children 
in school. A study found that the program has a positive effect on the enrollment of children, 
especially after primary school (Attanasio, 2012). To make this attractive in Ghana, the financial 
incentive needs to exceed the value gained by having the child working on the farm.  
Also, the government could create an alternate education track for children so that they can to 
attend school while they assist their families on the farm. A change in the instruction schedule 




evenings after completing their farm activities. However, for this option to be successful, the 
government would need to invest in infrastructure, particularly electricity. The government 
would also need to provide incentives for teachers to work in these remote farming communities. 
These incentives could include bonuses and accelerated professional development incentives. 
 
6.1.5 Option 4: Close Gender Gaps in Agriculture 
The results of the quantitative study suggest that women make better farmers than do men; 
women have fewer losses than men and produce more per acre than their male counterparts. This 
finding was also corroborated by the accounts of key informants in the Heritage Seeds company 
scheme. However, the full benefit that can be derived from women’s participation in agriculture 
is not being achieved because of the gender barriers that exist in the agricultural sector.  
One recommendation for closing these barriers is to expand the Block Farms Program (BFP) to 
focus on and prioritize women. The BFP was created by former President John Atta Mills in 
2009. The program focused on farmers with adjacent land, farmers with land allocated by the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), and on seed growers contracted by MoFA. BFP’s 
objectives include generating employment among the rural poor, especially the youth—at least 
60,000 farmers; improving incomes among farmers by at least 50 percent; increasing food 
security through the use of science and technology, leading to increased productivity and higher 
yields; and improving farming as a business (Johnson et. al, 2013). Farmers participating in the 
program benefited from subsidized credit in the form of mechanization services provided by the 
Agricultural Mechanization Service Centres, certified improved seeds, subsidized fertilizer, 
herbicide and pesticides as well as extension services. The MoFA provided these services. By 




more timely and at a lower unit cost (Donkoh et. al, 2016). Three years after the commencement 
of the program, MoFA reported that the program participants enjoyed several benefits “including 
access to low-cost credit in the form of inputs and mechanization services, which have led to 
greater farm productivity and high incomes (Donkoh et. al, 2016).” 
By expanding the program to prioritize women farmers, the government could bypass the 
cultural challenges of land ownership by mandating MoFA to allocate land to women who 
choose to participate. This program would enable women to have access to land and capital, 
make the day-to-day decisions of their farm, and also guarantee a source of income. 
Also, to close the gender skills gap, the government should create demonstration farms that 
would serve as a venue for teaching women agricultural skills. These farms would grow the 
staples and train the women in the use of agrochemicals and other good farming practices. The 
training would result in increased technology adoption and skills transfer. It may be necessary to 
have female extension workers on hand on these farms.  
6.1.6 Option 5: Improve Regional Security  
In the past, the Ghana government addressed the complaints against the Fulani pastoralists by 
forcefully evicting them from the country, such as the evictions starting in the late 1990s. These 
attempts have proven to be counterproductive because of the huge costs expended in expelling 
the herdsmen, and also, sometimes, these pastoralists put up resistance that eventually deepen 
into communal conflicts (Tonah, 2002). Also, the forced evictions disregard the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and 
Establishment protocol (ECOWAS, 1979), which Ghana is a signatory. The protocol allows 
ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside, and establish economic activities in the territory of other 




Tackling the issue of bushfires set by Fulani pastoralists would require concerted efforts of 
regional security agencies. This is because of their nomadic lifestyle. It is recommended that the 
governments in the West African sub-region set up a security initiative to track the activities and 
contain the movement of this tribe. One of the ways to do this is to create a mode of 
identification that is mandatory for all citizens and residents of the sub-region to carry. Some 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have also advocated for the enactment of a Cattle 
Ranching Law that “will prescribe the mechanisms for breeding animals and other procedures to 
ensure [the] safety and protection of lives and properties of both parties during the breeding 
season (News Ghana, 2019). Conversations on the creation of these laws have been ongoing 
since 2016, but it is not clear why the law has not been enacted. One reason could be the 
reluctance of the tribal chiefs to grant land to the pastoralists. Pastoralist laws exist in Africa. For 
example, in 2002, Burkina Faso enacted the Loi d’orientation relative au pastoralisme LORP 
2009-034) that creates pastoral areas within communities. However, this law was ineffective 
because of the government’s reluctance to enforce it and the long periods of political instability 
caused by military coups in the country. There are other examples of successes with grazing 
laws. Cameroon’s Decree No 86/755 of 24 June 1986 regulates grazing in the country. Articles 1 
and 2 of the Decree permits animals to graze on all grazing land of the Country except in urban 
areas and by the roadsides, provided the pastoralists vaccinate their animals and pay their taxes. 
The success of this law has been attributed to Decree No 78/263 that provides for the procedures 
for settling agro-pastoral disputes (Moritz et. al., 2013). 
It is recommended that in addition to a dispute resolution clause, the proposed grazing law 
should have provisions for the management of the grazing land. For example, because the ranch 




suggestion would be the creation of a government agency that ensures t there is a year-round 
supply of foliage, which would ensure that ranchers stay on the ranch. The advantage of creating 
a government entity is that it would provide continuity of the management arrangement.  
6.1.7 Option 6: Adopt a Systems Approach to Framing the Postharvest Loss Problem 
Numerous factors contribute to the postharvest loss farmers encounter in their daily life. 
Therefore, in proposing solutions that reduce loss, efforts must be made to consider the social 
and institutional factors that contribute to losses. For example, solutions should consist of 
expanding the local vocational education curriculum to include courses that encourage students 
to develop technologies from locally sourced materials that solve community challenges. 
Domestic production would guarantee that the machinery produced is designed intentionally for 
the people, and the peculiarities of the communities are factored in the design process. Also, 
machinery produced locally can be repaired easily without having to import parts. In the 
beginning, the machinery might be costly, but as local producers achieve economies of scale, it is 
expected that the production costs will be reduced. 
 Policy Recommendations 
Based on the policy options described in the previous sections, reducing losses should focus on 
these three priority areas. The quantitative and qualitative data suggest that these areas have the 
greatest impact on postharvest losses. These recommendations are discussed in order of priority 
that should be followed. 
The results from the quantitative study show that participating in a formal contract farming 
scheme has the most significant effect on postharvest losses. For farmers participating in a 




does not join. Therefore, it is recommended that the government prioritizes the growth of 
contract farming schemes in the country by providing a conducive environment that encourages 
contract farming to thrive. For example, in setting prices for subsidized inputs, the government 
should consult with the contract farming schemes that provide the same services. Thus, it is 
particularly crucial for contract farming that sells inputs as seen in the Heritage Seeds example, 
where the government’s subsidized prices are negatively affecting the ability of the profitability 
of the scheme.  
Also, the study shows that high transaction costs for formal contract farming organizations 
hinder some communities from benefitting from the gains that these organizations could 
potentially offer. For example, in the Masara scheme had to leave the Northern Region due to 
high default rates, and the inability of the scheme to pursue legal actions against defaulting 
farmers. To reduce these transaction costs, the government should prioritize the application of 
the rule of law across the country. By doing this, the justice system would be strengthened, and it 
would strengthen the force of contracts in the country. 
Another way the government can reduce transaction costs is by reducing information asymmetry 
that exists between the farmers and the market women. According to the farmers in the Upper 
West Region, they experienced losses when they are oblivious of the prevailing market price of 
their produce and store at home until they can get a better offer. The government could 
implement a policy and program that disseminates market information to the farmers. The 
government could also create incentives that encourage markets to develop closer to the farmers. 
To do this, the government could set up infrastructure and amenities that would promote 




Next, the government should focus on increasing educational attainment. The quantitative data 
suggest that farmers with the highest educational attainment have the least losses. According to 
the key informants, these groups of highly educated farmers were more likely to adopt good 
agricultural practices to reduce losses because of their education. Closely related to this is the 
need for the government to employ more extension workers. According to the farmers in the two 
regions, the lack of training services created an information gap on the best agricultural practices. 
The farmers stated that only farmers participating in the formal CF schemes had access to 
extension services. According to the representatives of these schemes, the provision of the 
extension services increases the financial costs of operation. These financial costs are passed on 
to the farmers. By employing more extension workers and partnering with the contract 
organizations to provide the service, these costs will be eliminated on the part of the CF scheme 
and the farmer.  
Finally, the government should prioritize the distribution of land to women. The quantitative data 
suggest that despite that, the average farm size of a male farmer is twice the size of a female, the 
difference between the average production per acre is marginal.  The data also suggests that 
women are less likely to have losses. According to the key informants, female farmers are more 
likely to follow instructions on good agricultural production and postharvest handling. However, 
the potential gains that could be benefitted from encouraging the participation of women are not 
fully maximized because of the cultural traditions that prevent women from landholding. It is 
recommended that the government expands its block farms programs to focus on women to 
allow women to hold land by bypassing the traditional norms. Also, the government should focus 





In conclusion, the recommendations above demonstrate that there are many policy options 
available for postharvest loss reduction and that loss reduction is far from a one size fits all 
strategy. Stakeholders should evaluate the distinct peculiarities of their communities and adopt 
the approach or a combination of strategies that work best within the community.  
6.3.1 Future Work 
The results from the quantitative study suggest that farmers participating in the informal contract 
schemes experienced the lowest levels of productivity and highest levels of postharvest loss. This 
study could not explain this finding. Future studies should explore the rationale for this 
observation.  Also, the results suggest that marginal increases in the number of people working 
on the farm led to an increase in postharvest losses. An additional future direction of research is 
to explain the inverse correlation between the two. Furthermore, understanding the stages along 
the value chain where additional labor could potentially increase losses will expand the body of 











Table 7: Postharvest Loss in Africa Journal Publications 1900-2018 
Authors Crop Focus 
(Adarkwah, Obeng-
Ofori et al. 2017) 
Cereals Etymology; Storage technologies 
(Afari-Sefa, Rajendran 
et al. 2015) 
Vegetables Nutrition 




(Aidoo 1993) Tropical Crops Storage Technologies 
(Ait-Oubahou 2013) Cereals Storage Technologies 
(Ambler, de Brauw et 
al. 2018) 
Maize, soya and 
groundnuts 
Measuring PHL 
(Asiedu 2003) Horticulture Agric Extension 





Nuamah et al. 2005) 
Tubers (Yam) Storage Technologies 
(Baoua, Amadou et al. 
2016) 
Rice Storage Technologies 
(Baoua, Amadou et al. 
2012) 
Cowpea Storage Technologies 
(Baoua, Amadou et al. 
2014) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Baoua, Margam et al. 
2012) 




(Bittner, Balfe et al. 
2018) 
Cowpea Storage Technologies 
(Bower, Dennison et al. 
2003) 
Avocados Storage Technologies; Transport 
Technologies 
(Buchner, Kinnear et al. 
2011) 
Pear Storage Technologies 
(Cronje 2013) Citrus Storage Technologies 
(de Beer and Crouch 
2013) 
Broccolli Storage Technologies 
(Ekanayake and Lyasse 
2003) 
Cassava Storage Technologies 
(Ekpa, Palacios-Rojas et 
al. 2018) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Gitonga, De Groote et 
al. 2013) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Gueye, Seck et al. 
2012) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Hodges, Buzby et al. 
2011) 
 
Markets, Storage Technologies, 
Transport Technologies,  
(Holst, Meikle et al. 
2000) 
Maize Etymology; Storage technologies 
(Kadzere, Watkins et al. 
2006) 
Uapaca kirkiana (Native 
South African fruit) 
Cause of PHL 
(Kahangi 2010) Banana Improved Seed Technologies 
(Kaminski, J., and 
Christiaensen, L. 
2014).  
Maize, Cereals Measuring PHL 
(Kamrath, Rajendran et 
al. 2018) 
Tomatoes Improved Seed Technologies 
(Kharel, Mason et al. 
2018) 




(Kitinoja and AlHassan 
2012) 
Horticulural crops Storage Technologies, Transport 
Technologies, 
(Kumar and Kalita 
2017) 
Cerals Storage Technologies 
(Lusiba, Kibwika et al. 
2017) 
Rice Mechanization 
(Macheka, Spelt et al. 
2017) 
Tomatoes Storage Technologies 
(Macheka, Spelt et al. 
2018) 
Tomatoes Transport Technologies 
(Mampholo, Sivakumar 
et al. 2016) 
Leafy vegetables Nutrition 
(Manu, Osekre et al. 
2018) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Mitcham, Crump et al. 
2013) 
Horticulture Markets 
(Munhuweyi, Lennox et 
al. 2017) 
Promongranate Fungicide use 
(Munhuweyi, Opara et 
al. 2016) 
Cabbage Storage Technologies 
(Murdock and Baoua 
2014) 
Cowpea Storage Technologies 
(Mutungi, Affognon et 
al. 2015) 
Cowpea Storage Technologies 
(Mutungi, Affognon et 
al. 2014) 
Cowpea Storage Technologies 
(Mvumi, Matsikira et al. 
2016) 
Banana Markets 
(Mwangi, Mutungi et al. 
2017) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Ndegwa, De Groote et 
al. 2016) 




(Ng'ang'a, Mutungi et 
al. 2016) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Nkolisa, Magwaza et 
al. 2018) 
Tomatoes Storage Technologies 
(Ognakossan, Affognon 
et al. 2016) 
Maize  Storage Technologies 
(Ortiz, Ponrajan et al. 
2018) 
Maize Milling Technologies 
(Osei-Kwarteng, 
Gweyi-Onyango et al. 
2017) 
Vegetables Markets, Transport Technologies 
(Paudyal, Opit et al. 
2017) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Precoppe, Chapuis et 
al. 2017) 
Cassava Drying Technologies 
(Rankins, Sathe et al. 
2008) 
Mangoes Drying Technologies 
(Rochefort, Theron et 
al. 2015) 
Pear Fungicide 
(Saran, Roy et al. 2012) Vegetables  Handling Technologies; Packing 
Technologies; Storage Technologies; 
Processing Technologies 
(Setamou, Schulthess et 
al. 2000) 
Maize Pesticide  
(Setamou, Schulthess et 
al. 2000) 
 
Literature Review of PHL interventions 
(Setamou, Schulthess et 
al. 2000) 
Citrus Fungicide 
(Sibomana, Workneh et 
al. 2016) 
Tomatoes Literature review 
(Siboza, Bower et al. 
2011) 








(Sowley, Osei et al. 
2013) 
Tubers (Yams) Fungicide 
(Ssebaggala, Kibwika et 
al. 2017) 
Rice Literature Review 
(Tefera, Demissie et al. 
2013) 
Maize Improved Seed Technologies 
(Tefera, Mugo et al. 
2016) 
Maize Improved Seed Technologies 




(Tolesa and Workneh 
2017) 
Tomatoes Storage Technologies 
(Vayssieres, Korie et al. 
2008) 
Mangoes Literature Review 
(Veldman, Regnier et 
al. 2018) 
Mangoes Fungicide 
(Venus, Asare-Kyei et 
al. 2013) 
Tomatoes Transport Technologies 
(Williams, Murdock et 
al. 2017) 
Soghurm Storage Technologies 
(Williams, Murdock et 
al. 2017) 
Maize Storage Technologies 
(Xu, Doel et al. 2017) Groundnuts, Maize, 
Rice, and Other Grains, 










1. District of farm location 
2. Business name of farm (To be encoded for privacy) 
3. Business contact of the farm (To be encoded for privacy) 
4. Are you the farm manager? 
Mark only one oval. 
Yes 
No
5. Are you able to answer questions about the management of the farm? 
Mark only one oval. 
Yes 
No
The following questions are intended for the persons that operate or manage the farm on a day 





6. Gender of farm owner/operator 
Mark only one oval. 
Male  
Female  
Equally owned by male and female 
Other: 
7. Age of farm owner/operator (in years) 













8. Highest Level of Education Attainment 
Mark only one oval. 
No formal education 
Primary School 
Junior Secondary School 
Senior Secondary School 
Polytechnic/University/Teacher Training College 
9.Is farming the primary occupation of the farm operator? 
Mark only one oval. 
Yes 
No 
10. If No, what is the primary occupation? 
11. What is the size of your land (in acres)? 





13.In what way was the farm acquired by the current owner? 
Check all that apply. 









14.What is the current holding of the farm? 





15. How many people are employed on the farm (including yourself)? 







17.Which of these farm machinery do you currently use on your farm for your maize farming? 
















18.How do you get access to the use of the farm machinery listed in the question above? Select 
all that apply. 








19. What are the challenges with marketing your maize? 
Check all that apply. 
Bad quality of maize seeds 
Bad quality of the maize 
Unpredictable weather patterns 
Poor infrastructure and transport system 
Inadequate knowledge of market price 
Downtown in the economic outlook of the city 







20. How do you store your harvested maize? 





Hermetic Storage e.g PICS bag 
Other: 
21.How do you get access to the use of the storage method? 














22. How do you dry your harvested maize? 





On ground drying 
Other: 
23.Do you participate in contract farming?  
Mark only one oval. 
Yes  
No 
24. If No, why? 
25.How long have you participated in contract farming (in years)? 
26. How many hectares of your farm land is under contract? 
27.Why do you not have all your farmland under contract? (Explain) 
28.How many bags of maize does your contract allow you to  
a) Pay back to the contractor? 





29.What is the nature of your contract? 
Mark only one oval. 
Formal (written)  
Informal (oral) 
Other: 
30.What is the name of the contract scheme you belong to? 
31.Why do you participate in the contract arrangement? 
Check all that apply. 
To improve sales 
To get tractors and equipment 
To get irrigation resources 
To get better inputs ( e.g. seeds, fertilizers) 
To get better personal and family income 
To get better storage facilities 
To improving packing access 






32.Is the contract farming arrangement more beneficial to you than non-contract farming? 




33. If yes or no, please explain why? 
34. What is the  
a) Quantity (in bags) that you sold to the contractor? 
b) Price per bag that you sold to the contractor 
35. What is the  
a) Quantity (in bags) that you sold in the open market? 






1 What is the total number of bags you harvested at the last harvest seasob? 
2. How many bags of the maize that you harvested did you and your family consume? 
3.  In your opinion, what is the total number of bags of maize you harvested was lost? 
How many bags were eaten by eaten by 
rodents or insects? 
 
How many bags were affected by mold?  
How many bags were destroyed during 
shelling? 
 
How many bags were destroyed during 
drying? 
 









Abdoulaye, T., Bamire, A. S., Akinola, A. A., & Etwire, P. M. (2017). Smallholder farmers’ 
perceptions and strategies for adaptation to climate change in Brong Ahafo and Upper 
West Regions of Ghana Working Paper No. 207 CGIAR Research Program on Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). 
Ackah, I. (2016). Sacrificing Cereals for Crude: Has oil discovery slowed agriculture growth in 
Ghana?. Available at SSRN 2745904. 
Adombila, M. (2018). Food Imports Cost US$ 2.4bn Annually. Available at 
https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/food-imports-cost-us-2-4bn-
annually.html  [Accessed December 12, 2019] 
Afful, C. F., Hejkrlík, J., & Doucha, T. (2015). Rural banking in Ghana and its impact on rural 
farmers. Case study of the Birim South District, Ghana. Asian Social Science, 11(25), 101–
110. https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v11n25p101 
AFP. (2019, June 25). The Fulani: An AFP Special Investigation. AFP. Available at 
https://www.afp.com/en/inside-afp/fulani-afp-special-investigation [Accessed November 
21, 2019] 
Agriculture Development Bank. (2020). Historical Milestones | Agricultural Development Bank. 
Available at https://www.agricbank.com/about-us/historical-milestones/  [Accessed July 23, 
2019] 
Ajetunmobi, W. (2018, July 7). Smugglers make huge profit diverting subsidized fertilizers in 
Ghana - African Liberty. African Liberty. Available at 
https://www.africanliberty.org/2018/09/07/smugglers-make-huge-profit-diverting-
subsidized-fertilizers-in-ghana/ {Accessed August 25, 2019] 
Akimowicz, M., Vyn, R. J., Cummings, H., & Landman, K. (2018). An introduction to mixed 
methods research in agricultural economics: The example of farm investment in Ontario’s 
Greenbelt, Canada. Journal of Rural Studies, 61, 162–174. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2018.04.012 
Al-Hassan, R., & Poulton, C. (2009). Agriculture and Social Protection in Ghana. FAC Working 
Paper No. SP04 January 2009. Available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b306/1631b4784d555fce1c52065a55acf98b5be8.pdf?_ga=
2.82091540.329759581.1581024455-1147583729.1581024455 [Accessed July 21, 2019]  
Alliance for Financial Inclusion. (2018). Bringing Smart Policies To Life Agricultural Finance 
Intervention In Ghana Case Study. Available at https://www.afi-
global.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018-
12/Case%20Study_Agricultural%20Finance%20Interventions%20in%20Ghana_Final.pdf 




Angelucci F., (2012). Analysis of incentives and disincentives for maize in Ghana. Technical 
notes series, MAFAP, FAO, Rome.  
Arhinful, D. K. (2003). The solidarity of self-interest : social and cultural feasibility of rural 
health insurance in Ghana. African Studies Centre, Leiden. 
Armah, E., Kissi, E. A., & Fiankor, D.-D. D. (2019). The impact of the National Food Buffer 
Stock Company on price transmission in Ghana. In African Journal of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (Vol. 14). 
Ashaley, R. (2013). Land Degradation In The Upper East Region Of Ghana, West Africa. 1–9. 
Attanasio, O. P., Meghir, C., & Santiago, A. (2012). Education Choices in Mexico: Using a 
Structural Model and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate PROGRESA. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 79(1), 37–66. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr015 
Awotide, B. A., Fashogbon, A., & Awoyemi, T. T. (2015). Impact of Agro-Industrial 
Development Strategies on Smallholder Rice Farmers’ Productivity, Income and Poverty: 
The Case of Contract Farming in Nigeria. Available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ef51/2c161237e325bd26c2f0d0b4c2a9509b4464.pdf 
[Accessed February 6, 2020] 
Azumah, S., Donkoh, S., & Ehiakpor, D. (2016). Examining the determinants and effects of 
Contract Farming on Farm Income in the Northern Region of Ghana. Ghana Journal of 
Science, Technology and Development, 4(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1093/AJAE 
Ba, H. A., de Mey, Y., Thoron, S., & Demont, M. (2019). Inclusiveness of contract farming 
along the vertical coordination continuum: Evidence from the Vietnamese rice sector. Land 
Use Policy, 87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104050 
Baloch U.K. (2010) In: Lewis B, Mejia D (eds) Wheat: postharvest operations. Pakistan 
Agricultural Research Council, Islamabad, pp 1–21 
Barrett, C. B. (2008). Smallholder market participation: Concepts and evidence from eastern and 
southern Africa. Food Policy, 33(4), 299–317. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.FOODPOL.2007.10.005 
Barrett, C. B., Bachke, M. E., Bellemare, M. F., Michelson, H. C., Narayanan, S., & Walker, T. 
F. (2012). Smallholder Participation in Contract Farming: Comparative Evidence from Five 
Countries. World Development, 40(4), 715–730. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2011.09.006 
Barry, P., Sonka, S., & Lajili, K. (1992). All sides should know pitfalls of agricultural 




Bates, R. (1989). Beyond the miracle of the market : the political economy of agrarian 
development in Kenya. Cambridge University Press. 
Baumann, P. (2000). Equity and Efficiency in Contract Farming Schemes: The Experience of 
Agricultural tree Crops. London 
BBC. (2019, April 30). Julius Malema - South Africa’s radical agenda setter - BBC News. BBC. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14718226 
Beets, W. C. (1990). Raising and sustaining productivity of smallholder farming systems in the 
tropics. A handbook of sustainable agricultural development. Alkmaar (Netherlands) AgBe. 
Bellemare, M. F. (2018). Contract farming: opportunity cost and trade-offs. Agricultural 
Economics (United Kingdom), 49(3), 279–288. https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12415 
Bellemare, M. F., & Lim, S. (2018). In all shapes and colors: Varieties of contract farming. 
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 40(3), 379–401. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/AEPP/PPY019 
Benin, S. M. (2013). Revisiting Agricultural Input and Farm Support Subsidies in Africa: The 
Case of Ghana's Mechanization, Fertilizer, Block Farms, and Marketing Programs 
(November 2013). Available at  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2373185 [Accessed 1 January, 
2019] 
Benin, S., Johnson, M., Jimah, K., Taabazuing, J., Tenga, A., Abokyi, E., Nasser, G., & Ahorbo, 
G. (2011). Evaluation of Four Special Initiatives of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Government of Ghana Fertilizer Subsidy Agricultural Mechanization Block Farms and 
Youth in Agriculture National Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO). Available at 
https://gssp.ifpri.info/files/2011/11/MoFA-Program-Evaluation-Report.pdf [Accessed 
Novermber 3, 2019] 
Berkes, F., Colding, J., & Folke, C. (2003). Navigating Social-Ecological Systems Building 
Resilience for Complexity and Change (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. 
Bijman, J. (2008). Contract farming in developing countries: an overview 1 Working Paper. 
https://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/fulltext/1763 
Binswanger, H. P., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (1986). Behavioural and Material Determinants of 
Production Relations in Agriculture. The Journal of Development Studies, 22(3), 503–539. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388608421994 
Boadu, F. O. (2016). Contract Farming. In Agricultural Law and Economics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (pp. 95–113). https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801771-5.00003-4 
Bryden, W. L. (2007). Mycotoxins in the food chain: human health implications. Asia Pacific 




Bukari, K. N., & Schareika, N. (2015). Stereotypes, prejudices and exclusion of Fulani 
pastoralists in Ghana. Pastoralism, 5(1), 20. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13570-015-0043-8 
Bukari, K. N., Sow, P., & Scheffran, J. (2018). Cooperation and Co-Existence Between Farmers 
and Herders in the Midst of Violent Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Ghana. In African Studies 
Review (Vol. 61, Issue 2, pp. 78–102). Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.124 
Chapoto, A., Onumah, G. E., & Ainembabazi, H. (n.d.). Getting More for Farmers from Post-
Harvest to Market CHAPTER 6 Mulat Demeke Food and Agriculture Organization, Nairob. 
Available at http://eagc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/2016_AASR_Chapter_6_Getting_more_for_Farmers_from_Post_
harvest_to_Market.pdf [Accessed February 18, 2019] 
Choudhary, V., Christienson, Garry, & Josserand, Henri. (2015). Ghana: Agricultural Sector 
Risk Assessment Risk Prioritization. Washington D.C. 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x 
Cochran, W. G. (1963). Sampling techniques. John Wiley & Sons. 
Control And Prevention Of Bushfires Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. P.N.D.C.L.229 (1990). 
Convention C095 - Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), (1949). Available at 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CO
DE:C095 [Accessed January 8, 2020] 
Cotula, L., Dyer, N., & Vermeulen, S. (2008). Fuelling exclusion? The biofuels boom and poor 
people’s access to land. IIED, London.  
Cowen, M. (1981). The Agrarian Problem: Notes on the Nairobi Discussion. Review of African 
Political Economy, 8(20), 57–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056248108703456 
Croppenstedt, A., Demeke, M., & Meschi, M. M. (2003). Technology Adoption in the Presence 
of Constraints: the Case of Fertilizer Demand in Ethiopia. Review of Development 
Economics, 7(1), 58–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9361.00175 
Daddieh, C (1994) Contract Farming in the Shadow of Competitive Markets: He Experience of 
Kenyan Horticulture, In Little, P. and Watts, M. Living Under Contract: Contract Farming 
and Agrarian Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. University of Wisconsin Press. 
Madison, Wisconsin. 
Daum, T., & Birner, R. (2019). African Agricultural Mechanization: Myths, Realities and an 





Delgado, C. L. (1999). Sources Of Growth In Smallholder Agriculture Integration Of 
Smallholders With Processors In Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role Of Vertical And Marketers 
Of High Value-Added Items. Agrekon, 38(sup001), 165–189. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03031853.1999.9524913 
Delgado, L., Schuster, M. & Torero, M. (2019). Quantity and quality food losses across the value 
chain: a comparative analysis. Background paper for The State of Food and Agriculture 
2019. Moving forward on food loss and waste reduction. Washington, DC, IFPRI. 
Unpublished. 
Deloitte. (2015). Reducing Post-Harvest Loss Through a Market-Led Approach. Johannesburg 
Dessein, J., & Nevens, F. (2007). ’I’m Sad To Be Glad?. An Analysis of Farmers? Pride in 
Flanders. Sociologia Ruralis, 47(3), 273–292. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9523.2007.00437.x 
Deutsche Welle. (2018, September 23). Ghana: Women struggle to secure land rights. Deutsche 
Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/ghana-women-struggle-to-secure-land-rights/a-45608607 
Diao, X., Cossar, F., Houssou, N., & Kolavalli, S. (2014). Mechanization in Ghana: Emerging 
demand, and the search for alternative supply models. Food Policy, 48, 168–181. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.05.013 
Donkoh, S. A., Eliasu, A., Gershon, I., & Ansah, K. (2016). Participation and output effect of a 
Block Farm Credit Programme in selected districts of Northern Ghana. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AFR-01-2016-0005 
Druilhe, Z., & Barreiro-Hurlé, J. (2012). Fertilizer subsidies in sub-Saharan Africa. Available at 
www.fao.org/economic/esa [Accessed December 4, 2019] 
Dumenu, W. K., & Obeng, E. A. (2016). Climate change and rural communities in Ghana: 
Social vulnerability, impacts, adaptations and policy implications. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.10.010 
Eaton, C., & Shepherd, A. W. (2001). Contract Farming: Partnerships for Growth. A Guide. 
FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin, 145, 1–161.  
ECOWAS (1979) ECOWAS/979 Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, 
Residence, and Establishment. Available from 
http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/PROTOCOL%20
RELATING%20TO%20%20FREE%20MOVEMENT%20OF%20PERSONS.pdf 
Emmanuel, D., Owusu-Sekyere, E., Owusu, V., & Jordaan, H. (2016). Impact of agricultural 
extension service on adoption of chemical fertilizer: Implications for rice productivity and 





FAO (2001) Contract farming Partnerships for growth. FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 145 
ISSN 000-000. Available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/y0937e/y0937e00.pdf 
FAO, IFAD, and UNIDROIT (2017). Legal aspects of contract farming agreements. Synthesis of 
the UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD Legal Guide on Contract Farming. Rome.  
FAO. (2009). The special challenge for sub-Saharan Africa. Available at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/Issues_papers/HLEF2050_Africa.pdf 
[Accessed September 30, 2019] 
FAO. (2011). 2010-11 The State of Food And Agriculture Women In Agriculture Closing the 
gender gap for development. Rome 
FAO. (2012). Gender Inequalities in Rural Employment in Ghana An Overview. Rome 
FAO. (2013). Contract farming for inclusive market access. Rome 
FAO. (2018). Gender Opportunities And Constraints In Land-Related Agricultural Investments 
Gender Opportunities And Constraints In Land-Related Agricultural Investments Synthesis 
Report. FAO. 
Fletcher, M. T., & Blaney, B. J. (2016). Mycotoxins. In Reference Module in Food Science. 
Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-100596-5.00112-8 
Fosu, M., Karlan, D., Kolavalli, S., & Udry, C. (2018). Comparing Yields and Profits of Seed 
Varieties in Northern Ghana. Innovations for Poverty Action 
Friedman, T. (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 
http://www.thomaslfriedman.com/the-lexus-and-the-olive-tree/ 
Frimpong, K. (2015, December 11). Ghana’s Anti-Bush Fire Law Is Not Deterring Enough To 
Stop Bush Fires – Anaglatey. Modernghana. 
https://www.modernghana.com/news/661132/ghanas-anti-bush-fire-law-is-not-deterring-
enough.html 
Fuentes, P. A., Bumb, B., & Johnson, M. (2011). Improving fertilizer markets in West Africa: 
The fertilizer supply chain in Ghana. Draft for Review, International Fertilizer 
Development Center and International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. 
 Fulton, K., & Nickels, B. (2017). Africa’s Pastoralists: A New Battleground for Terrorism. 
Africa Center for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-pastoralists-
battleground-terrorism/ 






GhanaWeb. (2019, September 5). Tonnes of Maize rot away as no buyers exist. GhanaWeb. 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Tonnes-of-Maize-rot-away-as-no-
buyers-exist-778610 
GhanaWeb. (2020). DOSSIER: Fulani clashes. GhanaWeb. 
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=822 
Gisolfi, M. (2006). From Crop Lien to Contract Farming: The Roots of Agribusiness in the 
American South, 1929-1939. Agricultural History, 80(2), 167-189.  
Glenn, D. I. (1992). Determining sample size. A series of the Program Evaluation and 
Organizational Development. University of Florida, Publication date: November. 
Global Knowledge Initiative. (2014). Reducing Global Food Waste and Spoilage A Rockefeller 
Foundation Initiative. 
Glover, D. (1990). Contract Farming And Outgrower Schemes In East And Southern Africa. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 41(3), 303–315. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-
9552.1990.tb00648.x 
Glover, D. J. (1984). Contract Farming and Smallholder Outgrower Schemes in Less-developed 
Countries. In World Development (Vol. 12). 
Glover, D., & Kusterer, K. (1990). Small Farmers, Big Business, Contract Farming and Rural 
Development (First). THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD. 
Government of Ghana. Local Government (Departments of District Assemblies) 
(Commencement) Instrument, L.I. 1961) (2009). Accra. 
Guyver, P., & MacCarthy, M. (2011). The Ghana grains partnership. International Journal of 
Agricultural Sustainability, 9(1), 35–41. https://doi.org/10.3763/ijas.2010.0564 
Haschek, W. M., & Voss, K. A. (2013). Chapter 39 - Mycotoxins. In Haschek and Rousseaux’s 
Handbook of Toxicologic Pathology (Third Edit, pp. 1187–1258). Elsevier. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-415759-0.00039-X 
Hengsdijk, H., & de Boer, W. J. (2017). Post-harvest management and post-harvest losses of 
cereals in Ethiopia. Food Security, 9(5), 945–958. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-017-
0714-y 
Hubbard, M. (1997). The ‘New Institutional Economics’ In Agricultural Development: Insights 





IMPAQ International. (2011). Millennium Development Authority (MIDA)-Ghana Mid-Term 
Review Consultancy Mid-Term Review Report The Chief Executive Officer Millennium 
Development Authority (MiDA) 
Jaffee, S (1994) Contract Farming in the Shadow of Competitive Markets: He Experience of 
Kenyan HOrticulture, In Little, P. and Watts, M. Living Under Contract: Contract Farming 
and Agrarian Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. University of Wisconsin Press. 
Madison, Wisconsin. 
Jayne, T., Kolavalli, S., Debrah, K., Ariga, J., Brunache, P., Kabaghe, C., Nunez-Rodriguez, W., 
Baah, K. O., Bationo, A., Huising, E., Lambrecht, I., Diao, X., Yeboah, F., Benin, S., & 
Andam, K. (2015). Towards A Sustainable Soil Fertility Strategy In Ghana Report 
submitted to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Government of Ghana. 
Johnson, B., & Christensen, L. (2016). Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and 
Mixed Approaches | SAGE Companion (6th ed.). Sage Publishing.  
Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2007). Toward a Definition of Mixed Methods Research. 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(2), 112–133. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1558689806298224 
Kherallah, M., & Kirsten, J. F. (2002). The new institutional economics: Applications for 
agricultural policy research in developing countries. Agrekon, 41(2), 110–133. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03031853.2002.9523589 
Kidane, W., Maetz, M., & Dardel, P. (2006). Food security and agricultural development in sub-
Saharan Africa Building a case for more public support Main report. FAO 
Kikulwe, E. M., Okurut, S., Ajambo, S., Nowakunda, K., Stoian, D., & Naziri, D. (2018). 
Postharvest Losses and their Determinants: A Challenge to Creating a Sustainable Cooking 
Banana Value Chain in Uganda. Sustainability, 10(7). https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072381 
Kimanya, M. E., De Meulenaer, B., Van Camp, J., Baert, K., & Kolsteren, P. (2011). Strategies 
to reduce exposure of fumonisins from complementary foods in rural Tanzaniam cn_337 
503..511. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8709.2011.00337.x 
Kirsten, J., & Sartorius, K. (2002). Linking agribusiness and small-scale farmers in developing 
countries: Is there a new role for contract farming? Development Southern Africa, 19(4), 
503–529. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835022000019428 
Kleemann, L. (2016). The relevance of business practices in linking smallholders and large agro-
businesses in sub-sahara africa. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 
19(4), 65–78. https://doi.org/10.22434/IFAMR2015.0204 
Kloeppinger-Todd, R., & Sharma, M. (2020). Edited By Innovations In Rural And Agriculture 




Kohls, R. and Uhl, J. (2002). Marketing of agricultural products. Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Komatsu, H., Malapit, H. J. L., & Theis, S. (2018). Does women’s time in domestic work and 
agriculture affect women’s and children’s dietary diversity? Evidence from Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Cambodia, Ghana, and Mozambique. Food Policy, 79, 256–270. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.07.002 
Kornher, L. (2018). Maize markets in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) in the context of 
climate change Background paper for The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 
(SOCO) 2018. Retrieved October 26, 2019, from www.fao.org/publications 
Kremelberg, D. (2014). Practical Statistics: A Quick and Easy Guide to IBM® SPSS® Statistics, 
STATA, and Other Statistical Software. In Practical Statistics: A Quick and Easy Guide to 
IBM® SPSS® Statistics, STATA, and Other Statistical Software. SAGE Publications, Inc. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483385655 
Krueger, R A., Casey, M. A. . (2009). Planning the Focus Group Study. In Focus Groups A 
Practical Guide for Applied Research (p. 215). https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-
6678.2007.tb00462.x 
Kusimi, J., & Appati, J. (2012). Bushfires in the Krachi District: The socio-economic and 
environmental implications. ISPRS - International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote 
Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences, XXXIX-B8, 39–44. 
https://doi.org/10.5194/isprsarchives-XXXIX-B8-39-2012 
Kuyu, C. G., Tola, Y. B., & Abdi, G. G. (2019). Study on post-harvest quantitative and 
qualitative losses of potato tubers from two different road access districts of Jimma zone, 
South West Ethiopia. Heliyon, 5(8), e02272. doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2019.e02272 
Labor Act, (2003). Available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex [accessed 1 October 2019]. 
Lambrecht, I. B., & Ragasa, C. (2018). Do development projects crowd-out private sector 
activities? Evidence from contract farming participation in Northern Ghana. Food Policy, 
74, 9–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.FOODPOL.2017.11.001 
Langford, B. E., Schoenfeld, G., & Izzo, G. (2002). Nominal grouping sessions vs focus groups. 
Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 5(1), 58–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13522750210414517 
Lawson, E. T., Alare, R. S., Salifu, A. R. Z., & Thompson-Hall, M. (2019). Dealing with climate 
change in semi-arid Ghana: understanding intersectional perceptions and adaptation 




Li, J., Rodriguez, D., Zhang, D., & Ma, K. (2015). Crop rotation model for contract farming with 
constraints on similar profits. Computers and Electronics in Agriculture, 119, 12–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.COMPAG.2015.10.002 
Little, P. D. (1994). Living Under Contract : Contract Farming And Agrarian Transformation In 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Univ. of Wisconsin Press. 
Mabe, F., Danso-Abbeam, G. and Sienso, G. (2019). Does contract farming improve rice yield In 
Ghana?. Cogent Food & Agriculture, 5(1). 
Macauley, H. (2015). Cereal Crops: Rice, Maize, Millet, Sorghum, Wheat. Available at 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Events/DakAgri2015/Cereal_Cro
ps-_Rice__Maize__Millet__Sorghum__Wheat.pdf [Accessed July 3, 2019] 
Maertens, M., & Vande Velde, K. (2017). Contract-farming in Staple Food Chains: The Case of 
Rice in Benin. World Development, 95, 73–87. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2017.02.011 
Mangnus, E., & van Westen, A. C. M. (2018). Roaming through the Maze of Maize in Northern 
Ghana. A Systems Approach to Explore the Long-Term Effects of a Food Security 
Intervention. Sustainability, 10(10), 3605. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10103605 
Marenya, P. P., & Barrett, C. B. (2009). Soil quality and fertilizer use rates among smallholder 
farmers in western Kenya. Agricultural Economics, 40(5), 561–572. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2009.00398.x 
McGregor, A. (2017). The Fulani Crisis: Communal Violence and Radicalization in the Sahel. In 
CTC SENTINEL (Vol. 10, Issue 2). Available at 
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/01/ [Accessed 
September 8, 2019] 
McMichael, P. (2016). Development and social change : a global perspective (6th ed.). Pine 
Forge Press. 
Mensah, O. J., & Nurah K. (2012). Factors determining access to formal credit in Ghana: A case 
study of smallholder farmers in the Abura-Asebu Kwamankese district of central region of 
Ghana. Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics, 4(14), 416–423. 
https://doi.org/10.5897/JDAE12.099 
MoFA. (2017). Agriculture in Ghana: Facts and Figures 2016. 
MoFA. (2019). National Food Buffer Stock Company. MoFA. Available at 
http://mofa.gov.gh/site/index.php/sports/sub-vented-organization-soes/national-food-buffer-




Mogues, T., Omusu-Baah, K., Ga, G. W., Assembly, W. M., Shai-Osudoku, S. O., & Assembly, 
D. (2014). Decentralizing Agricultural Public Expenditures Findings from a Scoping Study 
at the Onset of a New Stage in Ghana’s Decentralization Reform. 
Moritz, M. (2010). Understanding Herder-Farmer Conflicts in West Africa: Outline of a 
Processual Approach. In Human Organization (Vol. 69, Issue 2).  
Moritz, M., Larisa Catherine, B., Drent, A. K., Kari, S., Mouhaman, A., & Scholte, P. (2013). 
Rangeland governance in an open system: Protecting transhumance corridors in the Far 
North Province of Cameroon. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice, 3(1), 26. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/2041-7136-3-26 
Netting, R. M. (1993). Smallholders, householders : farm families and the ecology of intensive, 
sustainable agriculture. Stanford University Press. 
News Ghana. (2019, February 15). The Ghana Pastoral Policy, the Vehicle to drive Cattle 
Ranching Law. Available at  https://www.newsghana.com.gh/the-ghana-pastoral-policy-
the-vehicle-to-drive-cattle-ranching-law/ [Accessed January 20, 2020] 
North, D. C. (1984). Government and the Cost of Exchange in History. The Journal of Economic 
History, 44(2), 255–264. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700031855 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge 
University Press.  
Nowell, L. S., Norris, J. M., White, D. E., & Moules, N. J. (2017). Thematic Analysis. 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 16(1), 160940691773384. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406917733847 
Nsiah-Gyabaah, K. (1996). Ghana: Bushfires in Ghana. Available at 
https://gfmc.online/iffn/country/gh/gh_1.html [Accessed January 20, 2020] 
Nyantakyi-Frimpong, H., & Bezner Kerr, R. (2015). A political ecology of high-input agriculture 
in northern Ghana. African Geographical Review, 34(1), 13–35. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2014.929971 
O’Neil, M. (2016, August). In Ghana, Women and “Market Queens” Dominate the Economy. 
Vice, 12. Available at https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bjggyd/in-ghana-women-and-
market-queens-dominate-the-economy [Accessed August 24 2019] 
Oxford Business Group. (2020). Subsidies to promote fertiliser use in Ghana have been largely 






Oya, C. (2012). Contract Farming in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Survey of Approaches, Debates and 
Issues. Journal of Agrarian Change, 12(1), 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-
0366.2011.00337.x 
Paglietti, L., & Sabrie, R. (2012). Outgrower schemes: advantages of different business models 
for sustainable crop intensification. 
Parfitt, J., Barthel, M., & MacNaughton, S. (2010). Food waste within food supply chains: 
Quantification and potential for change to 2050. In Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences (Vol. 365, Issue 1554, pp. 3065–3081). Royal Society. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0126 
Porter, G., & Phillips-Howard, K. (1997). Comparing contracts: An evaluation of contract 
farming schemes in Africa. World Development, 25(2), 227–238. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(96)00101-5 
Prowse, M. (2012). Contract farming in developing countries: a review. (A savoir; Vol. 12). 
Paris: AFD, Agence française de développement.  
Ragasa, C., & Chapoto, A. (2017). Limits to Green Revolution in rice in Africa: The case of 
Ghana. Land Use Policy, 66, 304–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.04.052 
Ragasa, C., Dankyi, A., Acheampong, P., Wiredu, A. N., Chapoto, A., Asamoah, M., & Tripp, R. 
(2013). Patterns of Adoption of Improved Maize Technologies in Ghana. 
Ragasa, C., Lambrecht, I., & Kufoalor, D. S. (2018). Limitations of Contract Farming as a Pro-
poor Strategy: The Case of Maize Outgrower Schemes in Upper West Ghana. World 
Development, 102, 30–56. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2017.09.008 
Raynolds, L. T. (2002). Wages for wives: Renegotiating gender and production relations in 
contract farming in the Dominican Republic. World Development, 30(5), 783–798. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00008-6 
Rehber, E. (2000). Vertical Coordination in the Agro-Food Industry and Contract Farming: A 
Comparative Study of Turkey and the USA. In Food Marketing Policy Center. 
Rehber, E. (2007). Contract Farming: Theory and Practice (First). The Icfai University Press. 
Resnick, D. (2018). What Are the Impacts of Devolution on Agricultural Civil Servants and 
Services in Ghana? In Strategy Support Program | Policy Note (Vol. 14). Available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/devolution-revolution-implications-agricultural-service- 
[Accessed June 30, 2019] 
Reuters. (2019). UPDATE 1-Ghana company says it discovers 1.5 bln barrels of offshore oil. 
Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/ghana-oil/update-1-ghana-company-says-it-




Rockefeller (2019) Awareness: A Key to Reducing Post-Harvest Loss in Africa - The 
Rockefeller Foundation. Available at 
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/awareness-key-reducing-post-harvest/ 
[Accessed June 29, 2019] 
Rodgers, Y., & Akram-Lodhi, H. (2019). The Gender Gap in Agricultural Productivity: Five 
African Countries. [online] UN Women, UNDP, and UN Environment, pp.1-31. Available 
at: 
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/28383/CostGenderGap.pdf?sequen
ce=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 6 Feb. 2020]. 
Roy, E. P. (1963). Contract farming, U.S.A. Interstate Printers and Publishers.  
Royer, J. S. (1995). Potential for cooperative involvement in vertical coordination and value‐
added activities. Agribusiness, 11(5), 473–481. https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-
6297(199509/10)11:5<473::AID-AGR2720110510>3.0.CO;2-W 
Sachs, J. D. (2008). The African green revolution. In Scientific American (Vol. 298, Issue 5, p. 
42). Scientific American Inc. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0508-42 
Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2013). Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An 
Illustration from Nigeria. Journal of African Economies, 22(4), 570–615. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejs033 
Sanderson, S. (1985). The Americas in the new international division of labor. New York, N.Y.: 
Holmes & Meier. 
Sawicka, B. (2019). Post-harvest Losses of Agricultural Produce. Handbook of the 
Historiography of Biology, pp.1-16. 
Scherr, S., (1999). "Soil degradation: a threat to developing-country food security by 2020? 2020 
vision discussion papers 27, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Sheahan, M., Barrett, C., (2014). Understanding the agricultural input landscape in Sub-Saharan 
Africa : recent plot, household, and community-level evidence (English). Policy Research 
working paper ; no. WPS 7014. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/165341468002108906/Understanding-the-
agricultural-input-landscape-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-recent-plot-household-and-community-
level-evidence [Accessed September 2, 2019] 
Smalley, R. (2013). Plantations, Contract Farming and Commercial Farming Areas in Africa: A 
Comparative Review Land and Agricultural Commercialisation in Africa (LACA) project 





Snyder, K. A., Miththapala, S., Sommer, R., & Braslow, J. (2017). The Yield Gap: Closing the 
Gap by Widening the Approach. Experimental Agriculture, 53(3), 445–459. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0014479716000508 
Stearns, P. N. (2016). Globalization In World History. Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315561370 
Stiglitz, & J.E. (1985). Economics of information and the theory of economic development. 
Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 5(1). 
https://ideas.repec.org/a/sbe/breart/v5y1985i1a3129.html 
Sumberg, J. (2012). Mind the (yield) gap(s). Food Security, 4(4), 509–518. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-012-0213-0 
Sykuta, M. E., & Cook, M. L. (2001). A New Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts 
and Cooperatives. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.291189 
Tendall, D. M., Joerin, J., Kopainsky, B., Edwards, P., Shreck, A., Le, Q. B., Kruetli, P., Grant, 
M., & Six, J. (2015). Food system resilience: Defining the concept. In Global Food Security 
(Vol. 6, pp. 17–23). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2015.08.001 
Tonah, S. (2002). Fulani Pastoralists, Indigenous Farmers and the Contest for Land in Northern 
Ghana. Africa Spectrum, 37(1), 43–59. 
Tonah, S. (2006). Migration and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Ghana’s Volta Basin. In Source: 
Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines (Vol. 40, 
Issue 1). 
Tripp, R and Ragasa, C., (2015). Hybrid maize seed supply in Ghana. GSSP Working Paper 40. 
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/129746 
Tully, K., Sullivan, C., Weil, R., & Sanchez, P. (2015). The State of soil degradation in sub-
Saharan Africa: Baselines, trajectories, and solutions. In Sustainability (Switzerland) (Vol. 
7, Issue 6, pp. 6523–6552). MDPI AG. https://doi.org/10.3390/su7066523 
UNDP in Ghana. (2020). Increased Resilience to Climate Change in Northern Ghana through 
the Management of Water Resources and Diversification of Livelihoods. [online] Available 
at: 
https://www.gh.undp.org/content/ghana/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_ene
rgy/Adaptation_Fund_Project.html [Accessed 6 Feb. 2020]. 
UNESCO. (2020). Ghana | UNESCO UIS. Available at http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/gh 




United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2009). World Investment Report | 
World Investment Report 2009. https://worldinvestmentreport.unctad.org/wir2009/ 
USAID. (2017). Improving the Management of Agriculture Demonstration Sites in Food 
Security Programs A Practitioner’s Guide. 
USDA. (2018). Grain and Feed Update. Available at 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/commodities/grain-and-feed [Accessed January 25, 2020] 
van Gelderen, M., & Jansen, P. (2006). Autonomy as a start-up motive. Journal of Small 
Business and Enterprise Development, 13(1), 23–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14626000610645289 
van Ittersum, M., van Bussel, L., Wolf, J., Grassini, P., van Wart, J., Guilpart, N., Claessens, L., 
de Groot, H., Wiebe, K., Mason-D’Croz, D., Yang, H., Boogaard, H., van Oort, P., van 
Loon, M., Saito, K., Adimo, O., Adjei-Nsiah, S., Agali, A., Bala, A., Chikowo, R., Kaizzi, 
K., Kouressy, M., Makoi, J., Ouattara, K., Tesfaye, K. and Cassman, K. (2016). Can sub-
Saharan Africa feed itself?. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(52), 
pp.14964-14969. 
Wienco. (2010). The Masara N’Arziki Farmers Association . 
http://wienco.com/Site/subsidiaries.html [Accessed January 18 2020] 
Wisner, B. (1989). Power and need in Africa. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press. 
 World Bank. (2019). LSMS-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture | surveyunit. 
http://surveys.worldbank.org/lsms/programs/integrated-surveys-agriculture-ISA 
Wu, F., Groopman, J. D., & Pestka, J. J. (2014). Public Health Impacts of Foodborne 
Mycotoxins. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-food-030713-092431 
Wu, S. Y. (2014). Adapting contract theory to fit contract farming. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 96(5), 1241–1256. https://doi.org/Doi 10.1093/Ajae/Aau065 
Wuepper, D., & Sauer, J. (2015). Contributing to Contract Farming: Is Farmer Behavior 
Determined by the Past? Retrieved December 10, 2018, from http://www.bioecon-
network.org/pages/17th_2015/Wuepper.pdf 
Yahaya, A.-K., & Amoah, S. (2013). Bushfires in the Nandom District of the Upper West 
Region of Ghana : Perpetual Threat to Food Crop Production. Journal of Environment and 
Earth Science, 3, 10–14. 
Yembilah, R., & Grant, M. (2014). The political ecology of territoriality: territorialities in 
farmer–herder relationships in Northern Ghana. GeoJournal, 79(3), 385–400. 
